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INTRODUCTION:
THE ANSI SIT ION FROM
"COMMAND-OBEDIENCE"
TO CONSENT
American constitutional scholars have wrestled with the
legitimacy of judicial review for many years. Judicial review's
breadth of power raises the question whether in practice an
organ authorized by democratic republican mechanisms can
exercise such a degree of authority that the organ imposes legal
rules upon the community in what Hannah Arendt describes as
"a command-obedience relationship"' rather than in response
One
to the community (a democratic republican relati~nship).~

1. HANNAHAR~NDT,ON VIOLENCE39-41 (1970) (quoting ALEXANDERPASSERIN
D'ENTREVES,
THE NOTION
OF THE SFATE 129 (1967)).
2. Arendt contrasts "the Hebrew-Christian tradition and its 'imperative
conception of law' .... the result of a much earlier, almost automatic
generalization of God's 'Commandments,' according to which 'the simple relation of
command and obedience' indeed sufficed to identify the essence of law," id. a t 39
(citation omitted), with the Greek and Roman
concept of power and law whose essence did not rely on the commandobedience relationship . . . . It was to these examples that the men of
the eighteenth century revolutions turned when they . . . constituted a
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strain of American commentary concedes that the foundation of
judicial review, a t least in part, lies beyond democratic
republican theory. Those observers contend that the United
States Supreme Court's aura, adherence to higher law, and
other qualities induce the people to have a quasi-religious faith
in the authority of its opinions? At its foundation, "the model,
in whose image" such a system of constitutional law operates,
is the command-obedience relationship used by God a t Mt.
Sinai4 From the perspective of democratic republicanism, the
handing down of the Law a t Mt. Sinai constituted a violent
imposition, because there was an absence of prior communal
~onsent.~
form of government, a republic, where the rule of law, resting on the
power of the people, would put an end to the rule of man over man,
which they thought was a "government fit for slaves." They too,
unhappily, still talked about obedience . . . but what they meant was
support of the laws to which the citizenry had given its consent.
Id. at 40-41 (citations omitted).
3.
For discussions of the mystic function of the Supreme Court, see
BRANCH
(1962); CHARLES
L. BLACK,
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,THE LEASTDANGEROUS
JR., THE PEOPLEAND THE COURT(1960); Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy,
and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20
STAN.L. REV. 169 (1968).
Those who do not justify the authority of judicial review by its responsiveness
to the community do not necessarily base judicial review's authority on the
Supreme Court's mystique. Many observers construct rationales such as the Courts
reasonableness, morality, and political philosophy. Faith in judicial review based on
the Court's responsiveness to precedent could fall into any of those latter three
157 & 11.32 (1965)
categories. See also HANNAHARENDT,O N REVOLUTION
(embracing natural law justifications for constitutional law and judicial review,
while dismissing arguments for "supremacy [of] the Constitution . . . 'on the
ground solely of its rootage in popular will7") (quoting Edward S. Corwin, The
Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149,
152 (1928)).
4.
See ARENDT, supra note 3, at 189 (Even though the substance of the
American Constitution has Roman origins, the model of authority is "Hebrew in
origin and represented by the divine Commandments of the Decalogue."). The
substance of the Law handed down at Mt. Sinai is of a completely different
character than that of the new laws and constitutional amendments adopted in
Hungary. The Ten Commandments are rules of personal conduct, rather than rules
setting forth the structure of government. I use the analogy to highlight only the
issue of the source of the lawmaker's authority.
5.
The Israelites' first voluntary manifestation of consent to follow God's Law
occurred many years after the Exodus. This lack of a foundation for law in a
manifestation of communal consent is in accordance with the statement in the
Bible that the Jewish people must first follow the Law and only later make a
LEVINAS,NINE
decision whether to consent to the Law's authority. See EMMANUEL
TALMUDIC
READINGS
30, 31, 37 (1990). Levinas justifies the Biblical commandobedience relationship. He explains that prior consent requires indulgence in
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A competing school of thought (the "communal consensus"
school) avoids casting judicial review in a countermajoritarian
role. This school contends that the Court's opinions respond
directly to manifestations of the communal consensus, such as
the text of the Constitution and significant historical trends?
Both schools contend that constitutional restrictions upon a
democratic republican State are essential to the success of such
a State, but only the communal consensus school argues that
judicial revieds enforcement of those restrictions is founded
upon the democratic republican notion of prior consent.
Alexander Hamilton considered the substance of the
Constitution to have derived from the "reflection and choice" of
the people, rather than "accident and force."' Similarly, the

preconception, a form of knowledge which inevitably turns out to be false and
corrupt. Id. at 37, 48.
For Arendt, American constitutionalism and higher law in general are able to
avoid the role of "absolute despotic power," even though the checks of popular
consent are absent. The key is that the commands have origins in "divine
principle" rather than human principles. Divine principle restrains the leadership,
rather than permitting the leadership to exploit the command-obedience model for
evil ends. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 162, 182-85. It is yestionable though, how
American constitutionalism can have origins in divine principle, if there is an
amendment process without any apparent restrictions on the content of
amendments. Both the American Constitution and the Supreme Court are arguably
WE THE PEOPLE 14-15
manipulable by political forces. See BRUCEA. ACKERMAN,
(1991).
6 . See ACKERMAN,supra note 5; Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
PoZiticslConstitutional Law, 99 YALELJ. 453 (1989); cf. Michael W. McCorinell,
The Role of Democratic Politics in lYansforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98
YALELJ. 1501 (1989) (book review). On the societal roots of constitutional law
generally, as opposed to constitutional caselaw exclusively, see G r i 5 , Bringing the
State into Constitutional Theory: Public Authority and the Constitution, 16 LAWAND
SOCIAL INQUIRY 659, 674-75, 704 (1991) (analyzing societal roots of constitutional
developments and arguing for structural reforms to permit a greater role for the
influence of democratic public authority upon constitutional law).
7.
RIE FEDERALIST
NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
Nor is the Constitution thoroughly democratic; indeed it was specifically
designed to avoid the pitfalls of unbridled democracy, especially the
dangers to individual rights. But this was accomplished without
introduction of aristocratic or monarchical elements; all authority stems,
even if indirectly, fi.om the choice of the people. The constitutional scheme
was designed and defended as "a republican remedy for the diseases most
incident to republican government."

....

In Madison's words, "the people are the only legitimate fountain of power,
and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the
several branches of government hold their power, is derived." One of the
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communal consensus school views judicial review as a
mechanism enabling basic principles, which the majority of the
community shares, to flourish and avoid subordination to the
vagaries of the legislative process. Indeed, this Article's
discussion of the recent history of constitutionalism in Eastern
Europe shows that an elected legislature may neglect a
community's fundamental, shared principles due to insdfkient
insight into an enactment's ramifications and as a result of
special interest politics.
Whether constitutional law and judicial review operate
through a command-obedience model or a communal consensus
model is a particularly sensitive issue in the nations emerging
from communism. The rhetoric of the historic days of change in
Eastern Europe over the past two years has echoed with cries
for the abandonment of the Mt. Sinai-type pretenses which
characterized the forceful imposition of legal rules under
communism. Now the question arises: Is a constitutional court
simply a new pol it bur^?^ This Article will discuss the nature of
judicial review in Eastern Europe and whether it functions in
response to the community or imposes upon the ~ommunity.~

proudest claims of the American people is that they were the first to
adopt a form of government "from reflection and choice," instead of
"accident and force."
McCo~ell, supra note 6, at 1523, 1527 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NOS. 1
(Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 10, 49 (James Madison)) (emphasis added).
8. The same question could be posed with regard to the exercise of authority
by a directly elected legislature. An election process is no guarantee of actual
representation of the electorate's will. See Robert Bernasconi, Rousseau and The
Supplement to the Social Ccmtract, 11 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1539 (1990). And
representation has not necessarily failed if the representatives exercise a
deliberative function-i.e., they legislate based upon their own personal beliefs. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue, in
CONS~ITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstaad eds., 1988). It
is conceivable that the electorate prefers to have its representatives legislate in
accordance with their own deliberations.
But the potential failure of representation is more pressing with regard to
constitutional interpretation by a judicial body for three reasons: (1) the probability
of responsiveness to the community is lower where the members of a court are not
directly elected; (2) the interpretation of abstract constitutional terminology is
prone to a variety of legal realist influences, many of which may lead to the
espousal of viewpoints that conflict with the communal consensus; (3) a court's
interpretation of a constitution's meaning limits the legislative activity of directly
elected representatives and tends to have wide-ranging consequences.
9.
The decision of a democratic republican institution does not "impose" on
those who adhere to a minority point of view, because the minority has given its
"consent to the procedures by which that decision was reached and even bind
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This inquiry requires examination of (1) the formal extent of
the power of judicial review and (2) the substantive theories
underlying opinions. This Article will identify and analyze both
those factors which determine the extent of judicial review's
formal power and those substantive constitutional issues
critical to a new regime. The particular focus of the Article is
the exercise of judicial review in Hungary by the recently
formed Constitutional Court; but the analyses require insights
into other systems of judicial review and the transitional
experiences of other post-communist countries, post-World War
I1 Europe, the United States, and other former colonies.
Part I provides a brief overview of the democratic
foundations of the new Hungarian governmental structure.
Part I1 shifts the focus to the Constitutional Court's prominent
role in the new Hungary. ARer a summary of the Court's
organizational structure, Part I1 analyzes the formal elements
that determine the extent of the Court's power. The Court
possesses jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions and to engage
in review of legal rules before and after enactment. Recent
decisions set forth ripeness requirements; however, the burdens
on the Court remain heavy. The Court's vision of itself as a
supreme interpreter rather than as a dispute resolver results
in broad opinions and in the virtual absence of mootness
standards. In addition, recent cases show how the prevalence of
unconstitutional institutions left over from the prior regime,
the lack of federalism, and the pervasiveness of State action
enhance the responsibilities of the Court. Furthermore, due to
a June 1990 constitutional amendment, the Court has greater
authority than Parliament to determine the scope of
constitutional rights. Finally, the Court has escalated its own
authority by its reliance in recent opinions on an "invisible
Constitution" and Western legal standards.
Part 111 sheds light on the substance of the Court's work
through examination of the legal theories and policies
underlying the Land Act Case I-a controversial and complex
decision. This recent case challenged the constitutionality of
proposals to provide compensation for property confiscated
under the communist nationalization laws. The case presented

themselves indirectly to abide by whatever outcome the accepted procedure
produces." Stephen Holmes, G a g - d s or the Politics of Omission, in
CON~~~~UTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY,
supra note 8, at 19, 35.
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delicate issues of retroactive justice, property rights, and equal
protection. After an examination of the case's political and
philosophical background, Part I11 analyzes the holdings and
identifies the polices and constitutional theories endorsed by
the Court.
Part IV uses the insights of Parts I1 and 111 to address the
issue of whether the Constitutional Court functions in
accordance with the democratic republican notion of
government by consent. At the present time, whether the
Constitutional Court's authority responds to communal ideals
is not clear.1° This Article takes some initial steps toward
resolving the issue. Part IV proposes two normative categories
for analysis of the relationship between the form and substance
of judicial review and the Hungarian populace. If the Court's
authority is the product of communal consent, then it should
respond to: (1)communal expectations of the nature of judicial
precedents and the adjudicatory process, and (2) the popular
ideals of the rendszervaltozas," the social movement that
underlies the creation of the Constitution. Part WS
examination of these two categories supports the contention
that communal roots underlie the form and substance of the
Court's work. Despite this apparent foundation, uncertainty
exists as to whether the Court will remain a politically effective
organ. Part V explains how recent developments in the
relationship between the Court, Parliament, and the populace
have given rise to this uncertainty.

The election of a Hungarian Parliament in March 1990
was an important step toward fulfilling the democratic

10. Hungarian Sociologist Andrds Boz6ki wrote in September 1990, "One can
only answer the question whether the new Constitution and system of public law
correspond to the political and legal culture of the country after several years of
tested experience." Andrds Boz6ki, Political Travition a d Constitutional Change in
EUROPA538, 549 (1990).
Hungary, 39 S~DOST
11. Rendszerualtozas means literally "change of regime." Hungarians use the
term to describe the great "change" from Communist Party control. The word
rendszervaltas is often preferred. The difference is that rencEszerva1toza.s implies
that the change occurred passively, while redszervaltas implies an active subject
behind the change. By choosing the passive form, I do not intend to make an
implication about the nature of the change.
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republican goal of the rendszervaltozas (change of regime). This
representative body assumed broad legislative power over State
activities as well as control over the selection and affairs of
both the Council of Ministers and the President.12
The authority of the elected Parliament also superseded
that of'the Civil Code and the judicial bodies which resolve
non-constitutional issues. The rendszervaltozas did not revoke
the Civil Code as the source of private law, but the newly
elected Parliament possessed the authority to revise the Code.
The judiciary also remained intact following t h e
rend~zervaltozas.'~
However, the rule-making authority of the
courts is limited in comparison with that of the elected
Parliament. Hungarian courts primarily apply the Civil Code
and the enactments of Parliament rather than develop a
common law. Judicially created legal rules have precedential
authority only when issued by the Supreme Court-the court of
final appeal in Code and statutory matters-in response to an
issue without a pertinent code or statutory provision."

12. The structure of the Hungarian government is essentially parliamentary and
derived from the West German model. The single house of Parliament elects the
Council of Ministers and the President. The President is a figurehead with limited
powers to act independently of either the Parliament or the Council of Ministers.
The President independently can petition the Constitutional Court for review of a
bill before its passage or for an interpretation of the Constitution, appoint the
President of the National Bank when the prime minister co-signs, set the dates for
elections, and initiate referenda. He is also the commander-in-chief of the armed
KOZTARSASAGALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. 111, art. 29(2)
forces. See A MAGYAR
(Hung.).
Recently President Arpad Goncz has used the formal requirements that he sign
all legislation and approve certain appointments to expand the President's scope of
influence and limit the Democratic Forum's (MDF) domination. For example,
President Goncz, who is a member of the opposition's Alliance of Free Democrats
(SZDSZ), withheld his signature and thereby attempted to veto the MDF Prime
Minister's appointments to the leadership of the Hungarian equivalent of the
Federal Communications Commission. Goncz's refusal to sign parliamentary
enactments prevented the enforcement of the Zetenyi Act (permitting prosecutions
for murder and treason co~nmittedover the last 45 years under the auspices of
communism) and a statute providing for compensation for property lost to
nationalization. A Constitutional Court decision in September 1991 held that the
President's power over the armed forces and the political appointment process is
subordinate to the authority of the Prime Minister.
13. Hungary has a single judicial system consisting of specialized courts, lower
courts of general jurisdiction, appellate courts, and the court of final appeal in nonconstitutional matters, the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court commenced
operation in 1990 and is discussed at length herein.
14. For a more detailed explanation of the siwcant
differences between the
legal cultures created by the Anglo-American common law tradition and the
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A factor potentially more important than the elected
Parliament in Hungary's transition is the Constitution. The
present Hungarian Constitution is the product of meetings,
from June 13, 1989 through September 18, 1989, between the
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (the communists) and the
Opposition Roundtable, the collective leadership of the
opposition parties? Those meetings developed amendments
to the 1949 Stalinist Constitution.
The amended Constitution sets forth limits on State power.
In particular, the document outlines restrictions on emergency
power and provides for the guarantee of rights to property,
education, a healthy environment, due process safeguards,
equal protection, asylum, privacy, participation in elections,
religious freedom, free expression, and other basic liberties.
The Constitution also authorizes the creation of a new
independent judicial body, known as the Constitutional Court,
to enforce constitutional restrictions.
Whether the framers of the amended Constitution acted
with the consent of the community, in accordance with
republican theory, is questionable. The communist Parliament
was the product of elections held prior to the legalization of the
opposition parties. Those who formally approved the amended
Constitution had appeared to be complying with Moscow's
dictates a short time earlier. Furthermore, the opposition
groups who were present at the negotiations were primarily
Hungarian Civil Code tradition, see infizc part IVA.
The judges on the aforementioned courts are appointed by the President of the
Republic, with the exception of the President of the Supreme Court, whom the
President nominates and the Parliament elects. The length of time in office is
subject to the specific judiciary act covering the particular judgeship. There are no
constitutionally guaranteed appointments for life.
15.
A third group, made up of leaders of non-governmental organizations
authorized by the communist party, also participated in these meetings. The
meetings concerned not only the amendment of the Constitution, but also the law
on political parties, the electoral law, the penal law, information policy, and
safeguards for a non-violent transition.
The negotiations operated on the premise that all agreements must be the
product of the consensus of all participating parties. The Alliance of Free
Democrats (SZDSZ) and the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) of the
Opposition Roundtable did not endorse the results of the meetings, but those
members also withdrew their power to veto unilaterally the final agreement. The
issue which inspired these withdrawals was the timing of the election of the
President. The dissenters wanted parliamentary elections to precede the election of
the President. The dissenters eventually got their way as the result of a
referendum in November 1989.
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anti-communist associations. Many of their leaders had risen to
prominence through courageous endorsements of slogans like
free expression and human rights; but the leaders had never
presented particularized outlines for a new government t o the
populace for approval.l6
16. Furthermore, "[tlhe public was almost completely locked out of these talks
behind the scenes." An&&
Boz6ki, Hungary's Road to Systemic Change: The
Opposition Roundtable 18 (Jtizsef Btirticz trans., June 1991) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Brigham Young University Law Review).
Another reason for hesitancy to accept the legitimacy of the amended
Constitution is that the opposition parties originally opposed putting constitutional
reform on the agenda for the transition negotiations. The Opposition Roundtable
only wanted to work out the basic issues necessary for a transition to
democracy-free
expression and multi-party elections-and
then leave the
development of the future to the democratically elected representatives. The
communists insisted on putting constitutional reform on the agenda, because they
thought that they could entrench socialism in the Constitution and ensure the
perpetuation of socialism through the Constitutional Court. See Boz6ki, supra note
10, at 541, 543. The communist strategy failed, as the Opposition Roundtable
insisted on a nearly complete replacement of the text of the Stalinist Constitution.
The only concession to the Socialists was a meaningless reference in the Preamble
to the "equal standing" of "democratic socialism" and "bourgeois democracy." The
freely elected Parliament has subsequently repealed that portion of the Preamble.
Nevertheless, cynicism still exists toward the legitimacy of the present
Constitution. Professor Andrtis Stijo's account of the adoption of the October 1989
amendments gives little weight to the negotiations between the Opposition
Roundtable and the communists as legitimating the amendments:
After only three hours of [parliamentary] "debate" the Hungarian
Constitution was reshaped in October 1989. After the sudden collapse of
the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist) Party, it was believed by
Government and opposition elite alike that only quick codification could
safeguard the compromise achieved at the round table talks between
communists and the opposition.

....

. . . [Tlhis

was an ill-fated point of departure for a system which
was aimed to serve as a transition to the Rechtsstaat . . . .
.

....

As a matter of fact, the new Constitution was born from a lie as it
was declared to be an amendment only. The Parliament wanted to avoid
the public referendum which was required for a new constitution.
Andrb Stijo, The New Legalism: Law as an Instrument of Social Transformation
10-11 (June 18, 1990) (unpublished paper on file with the Brigham Young
UniversiQ Law Review) (delivered at American Council of Learned Societies
Conference on Constitutionalism and Transition to Democracy, Phs) (footnotes
omitted).
A week before the Opposition Roundtable negotiations on constitutional reform
commenced, J h o s Kis, the leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and a
well-known dissident philosopher, published an article stating that the transition is
"not [the product of'j a mass movement" and that all of the "parties have not yet
proved that they represent the masses." J h o s Kis, Not With Them, Not Without
Us, UNCAPTIVE
MINDS,
Aug.-Oct. 1989, at 33-34 (translation of article originally
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However, the fact that the October 1989 Constitution is not
the product of a formal republican mechanism is no reason to
dismiss Hungarian constitutional law as failing to embody a
communal consensus. Although not elected, the framers were
still subject to the influence of popular sentiments. Moreover,
they were aware that they would soon be subject to popular
scrutiny in elections following the adoption of the democratic
Constitution.
Furthermore, the amended Constitution granted the
elected Parliament the power to adopt both amendments and
an entirely new Constitution by the simple process of a twothirds majority vote. Thus far, the elected Parliament has
amended the Constitution on six occasions, but does not appear
t o be planning to adopt a new Constitution in the immediate
future. Most of the amendments are procedural in nature and
simply add detail to or delete detail from the basic ideas of the
framers.'' The elected Parliament's failure t o modify the basic
published in the official weekly HETI VILAGGAZDAS~G
on June 10, 1989).
However, Kis7s skepticism about the legitimacy of the Roundtable negotiation's
workproduct diminished after his SZDSZ attained a victory in a November 1989
referendum initiative to modify the presidential election provisions. Shortly after
the referendum results were made public, Kis wrote:
The referendum not only corrected the shortcomings of the 'triangular
table7negotiations, but more importantly, put the seal of popular approval
on these negotiations. After September 18, [I989 -when the negotiations
concluded-] it was still debatable whether the agreement was based on a
national consensus. But, as modified and endorsed by the referendum, it
can no longer be questioned.
MINDS, Jan-Feb. 1990, at 40
Janos Kis, The Message of the 'Four Yeses,' UNCAPFIVE
(translation of article originally published in MAGYARN
on Dec. 12, 1989). I
question the sincerity of Kis's sudden shift from skepticism to complete faith in the
Constitution's democratic legitimacy. Kis wrote the Tour Yeses" article in the midst
of an election campaign. The viewpoint endorsed by Kids SZDSZ had just emerged
victorious in the referendum vote. Kis's attribution of monumental signiscame to
the referendum results was in his party's political interest because it signalled
momentum for SZDSZ. Actually, the referendum won by only a narrow margin
with a voter turnout of not much more than 50 percent. In addition, the
referendum was on only one major issue.
17. The only major amendment, for purposes of this Article, modified the
relationship between the Constitutional Court and Parliament. See infrcs part 1I.F
(discussing Article 8). Other amendments have (1) added the requirement that the
parliamentary committee in charge of nominating Constitutional Court Judges shall
contain one member of each party represented in Parliament; (2) added a
description of the national coat of arms symbol; (3) elaborated on the provisions for
municipal governments without conflicting with the original pmvisions on local
authority; (4) repealed the requirement of a two-thirds vote to enact a law
affecting the scope of State economic activity and the right to engage in free
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ideas approved in October 1989, despite the easily accessible
amendment and replacement processes, is in part due t o the
plethora of pressing non-constitutional issues, especially in the
realm of financial and economic matters.18
Nevertheless, the elected Parliament's general lack of
interference with the work of the framers is an indication that
despite their nondemocratic origins, the October 1989
amendments are consistent with the communal consensus.
Whether the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the
Constitution is founded upon a democratic republican
relationship with the populace is a more complex issue. To
resolve that issue, analyses of the formal extent of the Court's
power and the substantive theories underlying opinions are
necessary. After a short overview of the Court's organizational
structure, Part I1 takes on the first of those tasks.
ELEMENTS
OF THE STRUCTURE
OF THE
11. FORMAL
CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT'S INTERPRETIVE
AUTHORITY

A. Organization of the Court
The Constitutional Court currently consists of ten Judges.
Commencing in 1995, there will be fifteen Judges. The communist Parliament elected the first five Judges following the October 23, 1989 revision of the Constitution. Those Judges took
office on January 1, 1990. The freely elected Parliament appointed five more Judges. The Parliament of 1995 will elect an
additional five Judges.lg The terms are nine years and a
enterprise; and (5) made it more difficult to dissolve Parliament and implement a
vote of non-confidence in the Prime Minister and his cabinet.
18. The parliamentary process is also rather lethargic and distracted. For
instance, legislators spent two weeks in March 1991 debating which day should be
the official national holiday.
19. The elected Parliament also elected a sixth Judge to replace one of the
original five, who resigned to become Chief Justice of the Hungarian Supreme
Court, the court of final appeal in nonconstitutional matters.
The Act on the Constitutional Court (ACC), No. XXXII (1989) (on file with the
Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter ACC], enacted by the communist Parliament shortly after the October 23, 1989 overhaul of the Constitution,
provides for the number of judges and their mode of appointment.
The ACC staggers the initial appointments to minimize the influence of any
single Parliament. However, the short time period between the election of Judges
by the communist Parliament and the h l y elected Parliament flaws this attempt.
Barring any discontinuities in membership over the next nine years, the Parliament in power in 1999 wiU have power over the election of ten positions on the
Court.
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Judge may be re-elected once. Only the Constitutional Court
can impeach its members."
Parliament elects and re-elects Constitutional Court Judges after they have been nominated by a committee composed of
one member of each party with a seat in Parliament.21The reelection provisions have the potential to influence a Judge;
however, the re-nomination process decreases the likelihood
that Judges interested in re-election will be responsive solely t o
the particular views of the ruling parliamentary coalition.
While in office, Constitutional Court Judges cannot engage
in political activity, join a political party, hold an office in a
corporate enterprise, or earn money from an activity unrelated
to the arts, science, or education.22The President of the Court
receives the same salary as the Prime Minister of the Republic
and the other Constitutional Court Judges receive the same
~ ~addition, the Judges resalary as the other M i n i ~ t e r s .In
ceive the same immunities as members of Parliament."
Currently, the Court's decisionmaking process rarely takes
place with the benefit of oral presentations. In a report on the
Court's activities, the President of the Court remarked that the
few public sessions which the Court has held impeded efficiency and were unnecessary in light of the statutory prohibition
'
against the collection of factual evidence by the C ~ u r t . ~The
Court has not made a public appearance since October 24,
1990, when the Court heard oral argument on one'case and
then immediately issued an opinion which had been prepared

.

20.
Id. at ch. 11, 6 15.
21.
A MAGYARKOZTARSASAG ALKoTMANYA [Constitution] ch. IV, art. 32/A(4)
(Hung.).
Candidates for Constitutional Court judgeships must be "outstanding theoretical
legal experts, university professors, Dodors of Political Science and Law, or jurists
having at least twenty years of experience practicing law." ACC, supra note 19, ch.
11, 6 5(2).
A Judge also must be between 45 years and 70 years of age at the time of
appointment. Candidates cannot have been a political party employee or have held
public office in the four years prior to their nomination. Id. ch. 11, 8 5(1), (2).
22.
ACC, supra note 19, ch. 11, 6 9.
23.
Id. ch. 11, 6 13. The role of the President of the Court is akin to that of
the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
24.
Id. ch. II, 8 14(1).
25.
See Lbsz16 Sdyom, President's Report on the First Year of the Constitutional Court 10-11 (Feb. 10, 1991) (unofficial translation on file with the Brighum
Young University Law Review). The President of the Court issued the Report at his
own discretion and for the benefit of the other members of the Court. He is not
under a duty to report to the other branches.
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bef~rehand.~~
The opinions themselves emphasize the Court's unity. The
voting is not anonymous; dissents and concurrences are permitted. However, an "Opinion of the Court" signed by all of the
participating Judges, including the dissenters, always prefaces
a decision. The Court's rules do not allow "concurrences in the
judgment only," although it is possible to detect that point of
view by comparing the substance of a concurrence with the
opinion of the Court. The Court has yet to deliver a plurality
opinion. In a report to the other members of the Court, the
President of the Court referred to the possibility of a plurality
opinion as "~nthinkable."~'

B. Jurisdiction
The foundation of the Constitutional Court's authority to
interpret the Constitution is the set of rules embodied in the
Constitution and in the Act on the Constitutional Court
(ACC),28 enacted by the communist Parliament shortly after
the October 23, 1989 overhaul of the Constitution. Article 32lA
of the Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court
"shall review the constitutionality of legal rules and shall perform the tasks assigned to it by law." The ACC sets forth three
major areas of activity for the Court: (1) review of proposed
legislation and regulations for constitutional infirmities, (2)
interpretation of the meaning of constitutional provisions (advisory opinions):' and (3) review of enacted legislation and reg-

Id. at 6.
Id. at 19.
28.
ACC, supra note 19.
29. In American legal jargon, the following characteristics of judicial opinions
are among those which prompt the appellation of a judicial decision as an "advisory opinion": (1) when the allegations do not satisfy either jurisdictional requirements, such as the condition of "a case or a controversy," or justiciability standards, such as the "direct injury to a legal rightn rule of standing; (2) when the
Constitution has committed resolution of the issue to another court or to a nonjudicial branch. See generally Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410-14 n.
THE FEDERALCOURTS AND
(1792); PAULM. BATORET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERALSYSI'EM 67-72 (3d ed. 1988). Under the standards of the first characterization, all cases before the Constitutional Court, except those brought on by
allegations of an injury resulting h m a constitutional violation, constitute advisory
opinions. Under the second characterization, there is no category of advisory
opinions among the three listed areas of judicial review, because the Constitutional
Court's decisions are constitutionally authorized as final and binding.
Herein, the decisions in response to petitions for interpretation of the meaning
26.

27.
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ulations, as well as actions and omissions, for constitutional
infirmities. The ACC also authorizes the Court to decide issues
of conformity with international treaties and to resolve conflicts
over the scope of authority between national organs, between
local organs, and between national and local organs.
Only members of government, specified by the ACC, can
file petitions for advisory opinions and for the review of laws
before their passage." Anyone, however, including individuals
who wish to remain anonymous, can file petitions for review of
enacted laws, actions, or omissions. Among those who are specifically authorized by the ACC to file petitions for the review
of enacted laws and regulations are lower court judges and litigants before lower courts, who "consider unconstitutional a
legal rule . . . which helshe [the lower court judge] should apply."31 Article 38 of the ACC provides that litigants and lower
court judges may initiate an interlocutory appeal to have their
constitutional concerns resolved by the Constitutional Court.
An Article 38 appeal stays the lower court proceedings while
the Constitutional Court decides the constitutional issue. Under Article 38, the constitutional Court is the sole body entitled t o engage in judicial review.
In addition, the duty of the Constitutional Court is to issue
determinations on constitutional grounds. Unlike the United
States Supreme Court, the Court has never avoided a delicate
constitutional decision by resolution of the case on statutory or
evidentiary grounds.32However, lower courts in Hungary may
attempt to resolve cases involving constitutional questions on

of constitutional provisions will be termed "advisory opinions." At its most specific,
such a decision constitutes commentary directed toward a particular debate.
30.
Petitions for pre-enactment review can be filed by Parliament, a parliamentary committee, fifty members of Parliament, the President, or the Council of
Ministers. ACC, supra note 19, ch. IV, $0 33, 35-36. Petitions for interpretation of
a constitutional provision can be filed by Parliament, a parliamentary committee,
the President, any Minister, the President of the State Audit Office, the President
of the Supreme Court, or the Chief Prosecutor. Id. ch. IV, $ 51. These limits on
petitioners, emanating from the ACC, conflict with the constitutional requirement
that proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Court "may be initiated by anyone."
A MAGYARKC~ZTARSASAG
ALKOTMANYA[Constitution] ch. IV, art. 32/A(3) (Hung.).
31.
ACC, supm note 19, ch. IV, 8 38(1).
32. See generally Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (Constitutional issue should only be reached if case cannot be resolved
on other grounds.); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 US. 157, 173-74 (1961) (Supreme
Court avoided ruling on constitutionality of lunch counter segregation law by
holding that there is insufficient evidence for the convictions.).
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nonconstitutional grounds. Article 48 of the ACC seems to presuppose that lower courts will act in this manner and thereby
lessen the Constitutional Court's burdens. Article 48 requires
litigants, who allege that their constitutional rights were violated, to exhaust remedies in lower courts before bringing a complaint in the Constitutional Court. However, Article 38's authorization of litigants and judges to file interlocutory appeals undercuts the likelihood that the Article 48 exhaustion requirement will effectively restrict the Constitutional Court's caseload. Indeed, the shift of decisionmaking burdens under Article
38 functions as an incentive for lower courts to encourage cases
t o be resolved on constitutional grounds by the Constitutional
Court.

C. Justiciability
The ACC's broad grants of jurisdiction are fashioned as
mandates upon the Court. The ACC only permits the Court to
deny "an obviously unfounded" petition. In the future, however,
the Court may attain an element of discretion over its jurisdiction through a modification of the ACC by Parliament. In a
move reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court's efforts
to persuade Congress t o include certiorari provisions in the
Judiciary Act of 1925, the President of the Constitutional Court
has informed the Prime Minister of the Court's large caseload
As of
and need for a degree of discretionary jurisdicti~n.~~
May 31, 1991, 2,981 petitions had been submitted to the Court
~ the present, the Court
and 630 remained ~ n a d d r e s s e d .For
has managed the large caseload by deriving certain limitations

33.
Cf S6lyoq supra note 25, at 12-16. The certiorari provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1925 did not permit the unfettered discretion pre'sent under the current
system in force in the United States, although they did enable the Supreme Court
to assume greater control over its docket. Compare Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229,
5 239, 43 Stat. 936, 938 with 28 U.S.C. 5 1254 (1988).
34.
Most decisions are short written opinions. A panel of only three Judges
addresses cases challenging ministerial regulations; a panel of all ten Judges
addresses all other cases. As of May 31, 1991, only 63 decisions had been published in the official gazette, Magyar Kazliny. All decisions declaring an act,
regulation or proposal unconstitutional are published and usually include a several
page opinion. The Court had received 3,097 petitions by July 1991 (1,572 petitions
in the first seven months of 1991). The Court has invalidated laws and regulations
47 times. The Court ruled in 235 cases in 1990 and in over 300 cases in 1991. E.
Oltay, "The Post-Communist Judiciary," Report on Eastern Europe (Oct. 1, 1991)
(published by the Radio Free Eumpe/Radio Liberty Research Institute).
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on justiciability from the ACC.
I . Advisory opinions: "Distinct application" requirement
The Court has attempted to develop from the ACC a
ground for deciding whether to deny the justiciability of advisory opinion petitions. ACC Article 22(2) provides: "[Tlhe petition
shall include a distinct application." In The Rabar Case,s5the
Court interpreted Article 22(2) to require the rejection of Finance Minister Rabar's petition for an explanation of the scope
of welfare rights under the Constitution. The Finance Minister
had submitted the petition for assistance in developing several
ambiguous ideas for drafts of a bill.36 The Court's scrutiny
revealed that the Minister's ideas were subject to future development in a variety of directions, each of which presented different constitutional questions. Accordingly, the Court held
that the Minister's embryonic ideas did not constitute a "distinct application."
The Rabar Case standard diminishes certain problems that
accompany advisory opinion jurisdiction. The Finance Minister
had petitioned the Court to select one of several ideas and then
to provide instructions on how to develop that idea into a bill
that satisfies constitutional standards. If the Court had helped
to refine cmde ideas into legislative proposals, it would have
infringed upon the duties of Parliament and the Ministers. The
Court noted that its involvement a t such an early stage of the
legislative process would "inevitably result in the Constitutional Court taking over the responsibility of the legislative and
even the executive power and thereby creating some sort of
government by the Constitutional Court, which is grossly opposite to the State organizational principles specified in the Constit~tion."~'Moreover, the requested advisory opinion would
have eviscerated the Minister's responsibility to consider independently the constitutionality of his legislative proposals.38
35.
Judgment of Dec. 18, 1990 (The Rabar Case), Akotm&nybiros@ Hatbzatai
[Constitutional Law Court], 199W128 MK. 136 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file
with the Brigham Young University Law Review; all pinpoint citations to this case
which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on file with the Brighum
Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Rabar Case].
36.
The Finance Minister's ideas concerned the National Savings Bank's increase in mortgage rates, which was the subject of several future decisions. See
infra part II.E.2.b.
37.
The Rabar Case, supra note 35, at 4.
38.
See id. at 3 ("the legislative and the executive organs also interpret the
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The absence of a "distinct application" requirement would
subject the Court's resources to inefficient use. Review of the
many constitutional issues that emanate fiom an embryonic
idea would require the Court to analyze issues that may never
be considered seriously by the Ministry or Parliament. The
requirement that all petitions relate to a specific and concrete
problem also enables the Court to make its decisions more
narrow and fact specific. Such decisions appear to infringe less
upon the discretion of the political branches and are, therefore,
less likely to lead to political condemnation of the Court.
A standard for identification of sufficiently developed ideas
would facilitate the capacity of the "distinct application" requirement to bring about the aforementioned benefits. One
possible standard would set forth a requirement that the Parliament or the pertinent Ministry engage in debate to resolve
the constitutional issue prior to the submission of an advisory
opinion petition. The requisite debate would crystalize the
petition's "distinct application."
Currently the Court is considering a petition for an advisory opinion on the meaning of the clauses in the Constitution
pertaining t o environmental rights.3g The "distinct application" is simply the constitutionality of all future environmental
protection statutes t o be considered by Parliament. The Court's
response to this petition may provide an occasion for further
elaboration of the requirements for satisfying Article 22(2)'s
justiciability standard.

Constitution in the course of providing for their duties); cf BICKEL,szcpra note 3,
at 22 (quoting JAMES BRAD^ THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901)) ("The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function Ljudicial review], now
lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to
deaden its sense of moral responsibility.").
To encourage other branches to participate more actively in the process of
constitutional interpretation, the Court has requested various members of the
Council of Ministers and the Parliament, as well as the President of the Supreme
Court and the Chief Prosecutor, to submit amicus briefs or expert testimony on
advisory opinion petitions.
39.
"The Republic of Hungary shall recognize and enforce the right of all to a
healthy environment." A MAGYAR
KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA[Constitution] ch. I,
art. 18 (Hung.). "0 Persons living within the territory of the Republic of Hungary
shall have the right to physical and mental health care of the highest possible
standard." Id. ch. XII, art. 7Q/D (1)."(2) The Republic of Hungary shall realize that
right by organizing labour safety, health institutions and medical care, by ensuring
opportunities for physical exercise, as well as by protecting the artificial and
natural environment." Id. ch. XII, art. 704) (2).
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2. Pre-enactment review: Finality requirement
In April 1991, members of Parliament from the Alliance of
Free Democrats (SZDSZ) sought an advisory opinion on the
constitutionality of a legislative proposal to compensate former
owners of private property for losses caused by the communist
nationalization laws. The Constitutional Court denied jurisdiction. The opinion set forth a justiciability limitation on preenactment reviewo4OThe Court held that unless a bill was exempt from further modification, it was not ripe for pre-enactment review.
The effect of this holding is ambiguous. Bills become law
by a vote in Parliament and theoretically modification is possible until that vote occurs. Before the decision, the Deputy
Speaker of the Parliament, who desired the Court to review the
proposed bill, and the Minister of Justice, who opposed review,
testified before a closed session of the Court. The Court requested the expert testimony to understand at what stage a bill
can no longer be modified. The two experts disagreed. Whenever the Deputy Speaker would point to a final stage, the Minister would point out a way in which the bill could be subject to
further modification prior to enactment. Consequently, a t a
press conference following the Court's decision, a spokesman
for the Minister's Democratic Forum Party (MDF) asserted that
the MDF interprets the principles set forth by the Court's decision as requiring absolute finality, which would virtually eliminate the Court's power to review a bill prior to enactment.
The MDF statement may be overly enthusiastic. At the
time of the bill's submission to the Court for review, over 400
modifications to the bill had been proposed and were still
awaiting debate. Accordingly, rather than requiring the abso40.
Judgment of April 20, 1991 (The Land Act Case XI), Alkotm~ybirosPg
Hatttrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], - MK. - (Hung.) (unofficial translation
on file with the Brigham Young University Law Review; all pinpoint citations to
this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on file with the
Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Land Act Case In. The
Court's restraint in this case not only was a likely response to the Court's heavy
workload but also may have been a reaction to criticism of the Court's activism
and an attempt to have the issue of compensation defeated in the political arena.
For an analysis of the particular political circumstances surrounding the decision,
see Ethan Klingsberg, Hungary: l"he Constitutional Politics of Compensation, in 2
S O W AND EASTEUROPEAN
LAW 1 (June 1991) (published by the Parker School of
Foreign and Comparative Law at Columbia Law School); see also infm part V .
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lute unamendability of a bill, the Court's holding may still
allow pre-enactment review so long as there are no outstanding
modification proposals. If the holding does require absolute
finality, then pre-enactment review may virtually disappear.
Parliament would have to pass a bill and set a prospective date
for enforcement to enable the Court to review an enactment
before it comes into force. Currently the Spanish Parliament
utilizes such a post-enactrnentlpre-enforcementmechanism to
obtain review by its Constitutional Court. A major problem
with such a procedure, however, is the time pressure it puts on
the Constitutional Court to decide the constitutionality of an
enactment before the enforcement date arrives. Motions for
preliminary injunctions and for temporary restraining orders
require United States district courts to face similar pressure in
deciding complex constitutional issues in a short period of time.
However, the decision of a district judge is subject to extended
appellate processes, unlike the unappealable decision of the
Constitutional Court.
Even if the Spanish option were a practical alternative, the
ACC requires the Court to engage in pre-enactment review as
well as post-enactmenupre-enforcement review. Separate provisions of the ACC mandate jurisdiction over proposed bills and
over legislation that has been enacted but not yet come into
force!'
The MDF"s interpretation of the recent decision is unlikely to be correct, because it conflicts with the ACC provision
that "the Constitutional Court shall examine for unconstitutionality any contestable provision of a bill.ya2In contrast, an
interpretation of the opinion's justiciability standard as requiring the lack of any outstanding modification proposals would be
consistent with the ACC.

D. Beyond Dispute Resolution
Ironically, while the Court has indicated that it would like
to trim its ~aseload?~
it has taken certain steps toward expanding its jurisdiction. These steps and their ramifications,
which will be discussed in the two subsections that follow, can
be more frilly understood as part of the Constitutional Court's
41.
ACC,
42.
43.

Compare ACC, supra note 19, ch. IV, fj 33 (preenactment review) with
supra note 19, ch. IV, fj 35 (postenactment/preenforcement review).
Id. ch. IV, fj 33(1) (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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general trend toward minimizing the adversary nature of its
proceedings. The trend appears most blatantly in the marginal
role t o which the decisionmaking process often relegates the
petitioner. The President of the Court, Judge Lbsz16 Sblyom,
described a recent decision as exclusively the product of input
from "experts and friend^.^ Judge S6lyom continued, "It is
our business as to what sort of help we intend t o use to form
our p o ~ i t i o n . 'In
~ ~some decisions the petitioner's name is not
even listed?
The Constitutional Court's position that it is not bound by
the adversary constraints of a case is in part due t o the prescribed jurisdictional rules. Because anyone may bring a case
before the Court, many petitioners lack any personal stake in
the outcome. Advisory opinions and reviews of proposed legislation are also often non-adversary. In some cases, a request for
an advisory opinion or review of a proposed bill takes on an adversary character. For instance, parliamentary debate of an
issue prior to the submission of a petition can divide the political sphere into camps of conflicting constitutional interpretation. However, the more common advisory opinion or pre-enactment review is sparked by uncertainty as to "what the Constitution says about this issue," rather than by a marked disagreement about the Constitution's meaning?
I . Mootness
'

The Court's vision of itself as a supreme interpreter, rather
than a dispute resolver, affects mootness requirements as well
as the scope of its opinions. The Court's conception of mootness
permits the issuance of an opinion even though the petitioner
is no longer affected by resolution of the constitutional question. As long as the issue still has pertinence t o society, the
Court will issue an opinion." Moreover, the Court has ruled
that it will issue a type of declaratory judgment even if there is
no way t o remedy the alleged unconstitutional act or omission.
That view approximates the "case or controversy" conception
44.
See S6lyom, supra note 25, at 10 (commenting on The Death Penalty Case,
infra note 50, which held that capital punishment is a per se violation of the right
to human dignity).
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 15.
See supra part II.C.l (discussing The Rabar Case, supm note 35).
See S6lyom, supra note 25, at 30-32.
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endorsed by American law commentators who favor broad powers for federal courts.49
2. Scope of opinions

_

Another consequence of the absence of adversarial concerns
limiting the Court's authority is that opinions occasionally
extend far beyond the issue posed in the petition. One example
is The Death Penalty Case," an opinion declaring capital punishment to be a per se violation of the right to human dignity.
This decision includes a lengthy dissertation upholding the
constitutionality of self-defense provisions. The opinion does
not approach the constitutionality of self-defense as a peripheral issue, on which the Court's commentary would only constitute dictum.'' Instead, the separate section treats the selfdefense laws as if the petition had directly challenged their
validity. The petitioner, The League of Those Opposed to the
Death Penalty, had never challenged the self-defense laws in

49.
Compare Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (no justiciability if
no remedy available to plaintiff other than a declaratory judgment) with William
A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALEL J . 221, 280-81 (1988) (justiciable
controversy exists even if the sole remedy available is the issuance of declaratory
judgment).
The Constitutional Court set forth this latter principle when it held in m e
Land Act Case I, infia, that it would review the constitutionality of the communist
Parliament's nationalization laws, even though there would be no way to remedy
the nationalization laws' alleged unconstitutionality. The Court wrote:
The Constitutional Court notes that it is now examhhg the constitutionality of the different regulations on nationalization. The Constitutional
Court refers to . . . the provision that the annulment of a regulation of
law-as a principal rule-does not concern the legal relations and the
rights and obligations resulting therefrom that had come into existence
before the publication of the decision.
Judgment of Od. 4, 1990 (The Land Act Case I), AlkotmdnybirosBg Hatbzatai
[Constitutional Law Court], 199W98 MK. 73 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file
with the Brighum Young Unwersity Law Review; all pinpoint citations to this case
which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on file with the Brighum
Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Land Act Case I]. However, in its
decision on nationalization, the Court did not issue such a retroactive declaratory
judgment. See The Natiollalization Case, infra note 63.
50. Judgment of Oct. 31, 1990 (The Death Penalty Case), AlkotmanybirosBg
Hatkozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 19901107 MK. 88 (Hung.) (unofficial
translation on file with the Brigham Young Universie Law Review; all pinpoint
citations to this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on
file with the Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Death
Penalty Case].
51. See id. at 33-35 (S6lyom, Res., concurring).
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their papers.

E. Circumstantial Factors Contributing
to the Court's Authority
The role of the Constitutional Court in Hungary is also a
product of circumstances such as the large number of unconstitutional institutions left over from the prior regime, the lack of
federalism, and the pemasiveness of State action.
1. Widespread unconstitutionality and remedial mechanisms
A nation cannot effectively complete the change fkom central European communism to Western democratic republicanism in the same short period that it takes to adopt a new Constitution and to hold elections. Even a year and a half after the
rendszerualtozas (change of regime), many institutional remnants of the prior regime thrive. If the Constitutional Court
scrutinized every one of these remnants, it could probably declare many aspects of State activity in Hungary unconstitutional.
For example, the Court has declared the vast socialist
system of government agencies to violate the Constit~tion.~~
Another decision held unconstitutional the Act on Social Insurance, which is responsible for supporting all elderly and needy
H u n g a r i a n ~ The
. ~ ~ agencies were held to violate due process

52. Judgment of Dec. 22, 1990 (The Agency Case), Akotmhybiros6g
HatArozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 199W130 MK. 145 (Hung.) (unofficial
translation on file with the Brighum Young University Law Review; all pinpoint
citations to this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on
file with the Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Agency
Case].
53. Judgment of Apr. 27, 1990 (The Social Insurance Case), Alkotm6nybiros6g
HatArozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 1990137 MK. 50 (Hung.) (unofficial
translation on file with the Brigham Young University Law Review; all pinpoint
citations to this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on
file with the Brighum Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Social
Insurance Case].
Until the Constitutional Court decision in May 1991, the nationalization laws
still permitted the Minister of Construction to enlarge the list of nationalized
property. See Judgment of May 20, 1991 (The Nationalization Case),
AlkotmAnybiros6g Hatslrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], - MK. - (Hung.)
(unofficial translation on file with the Brighm Young University Law Review; all
pinpoint citations to this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the
case on fde with the Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The
Nationalization Case].
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because a system of administrative courts is not available to
review their decisions. The Act on Social Insurance contains
gender classifications that violate a constitutional provision
which mandates equal treatment of men and women?
Although the Court has declared major, longstanding institutions to be in conflict with recently adopted constitutional
standards, it has acted delicately in setting forth remedies.
Initially, the Court considered undertaking the responsibility of
rewriting all of the Social Insurance provisions to eliminate
gender di~tinctions.6~
However, in both The Agency Case and
The Social Insurance Case, the Court only held the legal rules
prospectively unconstitutional. The Agency Case and The Social
Insurance Case set deadlines for Parliament t o act t o remedy
the unconstitutional ~onditions.~~
Under these decisions, the
structures of the agency decisionmaking process and the Social
Insurance Ad are constitutional until the deadlines pass.
ACC Article 43(4) authorizes this concept of prospective
unconstitutionality. The ACC states that in the presence of "a
particularly important interest of legal security,"' the Court
can set a date in the future when a legal rule and its application become unconstitutional. The Court relied on Article 43(4)
t o avoid the chaos that would have resulted from orders enjoining the current decisionmaking processes of government agencies and the current operation of many provisions of the Act on
Social Insurance.
Reliance on Article 43(4) also increases the chances of
compliance by designating an opportunity for Parliament to fill
the gap that would be left by the invalidation of current laws.
Nevertheless, Parliament has been slow t o react to The Agency
Case. With reference to the lack of parliamentary progress

54.
A MAGYAR K~TZARSASAG
ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. XII, art. 66 (1)
(Hung.) ("The Republic of Hungary shall ensure the equality of men and women in
respect of every civil, political, economic, social and cultural right.").
S6lyom, supm note 25, at 17.
55.
56.
The Agency Case, supra note 52, issued on December 22, 1990, gave Parliament until January 31, 1991, to set up a system of administrative law consistent with due process. Provisionally, the Court ordered judicial bodies to review
individual disputes with administrative decisions. The Social Insumnce Case, supra
note 53, issued on April 27, 1990, gave Parliament until December 31, 1990 to
modify the Act on Social Insurance.
57.
ACC, supra note 19, ch. IV, 8 43(4). The term ''legal security" derives from
the German concept of Rechtssickerheit. Article 43(4) enables the Court to refrain
from upsetting established legal relations and expectations.
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toward creating administrative courts, the President of the
Court has written, "I wonder whether the legislators keep a
record of these deadline^.^' The use of Article 43(4) facilitates
the Court's efforts to force Parliament to reconstruct the country, but it remains to be seen whether Parliament is equal t o
the challenge. 2. Federalism and State action

One limit on the authority of the Constitutional Court is
certain. The authority of the Constitutional Court can be no
broader than the authority of the Constitution itself. This section discusses the effect in Hungary of two Western doctrinal
limits on the scope of constitutional law: federalism and State
action.
Federalism sets limits upon the authority of the national
law, including the Constitution,sg in deference t o local law.
State action doctrines limit the applicability of certain constitutional provisions, in deference to the rules of private law. In
Hungary, the laws governing transactions between private
individuals are in the Civil Code and parliamentary statutes.
Supreme Court decrees also fill in gaps in the Code and legislatiodO
Ultimately, the scope of the doctrines of federalism and
State action and their effects upon the scope of constitutional
law depend upon two factors: (1)the substance of constitutional
provisions and (2) the nature of the society. The first factor is
determined by whether the Constitution sets aside realms for
local law and private law autonomy and by the breadth of the
legal rules set forth in the Constitution. The second factor
depends upon the levels of development of regional governing
structures and of the private sector. The ensuing subsections
examine the role of the doctrines of federalism and of State
action in Hungary through reference to these two factors. A
third subsection analyzes the effect these doctrines have on the
58.
S6lyom, supra note 25, at 29. Parliament's failure to meet a deadline may
be due to the presence of other pressing concerns during this transitional period,
rather than a lack of respect for the Court. As discussed in the Part I, many complex financial and economic matters are before Parliament and the nature of
operations in Parliament has been slow and distracted.
59.
In Hungary there is only a national constitution. Accordingly, all references
to constitutional law are to national law.
60. See i&ra part IVA (comparing Civil Code and common law).
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Constitutional Court's approach to a case concerning abortion
regulations.
a. Federalism. Chapter M of the Hungarian Constitution
requires Parliament to divide the country into regions and t o
permit local governing bodies to "independently regulate and
administer the municipal &airsM1 of those regions. Chapter
M also requires the approval of two-thirds of Parliament for
passage of an act "restricting the fundamental rights of the
m~nicipalities.'~~
Parliament passed an act empowering local
governments pursuant t o Chapter M during the summer of
1990. The vague terms of the Act provide for the structure of
local governments and empower them t o pursue measures
directed toward ensuring the general welfare. Despite Chapter
M and the Act, the American idea of federalism-that certain
areas of lawmaking are more appropriately subject to the control of regional governments-has not yet appeared as a factor
in the Constitutional Court's d e ~ i s i o n s . ~ ~
Federalism is not functioning to limit the areas of the
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction because a realm of local
authority does not yet exist in practice. Elections of local officials began in the fall of 1990. However, financial factors have
hampered the authority of these officials. At the present time,
most of the funding for local activities originates in the nationA MAGYARKO~ZARSASAGALKOT'MANYA[Constitution] ch. M, art. 44/A(l)(a)
61.
(Hung.).
62. Id. ch. M, art. 441C.
63. A hint of federalism finally appeared in the Judgment of June 3, 1991 (The
Land Act Case III), Alkotmbnybiros@ Hatslrozatai [Constitutional Law Court],
199V59 MK. 1091 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file with the Brigham Young
Universi6y Law Review; all pinpoint citations to this case which follow refer to the
unofficial translation of the case on file with the Brigham Young University Law
Review) [hereinafter The Land Act Case IIT]. The Court held unconstitutional
Parliament's attempt to return property lost as a result of nationalization. See
infra parts 111 & V. One of the Court's reasons was that Chapter M denies Parliament the power to order the local governments to return property that the Act
on Local Governments designates as within local control. It is not yet clear, however, whether the holding implies that there are restrictions on the Constitutional
Court's power to restrid how the local governments dispose of their property.
There has been so little activity by local governments that the Court has had no
occasion to restrain itself ikom interfering with local organs. For statements of the
restrictions imposed on American constitutional case law resulting fiom the federalist tradition, see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (limiting school desegregation remedies for violation of federal equal protection clause due to deference to
local control over schools); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941) (federal courts should abstain from deciding constitutional cases premised on
difficult and unsettled interpretations of State law).
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a1 government. The significance of local law is further dwarfed
by the absence of regional constitutions and local judicial systems to interpret local rules. Most importantly, the prior regime eliminated remnants of local control over law enforcement
agencies, financial institutions, hospitals, welfare programs,
schools, and judicial systems." An additional indication of the
lack of importance of Hungary's new regional authorities was
the turnout of only 25 to 40 percent of eligible voters at most
local elections.
Hungary's centralized past may be responsible for the slow
start of the development of local government, but post-communist antipathy toward centralized control may yet come to hition. In contrast to Hungary's anti-centralization sentiments,
the United States experienced anti-regionalism some two hundred years ago upon the demise of the Articles of Confederation." Just as the new Hungary must now confront a long
history of centralized power, the new United States had to confront a tradition of State power. It took many years and several
transitional events (including a civil war, a New Deal, and a
civil rights movement) for the Union to overcome the remnants
of States' rights. Similarly, it may take many years and additional acts of near-revolutionary change for Hungary to rid
itself of centralized control.66
64.
During the eighteenth century, power in Hungary was primarily at the
county level. After World War I, the nation began a centralization trend which has
yet to cease. The future development of autonomous, regional universities may strengthen the desire of university towns to exert local authority. See Mbt4 Szab6, Was
There A Strategy? Hungary's Path To Democracy (June 25, 1991) (unpublished
paper presented at Convention of the Hungarian Sociological Association in Budapest, on file with the Brigham Young University Law Review).
Gdbor Demszky, the Mayor of Budapest, explains the lack of power on the local level. "A signiticant portion of the new political organizations find it very
diflicult to accept that they must share power, must curb it, that they cannot
decide issues single-handedly . . . . [Dlecades of ingrained behavior patterns must
be changed . . . ." Gdbor Demszky, Local Government Finding Its Way, BUDAPESF
WEEK,
Aug. 15-21, 1991, at 2 (Amy M6dly trans.). In particular, Mayor Demszky
notes, "It took fourteen months after the democratic parliamentary elections for
legislation to be enacted on the legal status of Budapest municipal governments. In
effect, their executive abilities were paralyzed to this extreme . . . ." Id.
65.
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776See GORDONS. WOOD,THE CREATION
1787, 474 (1969) (anti-regionalism of framers of United States Constitution).
66.
By "near-revolutionary," I do not imply an overthrow of the government but
a shift in direction such as the Civil War Amendments or the New Deal in the
United States. See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 458-59, 474. The so-called "Reagan
Revolution" was an attempt to dramatically transform the United States back into
a more decentralized system.
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Currently there is little indication of movement toward
regionalism in Hungary. The national government continues to
play a leading role in running the economy and in dealing with
the West to resolve domestic crises. Moreover, aside from the
vague language of Chapter IX,the Constitution provides the
national government and courts with authority over most subject matter.
b. State action. Two factors combine to expand the authority of constitutional law over life in Hungary: (1)the prevalence
of State action in society as a result of the nation's communist
history and (2) the ma& constitutional rules that limit State
actione6'
State action in Hungary is prevalent because the State
owns and manages the majority of property and enterprises.
Although privatization plans' have been enacted, the process
has been extremely slow thus far. On February 12, 1991, The
Washington Post reported that "only 130 out of 2,300 sellable
[sic] enterprises were privatized* in the last yead" An example of the failure to effectuate a quick sale of State property is
the fate of the First Hungary Fund.This group of foreign investors arrived with 60 million dollars in its coffers, but one year
later reported purchases of only approximately 2.5 million dollars of Hungarian property.
There are several reasons for the slow pace of privatization. One is administrative. Auditing the value of enterprises
and property takes time. Investors as well as government property administrators both proceed cautiously to assure that they
receive a fair bargain. Another factor is the political influence
on the privatization process of managers and unions who fear
the loss of jobs which usually results afker a private entity purchases an inefficient, State-run enterprise. Finally, the failure
of the government to resolve the claims of those whose property
was confiscated by the former regime has caused many investors to hesitate to pursue deals out of fear that Parliament will

67.
Certain constitutional rights, such as the rights of children, impose obligations on both the State and private individuals. Examples of the few constitutional
rules pertaining exclusively to the private sector are the rules pertaining to trade
unions, political parties, and citizen violence. The main sources of private law are
the Civil Code, parliamentary statutes, agency regulations, and Supreme Court
precedents.
68. Blaine Harden, East Europe's Efforts to Sell State Firms Qf to Slow Start,
WASH.
POST, Feb. 12, 1991, at C1.
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attempt to return the property to its pre-nationalization owner.
In a society where State actors are so prevalent, many
commercial, contract and tort disputes enter the realm of public
rather than private law and raise questions of whether the
State has infringed on an individual's constitutional rights.
Banking is one State-run enterprise which has put the Constitutional Court in the business of resolving what appear to be
private law issues. The reform of Hungarian banking laws over
the last decade has resulted in the opening of a small number
of semi-private banks, which in theory are independent of the
State and have a range of powers. Nevertheless, in practice,
the National Savings Bank of Hungary remains the organ with
which most citizens engage in sayings and loan transa~tions.~~
A contract dispute between the National Savings Bank and
a class of private citizens who had taken out loans turned into
a major constitutional case this past year. The National Savings Bank Case arose from a decision by Parliament, in its
capacity as head of the National Savings Bank, to pass legislation which authorizes an increase in the interest rates on
loans that citizens had taken out for the purpose of buying
homes from the State. Parliament acted on information indicating that, due t o inflation, the Bank would be on the verge of
bankruptcy without the increase." The borrowers challenged
the increase as a violation of the terms of their loan contracts.
In Hungary, as in the United States, a contractual promise
from a State body creates a property interest on behalf of the
promisee^.^' Accordingly, the allegation that the National Savings Bank was in breach of its promise raised the issue of State
infringement on the promisees' property rights.?'
69.
See HUNGARIAN
CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE,
The Transformation of the Hungarian Banking System, in PUTlWG THOSEHECTIC YEARSIN PERSPECTIVE 19871989, 9-10 (1989). (discussing limited citizen transactions with new semi-private
commercial banks, which are currently owned primarily by the State and State
enterprises).
70.
According .to the Bank, the increase is permissible because its survival is in
the best interests of the country and the borrowers. In addition, the Bank argued
that it is fair for the State to ask for increased mortgage rates because the State
had increased the salaries of most of the borrowers (the vast majority of whom are
State employees) to keep up with inflation.
71.
Cf. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972)
(State promises create property rights on behalf of promisees); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (State promises of tenure to teachers
create property rights).
72.
Cf. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (government taking of
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The Constitutional Court must now resolve this case by
deriving standards from Article 13 of the Constitution which
prohibits the State from taking an individual's property without compensation. The resolution of a complex commercial
dispute &om the abbreviated text of the Article 13 "takings
clause" is a difficult task.13 If the case had arisen from a
breach by a private party, then a civil court could have applied
a refined excusable breach of contract rule derived from the
Civil Code and Supreme Court private law precedents. However, the Bank's alleged breach is not subject to a challenge under those non-constitutional provisions because the rate modification is in accordance with a Parliamentary enactment. The
only means for challenging the legality of Parliament's action is
through reliance on the Constitution. The National Savings
Bank Case shows that if State action remains widespread in
Hungary, then constitutional interpretation will play a central
role in the resolution of litigation in "private law" realms like
commerce and banking.
c. The abortion issue without federalism or a private sector
distinction. A brief comparison of the handling of the issue of
abortion rights by the United States Supreme Court and the
way in which the Constitutional Court has to approach challenges to the constitutionality of the Ministry of Health's abortion regulations manifests the sigmfkance to Hungarian constitutional jurisprudence of both the absence of federalism and
the prevalence of State action.
The major issue before the United States Supreme Court
in recent abortion cases is how much authority the States have
to establish their own abortion regulations. The trend toward
resolution of this issue in favor of local autonomy requires
careful scrutiny of concepts of federalism. The focus on federalism has enabled the current Supreme Court majority t o avoid
answering the more sensitive question of when a fetus is viable." Even if federalism does not give States plenary authoriproperty rights occurs when government breaches promises in disability and life insurance contracts issued to veterans).
73. The United States Supreme Court's attempts to decide whether infringements upon property rights in pursuit of police power objectives constitute takings
of property have resulted in decisions which are unpredictable, incoherent, "ad
hoc," "confusing," and "bafllingly inconsistent." See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562 &
n.6 (1984) (reviewing takings clause commentary and'case law).
74.
See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (de-
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ty in the area of abortion regulation, the United States Supreme Court may still refrain from reviewing the substance of
many laws restricting abortion because of the well-developed
American private sector. Ignoring the poverty factor, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, concluded that a Missouri statute's
restrictions on a woman's ability to have a State-subsidized
abortion do not even raise the issue of abortion rights. Even if
there is a right to an abortion, the removal of the State from
the business of abortions would not infringe upon that right.
The "reality" underlying the Chief Justice's reasoning is the
availability of abortions in the private se~tor.'~
By contrast, constitutional review of regulations governing
State-subsidizedabortions in Hungary has to meet head on the
substantive questions concerning the scope of abortion rights,
because neither the federalism question nor the publidprivate
distinction are issues. The Hungarian Court cannot evade the
question of when life begins by holding that the question f d s
within the discretion of local authorities. The national government promulgates the abortion regulations and hospitals run
by the national government conduct the abortions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's private sector distinction is also
not a factor in the consideration of the abortion issue in Hungary. Private abortion facilities in Hungary are now conceivable
under the new constitutional provisions protecting private
enterprise initiatives. Nevertheless, the possibility of private
ferring to State's authority to determine when the foetus is viable, because it is
one of the "areas of medical practice traditionally subject to State regulation").
75.
Chief Justice Rehnquist defends the regulations because they "only restrict
a woman's ability to obtain an abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a
physician affiliated with a public hospital." Id. at 509. The legal basis for that
statement is that there is " 'no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where
such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the
government itself may not deprive the individual.' " Id. at 507 (quoting DeShanney
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)). Nevertheless, a footnote reveals that this legal basis is only legitimate because there is a
private sector option available. In the footnote, the Chief Justice concedes, "A
different analysis might apply if a particular State had socialized medicine and all
of its hospitals and physicians were publicly funded." Id. at 510 n.8. The Webster
dissenters argued that for most women who seek abortions in Missouri, the private
sector is not a viable option and that the failure to qu*
for a State-subsidized
abortion means the impossibility of having an abortion. See id. at 540 n.1
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that 97% of all Missouri hospital abortions occur
in public institutions, and therefore those who are "too poor to travel [to another
State for a publicly funded abortion], perhaps [are left with] no choice at all").
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sector abortions will not be a factor in the deliberations over
the abortion issue at the Hungarian Constitutional Court. One
possible reason is that Hungarians cannot afford private sector
abortions. But there must be something more. Most abortion
seekers in Missouri could not afford private sector abortions,
but this factor did not inhibit Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Webster." The United States Supreme Court could rely
on the private sector alternative to avoid the issue of women's
rights to abortion in a case challenging governmental withholding of funds because such reasoning reflects a common American belief in the sigmficance of the private sector. The Constitutional Court's refusal to give credence to the legally feasible
private sector option while deliberating over the abortion question is a product in part of the failure of the Hungarian private
sector to develop in practice, but more simcantly it is a product of the private sector's failure to develop in the communal
imagination of H~ngary.~'

F. The Constitutional Court and Parliament:
Acts of Constitutional Force and the Amendment Process
1. The original Article 8
.
The absence of federalism and private sector considerations
- enlarges the national government's responsibility to interpret
the Constitution. The increased burden on the national government, however, does not necessarily mean that the Constitutional Court's responsibilities should increase. As in the United
States, the members of all branches of government in Hungary
take oaths to uphold the Constitution. There is nothing inherently illegitimate about delegating the ultimate responsibility
for constitutional interpretation t o Parliament or to the Council
of Ministers.
76. Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that "indigency . . . 'may make it d B cult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions'
without public funding." Webster, 492 U.S. at 509 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 474 (1977)).
77.
The Constitutional Court's fmst abortion decision found a way to evade the
issue of abortion rights. The Court held the current abortion laws unconstitutional
because they had been enacted by the Ministry of Health, rather than by Parliament. Dictum in the decision stated that the Constitution does not specify when
life begins. If the Christian Democrat Party, a member of the ruling coalition, attempts to push a restrictive abortion law through Parliament, then the Court will
have to decide whether the Constitution protects a woman's right to an abortion.
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The Constitution, as amended in October 1989, contained
such a provision. Article 8, Section (2), stated, "Rules affecting
fundamental rights and duties shall not be provided for by
legal rules other than acts of constitutional force." Under this
provision, the constitutionality of "rules affecting fundamental
rights" depended on the "constitutional force" vote in Parliament. An act of constitutional force is an act passed by a twothirds vote of Parliament. Although adoption of a constitutional
amendment requires the same two-thirds majority," a bill
designated as an act of constitutional force is not an amendment to the Constitution. Furthermore, an act passed by a twothirds vote of Parliament is an ordinary statute unless predesignated as either an act of constitutional force or a constitutional amendment. Article 8, Section 3, added that an act of constitutional force could only be passed under Section 2 if it is "indispensable" to a limited set of government interests: namely,
"State safety, safeguarding of home, law and order, public security, public health, public morals, or the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."
Article 8, Sections 2 and 3 were replaced in June 1990, but
while in operation they enabled the Constitutional Court to
shift t o Parliament the burden of resolving hard cases in which
rights conflicted either with each other or with compelling
government interests. Examination of The National Savings
Bank Case and The Abortion Case, described in the previous
section, shows how Article 8 can function to relieve the Court of
the responsibility of making substantive decisions on difficult
legal questions with potentially serious economic or political
consequences.
The National Savings Bank Case required the Court t o
decide whether the National Savings Bank's increase in interest rates was unconstitutional interference with property interests. Article 8, Section (2), relieved the Court of having to resolve this diffcult constitutional issue. The Court held that the
law "affected a fundamental property right" and presented the
risk of grave social consequences. Therefore, the Court concluded, Article 8 required Parliament to pass the rate increase as

78.
A slight difference exists between the prerequisites for a constitutional
amendment and an act of constitutional force. The former requires a two-thirds
majority of all members of Parliament, while the latter requires a two-thirds
majority of all members who are present at the time of the vote.
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an a d of constitutional force and with the support of a Section
3 justification. The pending challenge to the Ministry of
Health's abortion regulations could have been handled similarly if it had come before the Court prior to the June 1990 modification of Article 8. The Court could have held that abortion
regulations "affect fundamental rights" of unborn life and female liberty and that therefore Parliament must enact the
Ministry of Health's regulations by a two-third's majority for
the rules to have validity.
Article 8 relieved the Court of the burden of deciding delicate questions, such as banking and abortion issues, to which
the Constitution provides no clear answer. The determination
of the constitutionality of a rule that ''affects" a fundamental
right rested almost entirely upon the outcome of parliamentary
debates on acts of constitutional force. The Court's roles were
(1) to shiR the burden to Parliament by i d e n t w g when a rule
"affected" a fundamental right and (2) to assure that a compelling Section 3 interest supported all acts of constitutional force.
2. The amended Article 8

In June 1990, Parliament amended Article 8 t o alter dramatically the roles of the legislature and the Court in determining the scope of constitutional rights. Under the amended
Article 8, Section (2), "rules respecting fundamental rights and
duties shall be determined by Law which, however, shall not
limit the essential contents of any fundamental right." Section
3 was eliminated in its entirety.
Under the old Article 8, an act of constitutional force and a
Section 3 justification were necessary for any enactment "affecting" a b d a m e n t a l right. Now, however, Article 8 only
imposes restrictions upon enactments that 'limit the essential
contents" of a fundamental right. Consequently Parliament has
free reign t o pass laws that expand-i.e., "Uaffect" but do not
'limits-the scope of a right.
The amended Article 8's restrictions upon enactments that
limit rights are of even greater consequence. Article 8 now
invalidates "Laws that imposes limitations upon rights. Accordingly, the Court must approach issues of whether legislation
limits constitutional rights in a new manner. The Court can no
longer shift the responsibility for determining the proper scope
of rights to parliamentary debates on acts of constitutional
force, because an act of constitutional force cannot limit the
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essential contents of a right.7g The Constitutional Court is
now solely responsible for outlining the "essential contents" of a
right and protecting those "essential contents" from all State
interference.
Even though Article 8 burdens the Court with the task of
setting forth the essential contents of a right, the Court might
not have the "last word" because of the amendment process. It
is questionable, however, whether the amended Article 8's
proscription against "Law. . . limit[ing] the essential contents
of a fundamental right" leaves Parliament with the option to
amend the Constitution in a manner that would infringe on the
essential contents of a fundamental right. If Parliament attempts t o infringe upon the "essential contents" of a right by
constitutional amendment, then the Court will have to decide
whether the June 1990 amendment in effect amended the
Constitution's rules of amendments0 to prohibit amendments
that limit h d a m e n t a l rights. The resolution of this issue will
have important implications for the exclusivity and superiority
of the mtours of rights.81
of the Constitutional C o d s
The amendment's framers must have intended acts of constitutional force to
79.
fall within those acts of "Law" that are inadequate to limit the "substantial conKO~ARSASAG
ALKOTMANYA[Constitutents of any fundamental right", A MAGYAR
tion] ch. 1, art. 8(2) (Hung.), otherwise the June 1990 amendment would not have
accomplished any signiscant modification of the old Article 8 provision that acts of
constitutional force permit the enactment of "rules affecting fundamental rights."
Id.
In apparent conflict with Article 8's absolutism, clauses providing for restriction
by an act of constitutional force accompany the provisions for the rights to travel,
to reside, to strike, to associate, to worship, and to have personal data protected.
See id. ch. XII, arts. 58(3), 59(2), 60(4), 7WC. When a statute infringing on the
right to have personal data protected was recently challenged, the court did not
declare the law unconstitutional because it was not supported by an act of constitutional force. Instead, the court asked whether the statute infringed on the
"substantial contents" of the right, as proscribed by Article 8, Section 2. The court
then declared the statute unconstitutional for infringing on the essential contents
of a fundamental right. See Judgment of Od. 4, 1990 (The Communist Data Case),
Alkotmbybirostig Hatbozatai [Constitutional Law Court],
MK. - (Hung.)
(protecting privacy right of former communist officials).
80.
Prior to the amendment of Article 8, no restrictions applied to the content
of amendments that could be adopted under Article 24 of the constitution.
81.
For an insightful discussion of whether it is logically possible for an amendment process to authorize amendment of the amendment process, see John M.
Finnis, Revolutions and the Continuity of Law, in OXFORD
ESSAYSIN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND
SERIES)44, 50-61 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ed. 1973) (discussing
H.LA H&, Self-Referring Laws, in F E S T STILL
~ AGNAD KARL OLIVECRONA 31416 (1964); H. KELSEN,THE PURE THEORYOF LAW 195-200 (1967); A. ROSS, ON
LAW AND JUSTICE
81-83 (1958)). After pointing to holes in all attempts to resolve

-
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On a technical level, it appears plausible that the June
1990 amendment was intended to entrench b d a m e n t a l rights
in the Constitution beyond the reach of the amendment process. The prerequisite for an amendment-a two-thirds majority of Parliament-was unchanged by the June 1990 amendment. Prior to the June 1990 amendment, Article 8 permitted
infringements upon fundamental rights by acts of constitutional force, which also required a two-thirds majority of Parliament.82 If the June 1990 amendment did not achieve entrenchment, then the only real change the amendment made
was to require Parliament to label its votes on whether to limit
a fundamental right as votes on an amendment rather than on
an act of constitutional force. It is unlikely that Parliament
would amend the Constitution to achieve such an insignificant
change.
There are also indications that the consensus in Hungary
is to entrust the Constitutional Court with the duty of the
absolute protection of fundamental rights from all interference
including that of Parliament's amendment process. The basis
for this sentiment is a reaction to the history of
constitutionalism under the prior regime, the implications of
which will be explained further in Part N.The Constitution in
force for four decades prior to the rendszervaltozas (change of
regime) contained an extensive list of fundamental rights.83
Today the Parliament, which amended Article 8, looks back
with disdain on the way in which the old Constitution's rights
were rendered meaningless in practice. What eliminated the
meaning of those rights was not a denial by the State that the
rights existed, but the constitutional provisions that left the
contents of the rights subject to the whims of the political
branches of govern~nent.~~

the issue by legalistic logic, Finnis concludes that the validity of an amendment to
the amendment process depends upon whether the change conforms with the vision
of the spoudaia polis or the "mature" sector of society. For further explanation of
the spoudaia polis, see infra part III.C.
82.
But see supra note 78 (slight difference between prerequisites for constitutional amendment and act on constitutional force).
83.
See A MAGYAR
K ~ ~ A R S A S A ALKOTMANYA
G
[Constitution] ch. VIII (Hung.)
(1949 version).
84. An analogous historical precedent of fascism supported the decision of the
West German and Austrian peoples to adopt constitutional systems which prohibit
amendments that limit certain fundamental rights. G R U N D G E S [Constitution]
~
[GGI art. 79 (F.R.G.); Rudolf Machacek, Law and Politics 1, 9 (1990) (unpublished
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The operation of Article 8 as a restriction on the amendment process is a practical means of assuring the protection of
rights. The ease of attaining a two-thirds majority in Parliament leaves fundamental rights vulnerable to frequent amendments. Moreover, an easy amendment process means that an
amendment could fail to embody a firm national commitment.
A two-thirds majority a t one meeting of the Parliament might
reflect only the views of a temporarily popular special interest
Although the elected Parliament has amended the Constitution six times in the past year, there has not been an amendment since the fall of 1990. Parliament may be disciplining
itself despite the easy process. However, a more likely explanation is that the current ruling coalition possesses only a 60
percent majority. If a tworthirds majority becomes attainable in
the h t u r e and Parliament begins to resort more to the amendment process, the authority of both the Constitutional Court
and the Constitution could become trivialized. The interpretation of Article 8 as insulating the Court's fimdamental rights
jurisprudence from modification by the amendment process is
one way to prevent such a result. The following section presents another way.

G. Beyond the Control of Amendments: The Invisible
Constitution and the Influence of Western Legal Standards
The determination of whether Article 8 permits amendments which limit the essential contents of rights may not have
a definitive effect on the division of power between the Court
and Parliament with regard to certain constitutional matters.
Examination of two recent decisions, The Death Penalty Case
manuscript) (explaining how the Austrian Constitutional Court and the Indian Supreme Court have "formulated the standpoint that even in the course of the
amendment of [the] constitution, it is not permissible to change provisions of the
Constitution . . . belonging to its essentials").
85.
See Boz6ki, supra note 10, at 548-49 ('The objective [of the June 1990
amendment] . . . was to avoid the 'dictatorship of the legislature.' "). The view that
the new Article 8 entrenches fundamental rights from modification by amendment
has not been recognized at this time by either Parliament, the Council of Ministers, or any court.
James Madison observed that a diflicult amendment process encouraged democratic "bargaining and mutual learning" and heightened the quality of the
amendments. See Stephen Holmes, Precomittment and the Paradaz of Democracy,
in CONS~P~ZPTIONAL~SM
AND DEMOCRACY,
supra note 8, at 218.
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and The Union Case, reveals that factors beyond the text of the
Constitution play an important role in the Court's development
of constitutional law.
The Death Penalty Case held capital punishment to be
unconstitutional per se. The Union Case proscribed trade unions from representing employees without their consent. In
both cases the Court relied upon two extra-textual factors: (1)
conceptions of the right to human dignity and (2) the
precedential value of Western legal standards.
An application of the right to human dignity served as a
basis for both decisions. Such a right can be found in Article
54(1) of the Constitution. Nevertheless, The Death Penalty Case
and The Union Case both explain further that the right to
human dignity is a foundational principle of Hungarian constitutional law and therefore it would exist even without a reference in the constitutional text. The concurrence of the President of the Court in The Death Penalty Case described the
decision's reliance on the right to human dignity as a utilization of the "'invisible constitution'-[which is] beyond the [control of both the] Constitution, which is often amended . . . [,
and] future constitution^."^^ The Union Case adds that when
"none of the . . . named fundamental rights are applicable for a
given state of affairs," then the "general personal right [to
dignity] . . . may be relied upon at any time by the Constitutional
The Court rested The Union Case's holding upon the right
to dignity even though the Constitution contains clauses that
specifkally relate to the right of unions "to safeguard and represent the interest of employee^."^ The Court could easily
have held that these clauses only authorize representation by

86. The Death Penalty Case, supra note 50, at 16; cf. supra note 84 (quoting
Machecek).
87. The quote is found in the The Union Case, infia, at 5: Judgment of Apr.
23, 1990 (The Union Case), Alkotmcinybiros6g Hathzatai [Constitutional Law
Court], 1990/36 MK. 42 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on fde with the Brigham
Young University Law Review; all pinpoint citations to this case which follow refer
to the unofficial translation of the case on file with the Brtgham Young University
Law Review) [hereinafter The Union Case].
88.
"Trade unions and other organizations for the representation of interests
shall safeguard and represent the interests of employees, members of cooperatives
and entrepreneurs." A MAGYAR
K~zTARSASAGAWCOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. 1, art.
4 (Hung.). "Everybody shall have the right to form organizations with others with
the aim of protecting economic and social interests." Id. ch. XII, art. 70/C(1).
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consent.89The decision to rely on the admittedly extra-textual
right to human dignity, rather than the more relevant clause
on union representation, further signals that the Court does
not see a need to link its interpretations t o the text of the Constitution.
A complementary trend, which minimizes the importance
of the Constitution's text and the input of Parliament, is the
Court's reliance on Western legal standards. The Union Case
and The Death Penalty Case cite Western legal norms to establish both the irrevocable presence of the right to human dignity
in Hungarian constitutional law and the contents of that right.
While The Union Case only briefly cites "modern constitutions
and the practice of constitutional courts" t o support its holding,
The Death Penalty Case contains an extensive analysis of Western conventions.
The Death Penalty Case reviews the various European
protocols, as well as the status of capital punishment in the
United States. Curiously, the standards of the West, including
those of the Council of Europe, do not mandate the death penalty ban adopted by the Court. Only optional protocols in the
West prohibit the death penalty.s0 However, a brief look at
the case law of the judicial arm of the Council of Europe-the
European Court of Human Rights-reveals that the death
penalty conflicts with Western European values. The European
Court requires very strict procedural safeguards for an application of the death penalty t o comply with the ban on "inhuman
and degrading treatment." Recently, an extradition case presented the European Court with the opportunity to review the
procedures surrounding the application of the death penalty in
the State of Virginia.g1The European Court found a likelihood
that Virginia's sentencing and appellate process would violate

89.
The explanation for not relying upon those union clauses was that they
were remnants of the Stalinist Constitution and therefore could not be interpreted
to require prior consent to the union representation.
90.
The two "optional protocols" outlawing capital punishment are the Supplementary Protocol, Art. I (adopted on April 23, 1983) to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (signed on November 4,
1950) and the European Parliament's Declaration On Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Para. 22. Both instruments call for the abolition of the death
penalty. However, the terms of each document provide that it is only binding on
the signatories and is not a pronouncement of international or European norms.
See The Death Penalty Case, supra note 50.
91.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1989).
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the prohibition against "inhuman and degrading treatment."
The European Court added that satisfaction of the standards of
the United States due process clause and "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause were inadequate t o ensure consistency with
European standards.
The extreme nature of the European Court's procedural
emphasis indicates that capital punishment conflicts with the
Council's substantive values.g2Accordingly, the Constitutional
Court actually did live up to its opinion's claim to be "moving
in the same direction" as

Part I1 analyzed the formal components of the structure
enabling the Court to implement its authority over Hungary.
This Part presents a substantive analysis of the controversial
and multifaceted Land Act Case I. The purpose of this Part is
not to pass judgment on whether the logic and policy implications of the decision are good or bad, but to identify the legal
theories underlying the opinion and their social science implications.

A. The Land Act Case I: Facts and Holdings
In March 1990, Hungarian voters elected the Democratic
Forum Party (MDF) to a plurality of seats in Parliament."
92.
Professor Charles Black explains that " 'procedure' and 'substance' lock and
become one" in a court's decision to require such heightened procedural safeguards
PUNISHMENT
95-96
surrounding the death penalty. CHARLESL. BLACK,JR.,CAPITAL
(1974). Relying on the decisions of the high court in ancient Jerusalem, Black
concludes that the setting forth of such safeguards are not "collateral or accidental
means . . . to avoid its [the death penalty's] infliction." Id. Rather, a court's decision to implement strict procedural safeguards surrounding capital punishment
embodies the point of view that "the justice of man is altogether and always
insufficient for saying who may be" sentenced to death. Id.
93.
See The Death Penalty Case, supra note 50, at 14-35 (S6lyoq Pres., concurring).
94.
Sixty-two parties took part in the elections.
Percentage of the Vote, March 25, 1990
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF):
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ):
Smallholders Party:
Socialist Party:
Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ):
Christian Democrat Party:

24.7%
2 1.3%
11.7%
10.9%
8.9%
6.5%
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The MDF platform combined economic pledges to institute a
free market system and nationalist pledges to avoid permitting
the country's assets to fall under the exclusive control of foreigners. The appeal of the latter, nationalist sentiment left the
MDF in a bind. Few Hungarians, other than some former members of the communist nomenklature, could afford to purchase

Socialist Workers Party:
Social Democrat Party:
Agrarian Alliance:
Individual District Mandates
MDF:
SDZSZ:
Smallholders Party:
Socialist Party:
FIDESZ:
Christian Democrat Party:
Agrarian Alliance:
Independent:
Joint Candidates:
Territorial Mandates
MDF:
SZDSZ:
Smallholders Party:
FIDESZ:
Christian Democrats:
National Mandates
MDF:
SDZSZ:
Smallholders:
Socialist Party:
FIDESZ:
Christian Democrat Party:
Total Mandate
MDF:
SDZSZ:
Smallholders:
Socialist Party:
FIDESZ:
Christian Democrat Party:
Agrarian Alliance:
Independent:
Joint Candidates:

115 Seats
34 Seats

11 Seats
1 Seat
1 Seat
1 Seat
1 Seat
6 Seats
4 Seats
44 Seats
34 Seats

16 Seats
8 Seats

8 Seats
10 Seats
23 Seats

17 Seats
18 Seats
12 Seats
10 Seats
165 Seats
91 Seats
44 Seats
33 Seats
21 Seats
21 Seats
1 Seat
6 Seats
4 Seats

These statistics were compiled by Professor Andrew Arato from a variety of sources, including the tables in R. Barnabas, Political Pluralization in Hungary, 43
SO=
S ~ ! ~ D I E S120 (1991).
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State pr~perty.'~
Yet if State property was not sold off, entrepreneurs would have little with which to work in developing a
capitalist system.
One solution to this conflict between desire for capitalism
and resistance to foreign domination was to recreate a class of
property owning Hungarians by giving large amounts of land
and indemnification payments to those Hungarians from whom
the communists had confiscated property. At first the idea may
have seemed to be a stroke of political genius. It brought the
needed support of the Smallholders Party-representing former
peasant landowners-into the MDF ruling coalition and increased the potential for domestic participation in and enthusiasm for privatization.
During the ensuing months, however, the MDF began to
comprehend more f a y the extent of Hungary's financial problems. The nation could not afford the costly compensation
scheme fervently advocated by the smallholder^.'^ The best
solution for the nation was to expedite investment by foreigners
rather than to spend money subsidizing citizen participation in
investment. The MDF Council of Ministers retained a list of enterprises that had to remain at least 51 percent State or Hungarian owned:'
and the MDF concluded that the country
must not be sold to foreigners at bargain p r i ~ e s ? ~
Meanwhile, t h e MDF became dependent on the
Smallholders to retain their majority coalition.99 Other issues
had eliminated any chance of the MDF abandoning the
Smallholders to form a coalition with one of the other two major parties, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the
Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ).lWThe central issue
of the Smallholders platform was compensation for land taken

95. In addition, foreign investors had little interest in many properties, such as
steel mills and small properties, which offered no immediately foreseeable profits.
96. In addition, ,economists predicted that compensation would cause inflation.
97.
See Privatization Guide, DAILYNEWS OF THE HUNGARIAN
NEWSAGENCY,
April 12, 1991, at 3.
98.
Arguably, the MDF had always preferred the implementation of capitalism
through sales to foreigners rather than through re-privatization or compensation
programs. Accordingly, MDF may well have perceived its adoption of the Smallholders' platform on re-privatization and indemnification as a political compromise
rather than as a stroke of political genius.
99.
The Christian Democrat Party was also in the MDF coalition.
100. The MDF also did not consider the Socialist Party, who won nine percent
of the seats in Parliament, to be a viable candidate for a coalition partner.
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by the communists. The MDF could not back out. The coalition
drafted a bill providing for all those who had lost land due to
the nationalization laws of the communist Parliament, commencing in 1949, to receive either the original plot or a similar
plot. All those who had lost personal property were to receive a
payment.
Polls revealed that approximately two-thirds of the nation
believed the final proposal to be economic s~icide.'~'At the
last minute, the MDF figured out a way to delay having to vote
on this proposal, while simultaneously keeping the coalition
intact. The Prime Minister stayed the moment of truth by using his power under the ACC to request an advisory opinion on
the matter from the Constitutional Court.
The Prime Minister set forth a "distinct" querylo2for the
Court t o answer. He asked the Court only whether the equal
protection clause, contained in Article 7OlA of the Constitution,lo3 permitted the Parliament to compensate former real
property owners by a different means than would be used to
compensate former personal property owners. This question did
not indicate any antipathy toward the general concept of providing former owners with compensation.
On October 2, 1990, the Court issued a decision responding
t o the Prime Minister's question in the negative. The reasoning
was straightforward and is not the subject of this Part. The
Court held that payment constituted treatment that was significantly different from the restoration of ownership of actual
property. The Court concluded that such differential treatment
violated the equal protection clause because it was not justified
by any compelling government interest.
What is more intriguing is the reasoning the Court used t o
resolve the larger issue which was plaguing the nation politi101. Radio Brzdge Report (Radio Broadcast, Budapest, Hungary, 8:30 P.M.,
March 12, 1991); see also i e a note 224 (survey results).
102. See supra part II.C.l (discussing ACC, supra note 19, art. 22(2)).
103. The Republic of Hungary shall ensure human and civil rights for everyone within its territory without discrimination of any kind, such as upon
race, color, sex, language, religion, creed, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

....

The Republic of Hungary shall promote the attainment of the equality
of rights also by measures aimed at eliminating inequalities of opportuni-

tyA MAGYAR
KGICTARSASAG~ o T M A N Y A [Constitution] art. 7WA (Hung.) (1990).
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cally: whether to compensate for past injustices at all. The
Court determined that the coalition's current compensation
proposal would be unconstitutional even if it compensated
former owners of land and former owners of personal property
by the same means. Under the decision, any distribution of
government largess that discriminates between a former owner
of property and a "non-former owner" (NFO) violates equal
protection principles. The Court's decision was based on its
conclusion that the bill's discrimination against NFO's was
justified by neither an enforceable retroactive property right of
the former owners nor a scientifically grounded policy objective. loq
In addition, the Court included in the same opinion a decision resolving another issue on which the Prime Minister had
requested an advisory opinion. The latter issue was whether
the current regime could authorize the taking of land owned by
agricultural cooperatives without providing compensation. The
Court held that cooperatively owned property was independent
of the State and therefore entitled to protection by the "takings" clause.105 The decision concluded by stating that the
Constitution required full compensation for all takings, whether the taking was the result of a "single official resolution of expropriation" o r of any other State authorized infringement
upon private property rights.

B. The Political Delicacy and Signi'ance of Property Right
Reform in Post-Communist Hungary
The tale of The Land Act Cases is one of property right
reform. In the United States property right reform brings to

104. The wording of the decision did not declare the compensation bill to be
absolutely unconstitutional. Since it was an advisory opinion rather than the
review of an actual piece of legislation, the court simply stated that a scientific
policy showing was necessary for the discrimination against NFO's to be constitutional. Such a showing is impossible. Providing capital to the former owners would
facilitate the participation of Hungarians in the new free market economy; however, providing capital to NFO's would also have this favorable result. In essence, the
Court characterized compensation to former owners as an affmnative action program that is misdirected because it economically assists a group with neither a
special need nor a right to the aid. See in#k part 1II.D.
105. "Expropriation of property shall be allowed only exceptionally and for public
interests, in cases and ways as determined by law and with full, unconditional and
KC~ZTARSASAGALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch.
immediate compensation." A MAGYAR
1, art. 13 (Hung.) (1990).
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mind the State interfering with property interests over which
private citizens previously thought they had control. In a society emerging from a system where nearly all property rights
were possessed by the State, property right reform is of a different nature. It involves the reform of the State's previous allencompassing entitlement and the gradual creation of
entitlements to State property on behalf of others. Heretofore,
the reform of property rights was occurring primarily by purchases from the State. The Land Act Cases raise the specter of
State decisions t o reform property rights by the creation of
entitlements on behalf of certain individuals to certain property
interests. This subsection explains the political and philosophical si@cance of property rights debates and why resolution
of such debates is a particularly delicate and profound task in
post-communist Hungary. The four subsections which follow
will then analyze the substantive theories relied upon by the
Constitutional Court to bring unity to the property right reform
disputes present in The Land Act Cases.
1. Political delicacy of property right reform

According to James Madison, "the most violent struggles . . . [occur] between the parties interested in reviving, and
those interested in reforming the antecedent state of property."'OB Avoidance of such factionalism was one of the reasons
Madison endorsed a political structure that shields property
rights from the possibility of modification through political
debate.''' Professor Ronald Dworkin seems to advocate a different approach when he states, "Government must constantly
survey and alter its rules of property, radically if necessary, to
bring them closer to the ideal of treating people as equals under the best conception [of eq~ality]."'~~
The difference between the advice of Madison and Dworkin
is due to the different aims of their work; but they share a

See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 13
THE PAPERSOF JAMESMADISON
23 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds.,
1981) [hereinafter Letter to Jefferson], quoted in Holmes, supra note 85, at 220.

106.

107. Alexis Toqueville similarly believed that to "polarize politics around the
question of prosperity . . . would make the establishment of stable democratic
1MEISI'ER, POLITICAL
institutions a more or less permanent impossibility." ROBERT
IDENTITY 132 (1990) (describing Tocqueville's model of a "sincere democrat" in the
aftermath of the 1848 upheavals).
108. RONALD
M. DWORK~N,
LAW'S EMPIRE310 (1986).
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common premise: both perceive the rules setting forth property
rights as central to the definition of a community. As a political
scientist interested in framing a nation's future, James Madison concerned himself primarily with maintaining the unity of
the people of the United States. He realized that if there was
any dispute capable of tearing the American community apart,
it was a dispute rooted in conceptions of property rights.
Dworkin does not focus on unity, but shares an ultimate
belief in the critical role of property rights. His work consistently cites the fulfillment of a community's favored conception
of equality as a basic function of the State. Accordingly, he asserts that the State's most important obligation is adherence to
a particular concept of equality, rather than to any particular
set of property rights.lo9 Nevertheless, Dworkin concedes that
property rights are the area of the law that must be addressed
to bring about the realization of society's purpose of fulfilling
the communal conception of equality. Thus, the respective
thoughts of Dworkin and Madison, reflected in the above quotations, rest upon a vision of the rules governing property rights
as pivotal to the direction of a society.
Dworkin's philosophical approach urges the modification of
property rights rather than restraint. He views modification of
property rights as the way to bring about different types of
ideal societies. Madison, the political scientist, perceives the
promotion of the modification of property rights as a way to pit
proponents of opposing idealized visions against each other and
thereby catalyze the division of an otherwise unified community. For Dworkin, the modification of property rights can fulfill a
communal vision. That is true, when the community exists in
the imagination. However, when the goal is to safeguard the
unity of a certain grouping of people living within a defined
geographical area, then debates on how to m o w property
rights are dangerous because such debates may divide the
community.
Dworkin concedes that radical modifications of rules governing property rights can result in the creation of at least
three fundamentally different types of communities.'" How109. RONALD
M. DWORKIN,
TAKINGRIGHTS SERIOUSLY
277-78 (1978) (denying
that there are natural property rights to which all just States must adhere);
supra note' 108, at 295-301 (explaining that rules governing property
DWORKIN,
rights depend on which conception of equality a society chooses).
110. See DWORKIN,
supra note 108, at 297-301 (outlining three different models
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ever, he never expresses dismay over the possibility that the
radical changes in rules governing property rights, which his
approach permits, might lead a community to divide into two
or even three communities. For a philosopher, such a result is
a successful step on the difficult path toward actualizing ideals.
For a founding father of a unified nation, like Madison, such a
result is the mark of failure.
2. Significance of property right reform in post-communist
Hungary
How are property rights intimately connected to the basic
ideals that either support or destroy the unity of a community?
Property rights define entitlements or the expectations that
will be guaranteed by law."' The standards underlying a concept of property rights dictate basic economic relationship^.'^
Accordingly, property rights, along with the expectations they
sustain, structure the practical aspects of life in which a citizen
has faith.'13

of equality based on different notions of property rights: natural rights, resource or
material end equality, and utilitarian equality).
111. See Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Theory of Property, in THE RATIONAL
206, 211-12 (John H. Wigmore & Albert Kocourek
BASIS OF LEGALINSTITUTIONS
eds., 1923) ("Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards it . . . . Now this expectation,
this persuasion can only be the work of law."); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue,
Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1,46 YALEL.J.52, 59 & n.10 ("[Dlamage to 'property' is really damage to an expectancy." (citing SCHLOSSMANN,
DER
V E ~ 8 G39 (1934)).
112. See Bentham, supra note 111, at 212 (The idea of property consists in an
established expectation; in the persuasion of being able to draw such or such an
advantage from the thing possessed, according to the nature of the case."); RICHARD A. POSNER,ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
OF LAW 10-15 (1973) (property rights enable
modern economic relationships to exist); see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Ruks, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (basis of tort duties in entitlement theories).
113. See Bentham, supra note 111, at 211. Bentham emphasizes that
man is not like the animals, limited to the present; . . . he is susceptible
of pains and pleasures by anticipation . . . . Expectation is a chain which
unites our present existence to our future existence . . . . The sensibility
of man extends through all the links of this chain.

....

. . . [Accordingly, property is]
. . . influence upon human life.

a sentiment which exercises powerful
Id. 210-11; see a h Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 8,
13 (1927) (The extent of the power over the life of others which the legal order
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The resolution of the entitlement issues in The Land Act
Cases will have dramatic socio-economic consequences. In
Hungary's free market, rights to capital will play a central role.
Currently, most Hungarians lack capital. Virtually all of the
current rights to capital lie with the State or with foreigners.
The standards that determine whether and how to distribute
State property rights to citizenry will determine who is to be
empowered economically in the future. Citizens could face radically different futures depending on whether entitlements are
determined by the unfettered discretion of a vote in Parliament, certain property titles antecedent to the nationalization
laws, a particular theory of equal protection, a particular theory of utilitarianism, or a combination of the above. Foreigners
as well as Hungarians anxiously await the standards that will
determine citizen entitlements to State property. Cries by the
Smallholders contingent in Parliament to return all property to
"rightful owners" inhibit foreigners from investing in many
State properties.
Despite (and, perhaps, as a result of) their centrality,
entitlements are based on precarious concepts. There is no
natural or pre-political substance to property rights. The community and State authorities can constmct the nature of property rights in a variety of directions. Absolute property rights
advocates like Robert Nozick embrace the view that "[tlhings
come into the world already attached to people having
entitlements over them."'14 Commentators as diverse as utilit a r i a n Jeremy Bentham,"'
post-structuralist J e a n
Baudrillard116 and natural law scholar John Finnis, have
pointed out that a man-made myth is necessary to support that
view. Finnis observes that Nozick neglects to realize that
"things" did originate ''from nowhere, out of nothing" and that
therefore "things" only attain si@cance when a normative
structure of property rights is imposed upon them."' Accordconfers on those called owners is not fully appreciated by those who think of the
law as merely protecting men in their possession. Property law does more. It determines what men shall acquire.").
114. ROBERTNOZICK,ANARCHY, STATE& UTOPIA160 (1974).
115. See Bentham, supra note 111, at 206-19. "[Tlhere is no such thing as natural property, . . . it is entirely the work of law
. . Before laws were made there
was no property; take away laws, and property ceases." Id. at 211-13.
OF THE
116. See Jean Baudrillard, Fetishism and Idealogy, in FORA CRITIQUE
POLITICAL
ECONOMY
OF THE SIGN93, 97, 100 (Cristoph Levin trans., 1981).
LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS187 & n.30 (1980).
117. JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL

..
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ingly, Finnis concludes that diverse systems of property rights,
including those supported by the standards of "bad men," can
be "natural."118
The history of Hungary impresses this idea on the citizenry, thereby increasing the anxiety accompanying debates on
property right reform. Although property rights in the United
States have gone through significant shifts, they have consistently been constructed upon strains of economic efficiency
theories, distributional preferences, and certain traditional
notions of justice.llg By contrast, in Hungary, standards such
as anti-semitism and other ethnicity based criteria, the divine
right of the Crown, and communist ideology have governed
property rights over the years.
Hungary is now in a position where the standards governing the distribution of property rights can head in a variety of
directions. The text of the amended Constitution provides some
guidance, although not enough to resolve definitively current
debates, such as those pertinent to The Land Act Cases. Certain standards are out of bounds. Most noticeably, the Constitution proscribes those standards of the past such as bigotry

118. See id. at 187-88 (Natural law would require the redistribution of property
when it would "crystalize and enforce duties the property-holder already had . . . .
Distributive justice is here, as in most contexts, a relation between citizens, or
groups and associations within the community, and is the responsibility of those
citizens and groups."); id. at 251 (referring to Sir John Fortesque's opinion that
natural law possibly embodies the views of "bad men"); see also Bentham, supra
note 111, at 214 ("Tyrannical and sanguinary laws have indeed been founded upon
that property right.").
Finnis does place some boundaries on just how "bad" "natural" property rules
can be. "Natural law" requires conformity with the standards of the mature person
of practical reasonableness, the spoudaios. However, the standards of the spoudaios
are arguably not pre-defined, but dependent on the culture. FINNIS, supra note 117,
at 15-19.
Professor Sunstein also argues against a pre-political state of property rights.
Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.L. REV. 1689
(1984). He points out that all current property entitlements have been created by
State actions and inaction. Sunstein's outlook relies in part, as does Finnis' view,
on the hermeneutic truth that everything with a significance has a prior normative
source-i.e., a "thing" does not attain definition "from nowhere, out of nothing."
Since that normative source is constructed by the community or the State rather
than by a divine entity, then it is not immune from modification. Id. at 1776; see
also A. M. Honor& Property, Titk, and Redistribution, in PROPERTY,PROFITS AND
ECONOMIC
JUSTICE
84, 87 (Virginia Held ed., 1980) (Nozick's approach to property
rules ignores the significance of historical and social context.); infra note 147.
119. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melarned, supra note 112 (discussing substantive
bases for entitlements in American common law).
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and the absolute right of the State to possession of all property.120 The text of the Constitution offers some additional guidance through clauses providing for equal protection, fundamental rights to certain types of welfare,12' and the protection of
property from State interference without "full, unconditional,
and immediate omp pens at ion."'^ As American commentators
and courts have shown, however, interpretation of an equal
protection clause, welfare rights, and a compensation clause
can lead to a wide spectrum of standards.
Madisonian fears of a "violent struggle" over property
rights are exacerbated in Hungary by the unavailability of a
longstanding adherence to a particular conception of property,
such as that of Locke, which the country could fall back upon
as the "natural" law. The conflict in Hungary is not between
those "interested in reviving and those interested in reforming
the antecedent state of property."lzs All factions appear to reject the antecedent state of property. The efforts of the
Smallholders to revive the pre-communist State is just another
version of post-communist reform. Everybody in Hungary with
an opinion on the direction of property rights today is a reforrner. Debate on the issue must occur. Due to this apparent clean
slate, post-communist Hungary is perhaps the most fertile
territory imaginable for a Dworkinian approach. For a
Madisonian, Hungary is a worst case scenario.'"
In The Land Act Case I, the Constitutional Court attempt120. The limitation or the deprivation of the right of ownership "on the basis of
branding people and certain social groups or any kind of discrimination may not be
viewed as a public necessity . . . . The almost complete liquidation of property
may not be viewed as [in the] public interest today." The Nationalization Case,
supm note 53, at 8-9.
121. The Hungarian Constitution guarantees the rights to provisions necessary
for subsistence in case of old age, illness, disability, widowhood, orphanhood, and unemployKOZTARSASAG
ment due to circumstances beyond the person's control; A MAGYAR
ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. XII, art. 7Q/E(1)(Hung.) (1990); t o medical services
and to "opportunities for physical exercise"; id. ch. XII, art. 704); and to education;
id. ch. XII, art. 70/F, see also id. ch. XII, art. 704 (requiring every citizen "to
contribute, proportionally to his/her income, and property circumstances, to public
expenditures.").
122. Id. ch. I, art. 13; see also id ch. I, art. 9. (setting forth the rights of
enterprise and free competition and the right of equal treatment of private and
public property).
123. See Letter to Jefferson, supra note 106, at 23; see also text accompanying
note 106.
124. But see inj5-a note 63 and accompanying text (suggesting Madison did not
advocate eliminating all debate regarding property rights).
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ed to resolve some of the most thorny questions in the debate
over how to reformulate property rights in Hungary. The Court
had to set forth standards for determining: (1)whether property rights in effect antecedent to the communist regime were
entitled to recognition; (2) under what circumstances the State
could selectively distribute property; and (3) under what circumstances to require the State to provide compensation for
interference with property. The following subsections examine
the substantive theories underlying the Court's holdings on
these three questions and how the Court's endorsement of
these theories functions to enhance the capacity of the Court to
bring unity to the factionalism marking Hungary's current
property right reform debates.

C. Retroactive Recognition of Property Rights
and the Continuity of Law
Although The Land Act Case I involved decisions about
property entitlements, the overriding issue in any debate on
the modification of property rights is which conception of equality to pursue. All entitlement rules discriminate by definition.
They permit one party to have and thereby preclude another
party from having. Which discriminatory entitlements the Constitution will permit depends on which substantive theories
shape the Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause.
The proposed legislation under review in The Land Act
Case I would have created entitlements that discriminated
against NFO'S.'~~
In the United States, those excluded from
entitlements created by welfare programs have brought analogous challenges to the State's criteria for distinguishing between the entitled and the unentitled. In most cases, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the allegedly discriminatory classification because "[gleneral rules are essential if a
fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of
efi~iency."'~
In Hungary, however, the potential consequences of inclusion in or exclusion from the compensation scheme
were too great for the Court to take the Land Act's discrimination lightly. Accordingly, the Court engaged in an equal
protection analysis of the proposed Act's discrimination be125. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining the term %on-former
owner" (NFO) and how the Land Act discriminated against NFO's).
126. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977).
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tween former owners and NFO's.
The first issue was whether the discrimination was justified by the former owners' alleged fundamental right to the
compensation funds. The Smallholders claimed 'that such a
right existed prior to any enactment by the new Parliament.
Whether the new system would recognize any entitlements
stemming from rights antecedent to the nationalization laws is
the one issue of post-communist property right reform most
likely to lead to one of Madison's feared "violent struggles."
Virtually the sole issue on the Smallholders' agenda has been
the reform of property rights to reflect recognition of the prenationalization rights of peasant land owners. Even after the
Constitutional Court denied the legitimacy of their claim, the
steadfast Smallholders threatened to bring down the ruling
coalition if Parliament did not move quickly to enact a bill
granting special entitlements based upon pre-nationalization
property rights.
The Court rejected the Smallholders' view that pre-nationalization rights had any legitimacy under the present regime.
The Court cited Article 10(2) of the amended Constitution
which permits the State to continue in its role as the owner of
the property and enterprises to which it currently holds title." The Court then added that the titles resulting from nationalization were "legally sound," because they were in accordance with acts of Parliament, which supersede any Civil Code
rules protecting property rights.
The Court noted that its holding that former owners lacked
inherent rights to compensation was not dependent on whether
the nationalization laws were consistent with the Stalinist
~~
Constitution in effect at the time of the e n a ~ t m e n t s . ' The

127. See A MAGYARKGZTARSASAGALKOTMANYA[Constitution] ch. I, art. lO(2)
(indicating that the scope of the exclusive property and economic activity of the
State shall be defined by law).
128. In May 1991, the Court ruled on the constitutional challenges to nationalization legislation. The Court held the nationalization laws, which were still on
the books, to be invalid prospectively. But the Court refused to review the retroactive validity of the nationalization laws, because ACC art. 43(4)'s preconditions for
retroactive review were not met. The Court explained:
[I& would be a grave violation of legal security if legal rules[,] which
were in effect for quite a substantial period of time and were applied in
a great number of cases, and the legal relations[,] which developed on the
basis of those legal rules . . . [,I were [retroactively] repealed. Most of the
chattels taken into State ownership on the basis of the now [prospedive-

94 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I992

Court concluded that even if the nationalization laws somehow
violated the Stalinist Constitution, "their [invalidation] . . .
would not [affect] legal relations and the rights and obligations
resulting therefrom that came into effect prior to the publication of [a] decision"'" by the Constitutional Court. The Court
cited limitations on its jurisdiction to impose solutions to correct past injustices as the basis for the latter statement.
The substance of the Court's reasons for denying the existence of pre-nationalization property rights is not readily discernable from the text of the opinion. The controlling variable
appears t o be the amended Constitution's failure to reject the
legitimacy of the results of nationalization. However, Article
10(2), which the Court found decisive, only states, "The scope of
the exclusive property and economic activities of the State shall
be defined by law." The "defined by law" clause permits an
interpretation of Article 10(2) that would allow Parliament to
adopt legislation defining State property as limited by what
Parliament perceives to be the rights of former owners.
In addition, the Court's blanket statement about limitations on its powers to retroactively "undo" unconstitutional
interferences with property rights is overstated. There is no
statute of.limitations on remedies for constitutional violations
in Hungary. Accordingly, a finding of an unconstitutional interference with a property right always requires a court t o
''affect the legal relations and the rights and obligations resulting therefrom" by ordering compensation and by enjoining the
State interference from continuing. The Constitutional Court
apparently realized that it had overstated the limits on its
remedial powers, because it added that in other cases retroactive judicial interference could take place because of the presly] repealed rules cannot be found in the form . . . in which they were
at the time of the nationalization. Certain properties are annihilated, e-g.,
because of city-planning or for other reasons; others were in the meantime altered to a great extent; . . . and finally, a number of properties
are no longer in the ownership of the Hungarian State.
The Nationalization Case, supra note 53, at 14-15. This May 1991 decision followed
the Land Act Case I by "not affect[ing] the ownership right of the State based on"
nationalization. Id. at 13. The Nationalization Case concluded that legal claims to
compensation and legal challenges to State ownership could be premised upon the
texts of the nationalization laws and regulations, see infra note 134, and that any
compensation or re-privatization legislation had to be in accordance with the contemporary principles of equality set forth in The Land Act Case I.
129. The Land Act Case I, supra note 49, at 6 (emphasis added).
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1. The continuity of law principle

The Court's refusal to deny retroactively the validity of the
reform of rights effected by the communist nationalization laws
exemplifies more than responsiveness to Article lO(2) and limitations on the Court's remedial powers. Implicit in the Court's
refusal to recognize the current validity of pre-communist
rights is the Court's embrace of the continuity of law. An understanding of the substance of this theoretical strain, which is
at the foundation of the Court's holding, reveals why it is an
effective means for resolving this hotly disputed issue of property right reform.
The continuity of law means that the present regime's
position of authority is a continuation of the last regime's position of authority. From this point of view, the authority of each
regime that has been in power throughout history has been
equally valid during the period of its power. The new regime
can use its authority to completely modify the current laws.
But the present authority lacks any power to deny the authority of the prior regime's laws during the period of the prior
regime's existence. In the essay "R,evolutions and Continuity of
Law," Professor Finnis sets forth a succinct statement of the
effect of the continuity of law on the current authority of a past
regime's law reforms:
A law once validly brought into being, in accordance with the
criteria of validity then in force, remains valid until either it
expires according to its own terms or terms implied at its creation, or it is repealed in accordance with conditions of repeal
in force at the time of its repeal.131

According to the above principle, the negation of property
rights by the nationalization laws, despite its arguably unethical character, legitimately deprived citizens of property rights,
because those laws conformed with "the criteria of validity then
in forceH-i.e., the will of the communist government in power
at the time.
130. Citing to ACC, supra note 19, arts. 40-43;see also supra note 57 (on term
"legal security").
131. Finnis, supra note 81, at 63.
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To have been legitimate, the "criteria of validity then in
force" need not have been related to the consent of the citizenry. The obsession with having consent serve as a basis for the
legitimacy of "criteria of validity," especially when the State
action being validated is the reform of property rights, is an
Anglo-American phenomenon.'" To others, the legitimacy of
authority rests primarily upon effectiveness and acquiescence
rather than on consent.lB There is no doubt that the communist regime's nationalization reforms of 'legal relations and the
rights and obligations resulting . . . had come into force.""
2. Exceptions

Finnis adds, however, that an authoritative rule-a rule to
which the citizenry appears to acquiesce--ean lack legitimacy
in certain instan~es.'~These occasions, when effective laws
are not authoritative, can be applied t o identify those situations in which rules, despite their consistency with "criteria of
validity then in force," should not be treated as the authoritative rules for a past period. Finnis's two exceptions to the statement that "the sheer fact of effectiveness is presumptively (not
indefeasibly) decisive" are (1)when community rules have designated a different party as authority during the past time or
(2) when the minds of "mature practical reason" during the
past period rejected the content of the law.'%
A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
POWER
132. see, e.g., RICHARD
OF EMINENT
DOMAIN
146-60 (1985) (explaining that common law principles underlying takings clause require that a taking by the State be justified by an individual's
explicit waiver of a property right and not simply by prior notice from the State
that a taking without just compensation could occur).
133. See FINNIS, supm note 117, at 247-49; see also H.L.A. HAEET, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 113-14 (1961) (obedience by citizens and acceptance by officials are the
criteria for validity of a legal system).
134. Land Act Case I, supra note 49, at 6. In response to a direct challenge to
the constitutionality of the nationalization laws, the Court refused to invalidate
retroactively nationalization. Instead, the Court, in accordance with the Finnis
continuity principle, held that victims of nationalization could currently "enforce
their rights at the competent organs" if their particular property confiscation
"exceeded the provisions of the legal rules in effect at that time" when the confiscation occurred. The Nationalization Case, supra note 53, at 12 (emphasis added); see
supm note 128.
135. FINNIS, supra note 117, at 250-51.
136. Id. at 247-51. In the paragraphs that follow the term "minds of mature
practical reason" is used to refer to those adhering to the communal order or
sacred traditions. For a commentary on how to identify the contents of "minds of
mature practical reason" in contemporary Western society, see PHILIP RIEFF,
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A way to better understand the operation of these exceptions is to examine the question of the legitimacy of the laws of
the imperialist in a c~lony.'~'Natives often avoid punishment
by appearing to comply with a colonizer's rules, while they
retain steadfastly their own culture's rules. In fact, social scientists have documented native communities' maintenance of the
authority of native laws under the camouflage of compliance
~ such a scenario, community rules
with imperialist r ~ l e s . 'In
and mature minds can be said to adhere to the native sacred
order in many areas of the law, rather than to the "effective"
imperial law.
A decision that an imperialist law of the past was not
legitimate and therefore is not entitled to recognition as having
set forth rules governing that time period, rests upon the determination that a distinct cultural rule thrived in "mature
minds" during that past time period. The effect of such a decision is to put forward the present day authority as a continuation of a pre-existing communal order that is distinct from the
authority in power during the immediate past.lsS The denial
FREUD:THE MINDOF THE MORALIST
(3d. ed. 1979).
137. The ensuing analysis of the practical application of the exceptions is my
own and F i ~ i may
s
well disagree.
138. For a description of (1) how independent cultural orders are maintained
under the "camouflage" of compliance with the rules of imperialists, racists or sexists; and (2) how the imperialists, racists and sexists cannot perceive the subversive activity, see LUCEIRIGARAY,THIS SEX WHICHIS NOT ONE (C. Porter trans.,
1985) (developing feminist strategy of mimesis in which women comply with stereotypes and consequently subvert the stereotypes); Ethan Klingsberg, Narratives of
the Resistance of Jamaican Women (Apr. 29, 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the Brigham Young University Law Review) (discussing works of a Jamaican
sociologist and novelist and relying on theories of resistance in H. K. Babha, Signs
Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree Outside
L
144 (Autumn 1985)); see generally M.
Delhi, May 1817, 12 C ~ C A INQUIRY
453
Holquist, Stereotyping in Autobiography and Historiography, 9 POETICSTODAY
(1988) (explaining how compliance with societal stereotypes can simultaneously
reveal society's imperialist apperception).
An example of camouflaged compliance would be the Maranos, the Inquisition
Era Spanish Jews who convinced the Catholic Church that they had converted t o
Catholicism while they actually retained adherence to the rules of Judaism. See
ABBA EBAN,HERITAGE:CIVILIZATION AND THE JEWS
172 (1984) (The Marams
" 'were Jews in all but name, and Christians in nothing but form.'"). In such an
instance, the Church would be considered an illegitimate authority in the Jewish
community, despite the fad that its authority was in force.
139. See McConnell, supra note 6, at 1505 & n.17 ("Allegiance to the memory of
an idealized past, with its idealized principles, has historically been the leading
impetus to constructive social . . . transformation" in English history and according
to the analyses of Hannah Arendt and of Michael Walzer.).
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of the continuity of law relegates the prior regime to what
The trials of
H.L.A. Hart calls "a period of interrupti~n."'~~
Nazis in Western Europe after World War I1 attempted t o
achieve this effect. For example, the determination by the
French that rules of "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" governed behavior on French territory during World War 11,
rather than the Nazi laws in force a t the time,"' has been
portrayed as France's attempt to distinguish its culture from
that of the Nazis.'"
Similarly, Czechoslovakia's current
lustrace- or "communist purgation" process is an attempt t o
associate the present authority with a community distinct from
the authority of communism.
Arguably the principle of the continuity of law should have
another exception: The present regime should deny the continuity of law when the prior regime's rule conflicts with universal
mores of conduct. However, reliance on universal norms as a
separate exception to Finnis's continuity principle is superfluous and potentially misleading. If a prior regime's rule transgresses a universal rule, then it will activate the aforementioned exception on conflicts with the mature, native order.
Moreover, the formulation and application of transcendent
140. HART, supra note 133, at 115-16. Hart insists that the 'questions . . . as to
what was or was not law' in the territory during the period of interruption . . .
may not be . . . [questions] of fact." Id. at 115. He is willing to grant the new
regime unfettered discretion to pass laws which label the prior era a "period of interruption" and which retroactively deem the prior regime's rules to have been
illegitimate. Hart dismisses attempts to evaluate empirically the legitimacy of a
prior regime's authority. He explains that the determination of the stage at which
one legal system has legitimate authority and a suppressed legal rule or system
has "ceased to exist is a thing not susceptible of any exact determination." Id. I
tend to agree on one level. This subsection's (III.C.2) criteria of legitimacy may not
be subject to exact results. Moreover, the standard favors recognition of the vathe communists-which utilized ruthless methods to
lidity of a prior regim-like
eliminate virtually all space for private adherence to a distinct, native order.
But on another level, Hart's willingness to ignore empirical evaluation exhibits
a lack of foresight into the dangers which can result from a new regime's unfettered discretion to deny the continuity of law. The decision whether to recognize
the continuity of law must have an empirical basis to avoid the dangers of unintended self-condemnation and neglect of contemporary values. See discussion infra
part III.C.3.
141. Despite the frequent portrayal of Nazi authority as Yawless," the codes
were filled with positivist enactments authorizing the regime's vast powers. See
HANNAH ARENDT,EICHMANN
IN JEWSALEM
290 (1964) Nazi atrocities "took place
within a legal order. That, indeed, was their outstanding characteristic.").
142. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial
of &us Barbie, 98 Y m L.J. 1321, 1339 (1989).
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rules is a precarious exercise. Otto Kirchheimer relates the
difficulties which the Nuremberg tribunals had defining "universal" concepts like war crimes, crimes against the peace, and
crimes against humanity." The basis for those difficulties
was the diversity of local norms among the AUies.14 Consequently, the Nuremberg tribunals based charges whenever
possible on war-crime charges derived from "all the traditional
common crimes."'" The implicit justification for the application of traditional, domestic laws of crimes to the Nazis is the
aforementioned "mature, native order" exception.'"
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER,
POLITICAL
JUSTICE:
THE USE OF LEGALPROCEDURETO
POLITICAL
ENDS323-27 (1961). Similar problems plagued the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo following World War IX. See Kopelman, Ideolo-

143.

gy and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War
Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J . I m . L. & POL.373, 435 (1991) ("[Tlhe failed attempt
at defining 'aggression' in the Tribunal's Charter . . . revealed the Allies as a
shaky coalition of victor nations capable of uniting only for the immediate purpose
of dispatching the vanquished.").
144. KIRCHHEIMER,supra note 143, at 323-27. The definition of war crimes was
subject to the "uncertain and shifting boundary lines of warfare," id. at 324; the
defmition of crimes against peace was undermined by the post-War dissension
among the Allies, id. at 325; and crimes against humanity suffered from the "absence of a boundary line between atrocity beyond the pale and legitimate policy
reserved for the individual state," id. at 326.
145. Id. at 323-27.
146. A similar outlook on trials of Nazis can be derived from HART, supra note
133. At one point, Hart severely criticizes a post-World War 11 German Court of
Appeals decision upholding the conviction of a Nazi informant. Id. at 204-07. Hart
defends the convict as having complied with valid Nazi era laws. He reasons that
the Nazi laws were valid based on "the distinction between what law is and what
law ought to be." Id. at 206. Earlier in m e Concept of Law, Hart seems to contradict his stance on the German Court of Appeals ruling. He defends a new regime's
right to declare a prior regime's laws retroactively invalid. Id. at 115-16; see supra
note 140.
Hart's apparent contradiction can be resolved. There is a difference between the
basis for the denial of the continuity of law by the German Court and by Hart's
hypothetical new regime. The faulted German Court relied on universal, higher law
principles--a "sense of justice." HAIYT, supra note 133, at 254-55. By contrast, the
hypothetical new regime's justifiable denial of the continuity of law is founded on a
vision of the prior regime as "a period of interruption." Id. at 115-16. The "period
of interruption" theory is consistent with the approach advocated by this Article; it
invalidates a prior regime's law based on the view that the true, native order was
suppressed during the prior regime and has been resurrected by the new regime.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
H a ~ a hArendt makes a similar point in her argument that the Israeli
judiciary's authority in the E i c h m a ~trial would have been more well-founded if it
had been founded on a "territorial principlewrather than on "universal jurisdiction."
See ARENDT,supra note 141, at 258-63. Under the territorial principle, Eichmann
would have been charged for infringement upon the legal order of the Jewish
community rather than for a nebulous universal violation. Arendt explains that the
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Application of transcendent norms, without identification
of a basis in the particular community, is especially inappropriate in the realm of property rights. While many societies are
prone to believe that visions of a free conscience are natural
and universal, the idea of natural, universal rights to property
is clearly an oxymoron.147The contours of property rights ontrials of Nazis in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, Russia, and
France were premised upon the "territorial principle" or infringement upon the distinct orders of those lands. Id. Later, however, Arendt changes perspectives and
argues for the establishment of an international tribunal with "universal jurisdiction* in the case of genocide, because genocide is a crime beyond any common
crime within a community. Id. at 267-77.
Resurrection of the "mature, native order" which preceded the prior regime is
also more effective than reliance on assertions of universal laws when the prior
regime is put on trial by the successor. The three main defenses in so called
"successor trials" are (1) the act of State doctrine, (2) the superior orders defense,
and (3) the claim that the conviction constitutes retroactive justice in violation of
ex post facto principles. See, e.g., WILLIAM
J . BOSCH,JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG
4066, 130-44 (1970) (international and domestic lawyers' critiques of problems with
Nuremberg trials). With regard to the first two defenses, the resurrection of the
traditional law preceding the prior regime de-legitimizes the acts of the prior State
and the superior orders of the prior regime. With regard to the third defense, the
charges are not based upon malleable universal rules which appear to have been
created especially for the occasion, but upon longstanding, native traditions.
For a survey of the international law instruments available for prosecution of a
prior regime's human rights violations and an argument in favor of their potential
effectiveness, see Roht-Aniaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute
Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL.L. REV. 449 (1990).
147. See discussion supra part 1II.B. The following statement reveals a typical
Western distinction between norms that are universal and norms that are products
of a particular legal system and therefore inherently flexible: "[Plroperty (unlike
freedom of conscience, for example) could not exist without the mechanism of
government." Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of
hivate hoper@, in CONSIT~~~~ONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY,
supra note 8, at 241,
264. Even freedom of conscience, however, is a particularistic norm. For example, a
community of monks would set forth different rules to create a free conscience
than would a community of so-called "free-thinkers." Nedelsky hints that she is
aware that other rights are no more absolute and transcendent than property
rights: "[Plroperty is, of all the basic rights, perhaps most obviously the creation of
the state . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
In Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), discussed in the next subsection,
Chief Justice Marshall recognized the continuity of a British legal rule on property
rights even though it was "opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized
nations." Id. at 591. "[P]rinciples of abstract justice" amounted only to "the private
and speculative opinions of individuals," because the rule was consistent with the
particular "system under which the country had been settled" and the particular
circumstances of the settlement. Id. at 572, 588, 591.
Michel Foucault dedicates his scholarship to illustrating that all that is considered "naturaln-from
sexual behavior to the ideals of political liberation
movements--are concepts constructed by humans with historicist rather than divine
or natural origins. See infb note 204.
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ly exist as a result of a country's particular legal rules, and
therefore certain contours can be "naturaln only with regard to
a particular community or set of communities which have the
same rules simultaneously.
Another misleading consideration in continuity of law determinations is whether the prior regime legally authorized the
present regime. Under the Finnis approach, such a technical,
legalistic factor is irrelevant to the continuity of law. Simply
because a prior regime legally authorized a subsequent regime,
as was the case in the Hungarian transition, does not mean
that the prior regime's law is entitled to retroactive recognition.
The prior regime's laws may lack legitimacy and the present
regime's authority does not rest on the prior regime's authorization. Conversely, if a regime takes power by technically illegal means, such as a coup d'etat, then the continuity of law
still may apply. Professor Finnis points to several examples
from British history in which a monarch forcibly regained power from a usurper. The monarch then recognized the validity of
the usurper's laws during the prior period, because the usurper
had legitimate authority during that period? The United
States Constitution's supersession of the Articles of Confederation is another example of a technically illegal transition in
which the continuity of law prevailed.'"

148. See Finnis, supra note 81, at 44-61 (criticizing Hans Kelsen's focus on
Y awful devolutionw).
149. Neither the Articles of Confederation nor State laws authorized the methods
used to ratify the Constitution. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 6, at 456-57 & n.3.
Nevertheless, the continuity of law was never doubted. James Madison wrote that,
even without a reference in the Constitution, see U.S. CONST.art. VI, 5 1, the
debts and property rights against and in favor of the United States which had
been established under the Articles would retain validity under the Constitution.
THE FEDERALIST
NO. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also infra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the assumption of the prior
regime's debts as a manifestation of the continuity of law). Professor Ackerman
notes that the framers considered it irrelevant to search the Articles to find legal
authority for the Constitution's ratification. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 456-57 &
n.3. A basis in popular sovereignty was all that was necessary "to legitimate their
act of constitutional creation." Id. at 457 n.3. Ackerman's assertion that popular
sovereignty is the sole legitimating factor and that attempts to "legalizew the
Constitution's ratification are unnecessary parallels Finnis's emphasis on the
"mature sector of society" in response to Kelsen's "pure law" approach to changes
of regime. As long as "popular sovereignty" or the "mature sector of society"
(spoudaia polis) is at the foundation of the prior and new regimes, then the
continuity of law should be -ed
without regard to whether the prior regime
legally authorized the new regime.
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3. Problems accompanyingthe denial of the continuity of law

a. Unintended self-condemnation. Two problems may
plague denials of the continuity of law. The first problem is
that the present regime can be easily construed as a continuation of the past regime. In Czechoslovakia for example, the
lustrace is showing that the authority of the prior regime was
of such a pervasive nature that nobody outside of prison maintained a distinct set of cultural rules under the camouflage of
compliance with communism. The revelations of the lustrace
may eliminate the capacity of the present regime to put itself
forward as a continuation of a communal order that was distinct from the authority of communism.
Similar links existed between the supporters of British
oppression of Native American Indians and the community
authorizing the independent American government. Consequently, Chief Justice Marshall in 1823 upheld the continuity
of a British rule on Indian rights, rather than denying the
continuity of law and simultaneously condemning the values
and authority of the contemporary American government. The
~ whether Indians, in
dispute in Johnson v. ~ ' I n t o s h 'was
years prior to the independence of the colonies (1773 and 1775),
could have made valid land sales to private individuals. Following the principle of the continuity of law, Chief Justice Marshall looked to the legal rule in force in 1773 and 1775. The
British legal rule-which was "maintained and established as
far west as the river Mississippi, by the swordn-permitted
Indians to possess rights to occupy land, but prohibited their
possession of rights to sell that land.'"
Chief Justice Marshall's continuity of law inquiry, like the
approach derived from Finnis, did not end with the identification of the legal rule in force in 1773 and 1775. Two potential
obstacles to Marshall's recognition of the British legal rule
stemmed from the rule's "wantonly oppress[iveIn nature. The
first obstacle was the conflict between the. British rule and
"principles of abstract justice, which the Creator of all things
has impressed on the mind of his creature man." Marshall
150. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
151. Id. at 587-88.The European principle of "discovery gave [Great Britain] an
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or
conquest." Id. at 587.
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disposed of this argument by dismissing the applicability of
"abstract justice" to a rule that is consistent with "that system
under which the country has been settled" and the particular
circumstances of that settlement. Flaws with the "original
justice of the British rule" merely amounted to "the private and
speculative opinions of individuals."
The second obstacle, which stemmed from the "wantonly
oppress[ivel" nature of the British rule, was that it inhibited
the Indians from "separat[ing] from their ancient connexions."
The Indians had not accepted the British rule's validity and
therefore America had not become "one people" under one authority. Marshall therefore perceived the legitimacy of the
British rule's authority over the Indians to be q~estionab1e.l~~
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court applied the British rule
to the pre-Revolution transactions. Marshall succinctly stated
the basis for his acceptance of the continuity of the British law:
"The British government . . . was then our government," while
those who authorized the sales by Indians chiefs were "their
people."lrn The "civilized inhabitants [who] now hold this
country," were part of the British community in 1773 and 1775,
as opposed to a community of savage^."'^ The continuity between the oppressors of American Indians and the post-Revolution American authorities was further exemplified by the incorporation of the British rule in State and federal laws following the Revolution. The United States was the heir to the British with regard to the "savages," rather than the heir to either
the Indian order or a higher order of "abstract justice." Johnson
v. WIntosh aptly avoided a condemnation of the cherished
regime of the present which accompanies the denial of the
continuity of law when the prior regime and the present regime

152. [Hhmanity demands, and a wise policy requires, that the rights of the
conquered to property should remain unimpaired . . . [so] that [the conquered people's] confidence in their security should gradually banish the
painfbl sense of being separated fiom their ancient connexions and united
by force with strangers.
When the conquest is complete, and the conquered inhabitants can be
blended with the conquerors, or safely governed as a distinct people, public opinion, which not even the conqueror can disregard, imposes these
restraints upon him; and he c a ~ o tneglect them without injury to his
fame, and hazard to his power.
Id. at 589-90.
153.
Id at 588 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
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are closely linked.
b. Neglect of contemporary values. The second potential
problem with the denial of the continuity of law is that contemporary values often fail to emerge. If the continuity of law is
denied, then the current authority must adopt rules that supposedly reflect the true communal order suppressed during the
prior regime's rule. These laws often function as a vehicle to
make a statement that "we" of the present are not "them" of
the past, rather than as an expression of the affmnative beliefs
of the present community. At the Klaus Barbie trial, the legal
rules stated only that Nazism was unlawfiil, without any elaboration of what substantive, French standards of conduct made
Nazism u n l a ~ f u 1 . lThe
~ lustrace emphasis is also basically
anti-communist, without an emphasis on what distinctly
Czechoslovakian values distinguish communist acts as transgressive.
c. The continuity of nationalization. Both of the aforementioned problems would have applied to Hungary had the Court
denied the continuity of the nationalization laws' reform of
property rights. First, condemnation of the supporters of nationalization as anti-Hungarian would have been a condemnation of the Hungarian community rather than of outsiders.ls6
While it is true that elements of violent enforcement and Soviet
imperialism characterized communist rule in Hungary, it would
be false to claim that a Lockean culture existed over the last
four decades beneath a camouflage of Hungarian compliance
with the communist nationalization laws. Although communism arguably suppressed a traditional strain of free market
activity in Hungarian society,ls7 nationalization did not in-

See Binder, supra note 142, at 1328, 1339-55.
Cf. SBjo, supra note 16, at 12 11.19.
Obviously there is a general tendency in the Hungarian transformation
process to offer survival possibilities for many supporters of the communist regime. As a matter of f a d there were too many collaborators or at
least non-resistants. Hungary (and the GDR or Romania) is different from
Poland where "you exped the great divide to lie between opposition and
collaboration, black and white, the craven and the brave."
Id. (quoting TIMOTHYG. ASH, THE USESOF ADVERSITY 148-49 (1989)).
157. Elem& Hankiss writes, "Until the late 1940s Hungary was a market economy. Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial spirit had a long tradition both in the
cities and in some of the mral areas." Elem& Hankiss, Between Ttvo Worlds, in
RESEARCHREVIEW:PROJECT
NO. 2, CHANGINGVALUESIN HUNGARIAN
SOCIETY39,
44 (P.Somalai ed., 1989). Hankiss further notes that "without the skills, attitudes,

155.
156.
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fringe upon an innate Hungarian tradition of natural property
rights. Prior to the communists' rise to power in 1947, property
rights had been founded upon State ordered confiscations from
large landowners in 1945,'~ from Germans in 1945,'" and
from Jews during World War II.'* Moreover, prior to the rise
of communism, the "large-scale involvement of the Hungarian
government in the country's economy [reached] the point where
it is not an exaggeration t o say that the nationalization of the
Hungarian economy began during World War II."'6'

and values transmitted by this tradition, the 'second economy' could not have taken
off so easily and swiftly in the 1960s and 1970s."). Id. at 44 n.4.
158. See Charles Gati, Fmm Libemtion to Revolution, in A HISTORY
OF HUNGARY
370 (P.Sugar et. al. eds., 1990) (YTIthe Land Reform Act of 1945 . . . provided for
the expropriation of estates larger than one thousand hold (1,420 acres) and the
seizure of some smaller estates as well."). Viktor Orbtin also notes that "the beneficiaries of the 1945 land reform [which broke up large estates and distributed land
to individual farmers] obtained their property precisely because of the same violation of the sanctity of property as those who received theirs as a result of
collectivization." Viktor Orb&, The Case Against Compensation, UNCAPTIVE
MINDS,
Summer 1991, at 35 (speech by leader of FIDESZ Party in Parliament on February
4, 1991) (brackets in original).
159. See Celestine Bohlen, Hungarians Debate How Far Back to Go to Right Old
Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 15, 1991, at Al, A6 ("Ethnic Germans estimate that
980,000 acres and about 60,000 homes were seized aRer the war.").
In 1945, following the end of World War 11, Hungary not only redistributed to
the poor the land of ethnic Germans, but also large amounts of property owned by
"Horthy fascists," the Church, as well as banks and other private enterprises
OF MODERNHUNGARY
169 (K.
involved with Germany. J. HOENSCH,A H I ~ R Y
Traynor trans., 1988).
160. Hungarian Jews not only lost businesses under various World War I1 property reform laws, see L. Tilkovszky, The Late Interwar Years and World War 11, in
A HISTORYOF HUNGARY,
supra note 158 (discussing transfer of property rights to
"high ranking officials and military leaders" under "[tlhe law of 1942 which nationalized land owned by Jews"), but also had land expropriated pursuant to decrees
issued in the 1920s. See HOENSCH,supra note 159, at 106. Much of the land
expropriated in the 1920s ended up in the hands of Admiral Horthy's 18,000 member Order of Heroes. The State granted each member of this ultra-patriotic organization a farm of up to 50 hectares at no charge. Id. at 107. Hungarian participation in the Holocaust also led to confiscations h m Jews. See Bohlen, supra note
159 ("An estimated 337,000 properties belonging to [Hungarian] Jews who died in
Nazi concentration camps were turned over . . . under deeds that showed that the
former owners had died of 'poisoning.' ").
The Constitutional Court similarly traced the "gradual[]" implementation of
nationalization back to the racist takings of the World War I1 era and the postWar land reform: "At the beginning, this was directed at certain social groups,
then it was executed according to the size of the property, and finally, the nearly
complete liquidation of property took place." See The Nationalization Case, supra
note 53 (holding nationalization laws prospectively unconstitutional).
161. Gyorgy Ranki, The Hungarian Economy in the Late Interwar Years, in A
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The second problem with the argument against the continuity of law in Hungary is that it would hinder the development of property right reforms that reflect the views of contemporary Hungary. The explanation of the first problem indicates
that Hungary has a flexible tradition in the realm of property
rights. The property rights of a particular moment prior to
1947 are not distinctly Hungarian and have no definitive connections to the present Hungarian community. The recognition
of pre-communist rights would be part of an effort to deny the
connections between the prior regime and the Hungarian community, rather than the result of any connection between the
pre-communist order and the present Hungarian community.
The Court's validation of pre-communist rights would amount
to an imposition on Hungary of fimdamental rights that have
no roots in the current community.'"
HISTORYOF HUNGARY,
supra note 158, at 366. Other precommunist departures
from the sanctity of property rights occurred in 1941 and December 1945. In 1941,
Hungary authorized the expropriation of non-Magyar property in the territories resupra note
gained from Hungary's neighbors during World War 11. See HOENSCH,
159. Under the 1945 armistice, those territories were returned to Hungary's neighbors.
On November 7, 1945, Hungarians elected a Parliament in the "the freest and
least rigged of any [national election] ever held in Hungary." Id. at 173. On
December 6, 1945, that Parliament voted to place the mines %rider state
control-amounting in practice t o nationalization." Id. at 174. That measure,
introduced by the Communist Party, which only had 17% of the seats, passed with
the support of popularly elected left wing leaders of the Smallholders Party (57%
of the seats) and the Social Democrat Party (17% of the seats). Id. at 173-74.
From one perspective, the various pre-1947 property reforms and confiscations
reaf3hned the centrality of free market property rules in Hungary. If free market
property rules had not also been in force in pre-1947 Hungary, then the pre-1947
takings would not have been able to achieve their purposes of harming and benefitting respective sedors. However, the pre-1947 reforms and confiscations were not
considered to have been unlawful stealing any more than the confiscations by the
Crown in nineteenth century Hungary. Instead, those pre-1947 takings were
considered natural departures from free market principles for the sake of various
higher State purposes, such as bigotry and opposition to aristocracy. The postc1947
reform of property rights under nationalization was in this same tradition of
serving a State principle superior to free market rules.
The various post-1947 nationalization programs reflected H u n g w s ambivalence
toward respect for and infringement upon property rights. At no time was all
private property ordered to be nationalized. Moreover, some of the nationalization
laws had provisions for compensation and permitted portions of the economy to
remain subject to private control.
162. See Ethan Klingsberg, "Letter to the Editor," The New York Times Magazine, Dec. 1, 1991 (Article on the return of property in the former G.D.R. to precommunist owners showed that the result was the subordination of "the contemporary German community's interests" to "the interests of someone from another era
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Madison might have viewed such a denial of the continuity
of law as an ingenious solution. The inevitable "violent struggle" accompanying the creation of new property rules after the
rejection of communism could be avoided simply by structuring
new entitlements on the basis of those property rights in existence prior to communism. It is more likely, however, that
Madison would have endorsed the continuity of law approach
taken by the Constitutional Court. One of the bases of
Madison's opposition to the reform of property rights was that
the current state of property rights reflected the existing communal traditions. His fear was that if the topic was opened up
for debate, then the unity might disintegrate. In contrast, Hungary has yet t o produce a stable communal vision of property
rights with which to begin before Madisonian prudence can be
invoked. The suppression of debate on a topic on which a communal consensus does not yet exist would infringe on
Madison's basic notions of liberty and popular ~overeignty.'~
The Court's decision t o uphold the continuity of law did not
resolve the debate, but it enabled the debate t o avoid certain
obstacles. Recognition of the continuity of law eliminates the
credibility of the distracting and false claim that pre-communist entitlements are the true Hungarian state of affairs. The
Court's decision directs energies away from futile efforts to
distinguish the past four decades and toward the constructive

and, as [the former owner] has come to realize, another place.").
Madison advocated neither the elimination of all factionalism stemming
from property rights nor the imposition of constitutional rules that do not emanate
from the people.
On Madison's embrace of factionalism, see THE FEDERALIST
NO. 10, at 78
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (Madison indicated that there were
two ways to eliminate the "disease" of factions. First, one could eliminate the
liberty "essential to its existence," but that would be "worse than the disease"
itself. A second option was "giving to every citizen the same opinions" which is
"impracticable").
Later in the same essay, Madison recognized that "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property."
Id. at 79. This recognition indicates that Madison's response to Jefferson (that
property rules must remain stable and that the unequal distribution of property
must not be interfered with by the State, see supra part II1.B) assures the continuation of factionalism, rather than serving to eliminate factionalism. Despite
Madison's reluctance to permit upheavals, as indicated in his response to Jefferson,
Madison realized that even by taking a prudent approach he was permitting widespread factionalism.
On Madison's vision of popular sovereignty, see McConnell, supra note 6 (the
people are the fountain of all power).

163.
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and pressing project of communal self-definition.

D. The Prospective Creation of Property Rights:
The Rejection of Metaphysical Justifications
in Favor of Scientific Policy Objectives

The Land Act Case I did not end after the Court's refusal
to recognize pre-communist rights. The Constitutional Court
did not just take away the possibility of using pre-communist
rights as guideposts for the creation of entitlements and then
leave Parliament to its "violent struggle." The Court proceeded
to set forth constitutionally permissible standards for determining entitlements. The Court held that the grant of an exclusive
entitlement to former owners, a party who lacked a prior fundamental right to such a property interest, would only be permitted if "such a distribution of State property would have a
more favorable total social result than equal treatment, and if
it undoubtedly follows from the facts that another solution that
is not discriminatory against non-owners [NFO s164] would
not be comparable to this [total s o c i a result."lBSThe opinion
explained that to establish a "more favorable total social result," "it is necessary [for the Parliament] to give a complete
account of the interests of both the preferred and discriminated
groups together with the method of evaluati~n."'~While the
Court did not elaborate further on the contours of "a more favorable total social result," it implied that the "total social
result" is the product of an empirically based, utilitarian policy
calculation and that the precise nature of the formula is subject
to the discretion of Parliament.
The only apparent justification for Parliament's proposed
creation of a discriminatory entitlement on behalf of the former
owners was to remedy injustices of the past. The Court did not
have to make a final determination on whether the explanation
would ultimately satisfy the "favorable total social result" standard, because The Land Act Case I was a request for an advisory interpretation of the Constitution, rather than for a review
of a .actual enactment or proposed enactment. The Constitutional Court observed, however, that the basis appeared to be
9

1
See supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining term %on-former
owner" W O ) and how the Land Act's provisions discriminated against NFO's).
165. The Land Act Case I , supra note 49, at 9.
166. Id. at 10.

JUDICIAL REVIEW: COMMAND OR CONSENT
inadequate.lp7
Parliament's sense of justice could only support the discriminatory distribution of State property if the roots of this
sense of justice could be traced beyond the metaphysical realm
of moral sentiments t o a policy-oriented, forward-looking "favorable total social result" formula. Nationalization undoubtedly had harmed the former owners. Nevertheless, the entitlement of the former owners to benefits would neither meet a
special need of assistance, which they have and other Hungarians lack, nor benefit the entire community more than a nondiscriminatory scheme ~ o u l d . ' ~

167. Another possible justification was the facilitation of domestic entrepreneurial
activity. The argument was quickly dismissed because providing entitlements only
to former owners did not encourage fkee market activity anymore than distributing
the State largess in a non-discriminatory manner (to all citizens without regard to
possession of pre-communist rights).
168. I have included the satisfaction of individual special needs as falling within
the penumbra of "favorable total social result." See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 70 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (government can address special needs
as part of efforts to improve community). A focus on addressing special needs to
bring about a "more favorable total social result" must include consideration of the
new needs created by the cost of benefitting a special need. For an attempt to give
content to the term "special needs" based upon a communal consensus of basic
rights, see Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of
Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV.877 (1976).
Any demoralization suffered by the former owners as a result of nationalization
has to be measured by nationalization's infringement upon their expectations. The
discussion of retroactivity and the continuity of law in the previous section shows
that nationalization did not violate any fundamental vision of property rights
prevalent in Hungary; therefore, the special needs of the former owners for compensation to help them overcome the demoralization of nationalization are minimal.
See Frank I . Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.L. REV. 1165 (1967) (explaining
demoralization costs).
A variety of economic fadors dictate against the provision of benefits to pre-nationalization property owners such as the lack of sufficient knds in the Hungarian
Treasury, the administrative costs of verifying pre-communist rights, and the risk
of inflation.
Most compensation proposals provide pre-nationalization owners with preferences or subsidized opportunities to purchase their former properties. Such an enadment would be costly. Many years may pass before the State Property Agency and
the courts w i l l be able to clarify which properties have former owners with veritiable pre-nationalization titles. The State Property Agency may have to delay the
privatization of many properties while claims to preferences (based on precommunist rights) are pending. Furthermore, investors will continue to hesitate to purchase property out of fear that a "rightful" owner may be identified. Moreover, the
owners of those State properties that have become private, such as agricultural
cooperatives, will hesitate to invest in the long-term future because of the probability of a "righthl" owner making a claim. Current private owners who lose property
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At first glance, it appears strange for a court to hold that a
legislature's sense of justice is insufficient grounds for the creation of an entitlement. Metaphysically based concepts of justice have been present in determinations in the United States
of whether an adequate justification exists for a discriminatory
distribution of entitlements. For example, a fundamental constitutional right often only has a basis in a metaphysical sense
of justice,lBgand satisfaction of such a right is a' sufficient
grounds for the creation of ap entitlement to State property.170 On occasion, a metaphysical sense of justice also has
played a role in the United States Congress' formation of
entitlements, like those proposed in The Land Act Case I, that
do not emanate directly from a fundamental right in the Constitution. For instance, a metaphysical sense of justice motivated the United States Congress recently to grant entitlements to
those who had been interned in concentration camps during
World War I1 with the approval of the Supreme Court. The
legal status of the recently entitled victims of Korematsu v.
United state^"^ was similar to that of the Hungarian victims
of nationalization. According to the courts, both groups lacked a
prior fundamental right to the entitlements. Moreover, all of
the members of each group did not necessarily currently possess a special, forward-looking need for the entitlement.'"
The only basis for the entitlement was morality. However, a

to %ghtfuln owners will suffer demoralization.
For a discussion of how the msts of remedying past injustices outweigh the
benefits in America, see EPSTEIN,supra note 132, at 346-49.
RIGI-~~S
SERI169. See Ronald Dworkin, Appendix: A Reply to Critics, in TAKING
OUSLY, supm note 109, at 291, 364-68 (by definition, rights do not have a utilitarian justification).
170. These metaphysically-based rights are inherent rights existing prior to any
legislative action. See Frank I. Michelman, h p e r t y as a Constitutional Right, 38
WASH.& LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981) (distinguishing between "direct rights" to property which emanate fkom the Constitution and "indirect rights" to property which are
created by a government promise); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 685-701 (1988) (distinguishing between inherent or core rights and
positivist rights).
171. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding constitutionality of internment of Japanese
Americans during World War 11).
172. It is arguable that the victims of World War I1 internments possessed a
special need for the funds to enable recovery from their demoralization. Cf.
Michelman, supra note 168 (fitting justice concerns into utilitarian calculation). It
would be more difficult to argue that former owners are emerging fkom Hungary's
four decades of communism any more demoralized than the rest of the Hungarian
people.
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metaphysical sentiment such as justice or morality is rarely the
sole basis for the creation of an entitlement to property in the
United States. Anglo-American law has a longstanding tradition of limiting the scope of legal interference to realms of scientific policy, as opposed to pure morality.'" Accordingly, in
the absence of a prior fundamental right, the presence of a scientific policy justification is usually necessary in the United
States for Congress to create an e11tit1ement.l~~
Opinions in a recent United States case analogous to The
Land Act Case I offer insights into the substance of the rationale for invoking the scientific-policy/metaphysicsdichotomy in
the equal protection scrutiny of entitlements. In Zobel v. Williams,'" the United States Supreme Court struck down an

173. For a discussion of the history of purely moral justifications for interference
by the State in America, see Duncan K e ~ e d y ,Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjzldication, 89 HARV.L. REV. 1685, 1725-28 (1976). Kennedy relates how
prior to the Civil War, the American legal system limited its non-constitutional
justifications for interference to the pursuit of policy objectives as opposed to purely
moral aims. After the Civil War, justifications for legal interference took the form
of an ethic which had a strong practical, scientific dimension; simultaneously, jurisprudence experienced "the total disappearance of religious arguments, and the
fading of overtly moralistic discussions." Id. at 1728.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961), lists the
rare and delicate situations in which the State has "traditionally concerned itself
with the moral soundness of its people." Kennedy, supra, at 1728. Yet even those
situations--such as restrictions upon obscenity and homosexual condudcdo not
pursue metaphysical or moral objectives without regard for scientific policy concerns. Obscenity restrictions apply only to expression without redeeming social
merit, see Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and cannot apply to obscene expression without any conceivable social ramifications. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Supreme Court upheld Georgia's sodomy prohibition
because homosexuality "malign[s]" people just as rape does. Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Burger, CJ., concurring). Perhaps Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Bowers shows that virtually any moral viewpoint can masquerade as a
policy in the pursuit of the general welfare. I will explain at the end of this
section why the identification of some sort of scientific policy objective is important
from a political science perspective, although meaningless to perceptive legal
observers.
To survive equal protection analysis, a classification must have a scientific
policy element. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); see also McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (legislature's scientific policy justification for the
provision of time for recreation activities enables Sunday closing laws to survive
equal protection challenge).
174. Of course, there are limits on the acceptability of certain policy or utilitarian justifications. See Ronald Dworkin, Reverse Discrimination, in TAKING
R I G ~ SSERIOUSLY,
supra note 109, at 223-39 (distinguishing the argument that
segregation has a utilitarian value because it prevents race riots).
175. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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attempt by Alaska to create discriminatory entitlements justified by a communal sense of morality. Alaska had sought to
distribute its surplus mineral profits to residents in amounts
proportional to the length of time a resident had lived in the
State. The longtime residents, like the pre-nationalization property owners, lacked a fimdamental right to the larger
entitlements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court had to determine
the motive behind the discriminatory scheme and whether it
was constitutionally adequate.
The basic motivation of the Alaskan legislature was to
compensate the longtime residents for the hardships they had
endured while living in Alaska prior to the discovery of oil
there. Thendustice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority over
whether a utilitarian policy justification accompanied this motive. The majority held that, despite the existence of these past
hardships, a utilitarian concern, such as a special need on the
part of longtime residents or the improvement of life in the
S t a t e , did not exist to justify t h e discriminatory
entitlement^.'^^ Accordingly, the Court held that the scheme
violated equal protection. Justice Rehnquist in dissent, citing
the post-lochner legacy of deference to legislatures, was willing
to give the Alaskan legislature the benefit of the doubt that a
utilitarian justification existed.'"
Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the Zobel majority,
but on a much more fundamental level than Justice
Rehnquist. 17' She found nothing "innately improper" about

176. Id. at 61-63 (denying that the statute has a rational relation to any of the
forward-looking policies advanced -by Alaska as the purpose of the statute). Alaska
unsuccessfully advanced three justifications for the discriminatory treatment of the
compensation plan: (1) the need to create financial incentives to induce individuals
to stay or move to Alaska; (2) the need to reward residents for their contributions
to the State; and (3) the need to encourage proper management of the State
mineral revenue trust fund.
177. Id. at 84 @ehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In striking down the Alaskan scheme,
the Court seems momentarily to have forgotten 'the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their
views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.' " (quoting Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970))).
178. Justice O ' C o ~ o rconcurred in the judgment only. She voted to invalidate
the enactment solely for its infringement on the right to travel. The majority holding was based on both the right to travel violation and the more general equal
protection violation discussed herein. Justice B r e ~ a n ' sconcurrence elaborated on
how the majority opinion's right to travel discussion was not essential for the
finding of the equal protection violation upon which this Article focuses.
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the legislature's reliance on a metaphysically based conception
of justice or of "civic ~irtue.""~
In response, Justice Breman's concurrence pointed directly
to the danger of the principle endorsed by Justice O'Connor.
Inherent in any metaphysical belief that justifies discriminatory creation of property entitlements is the "premise that 'some
citizens are more equal than others."180 The only way to
show that such a premise does not underlie the discrimination
is to show empirically that the result will benefit the community, compensate individuals for a lack from which they currently
suffer, or "remedy continuing injustice^."'^^ If such forwardlooking justifications do not exist, then the basis for the enactment is simply a metaphysical belief that something in the
past, without any material relevance to the present or fbture,
makes "some citizens more equal than others." Breman concluded O'Comor7sviewpoint would allow legislatures to distribute entitlements on grounds such as the recognition of aristocracy.'" Indeed, overtones of the recognition of the inherent
rights of nobility characterize the creation of entitlements to
property in response t o the length of time one has lived in a
State or to the amount of property one owned many years ago.
The anti-metaphysics principle of Zobel and The Land Act
Case I can be summed up by an analogy to basic equal protection standards governing the creation of entitlements for African Americans, also known as affirmative action programs.
Slaves, longtime residents of Alaska, and pre-nationalization
property owners all have suffered in the past. However, the
suffering during slavery days, like the troubles caused by the
lack of oil in Alaska and by nationalization, did not violate any
fundamental rights for which one would be constitutionally

179. 457 U.S. 55, 72 ( O ' c o ~ o r ,J., concurring); see ako Suzanna Sherry, Civic
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV.543
(1986) (identifying a theme of deference to community value choices or "civic virtue" in O ' C o ~ o ropinions such as her Zobel concurrence). For a general discussion
of the metaphysical, as opposed to scientific, basis of "civic virtue," see RIEFF,
supm note 136.
180. For additional criticism of the potential dangers of permitting "civic virtue"
rather than utilitarian calculation to serve as a justification for property right
reform, see EPS~EJN,supra note 132, at 344-46. Epstein also considers much of
what many post-Lochner thinkers would let pass as utilitarian policies to be negative-sum gains.
181. 457 U.S. at 68-71 @reMan, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 69 & n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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entitled to a current benefit. In light of the absence of any
fundamental rights to a current benefit, something more than
merely a communal desire to redress the difficulties of the past
is necessary to justify the discrimination of an affirmative action program, the Alaskan surplus distribution plan, and the
Land Act. The past has to have left these groups with current,
special needs that would be met by the creation of
entitlements. Alternatively, the entitlement should benefit the
community in a way that non-discriminatory action could
From a certain perspective, even the scientific policy requirement in both Zobel and The Land Act Case I has an element of metaphysics to it. A scientific policy objective often
brings to State action more of a mystique of acceptability than
actual scientific justification. In reality, there are so many
different utilitarian formulas, as well as definitions of special
need and "favorable total social result," that many different
types of property reform could be adopted and found acceptable
by a scientific policy calculation. Evidence of this truth is the
current, post-Lochner era of judicial review. Government attorneys and judges in this era have become ingenious a t identifying a utilitarian policy consideration underlying regulatory
enactments.'" The United States Supreme Court even rationalizes discriminatorily underinclusive distributions of
entitlements as first steps toward addressing broader utilitarian needdS5
The Land Act Case I indicates that the Constitutional
Court may not be so permissive. The decision condemns as

183. Kathleen Sullivan argues that affirmative action should not only redress the
"sins of discrimination" but .also pursue a vision of the future. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Mirmative Action Cases,
100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986). Both of those objectives are forward-looking policies.
M i t i v e action as a response to the "sins of discriminationn is based upon
redressing the current and -future harmful effects of past discrimination rather
than purely upon backward-looking moralism.
184. See, eg., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (&ing
that %he extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming
up rational bases for state regulationn in the post-Lochner era has gone too far in
equal protection review of entitlements); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.").
185. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486-87 (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) to support the underinclusive classifications of a welfare
program).
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unacceptable an enactment with a policy justification that is
either underinclusive (if the justification does not support entitling all of the former owners) or overinclusive (if the justification would also support an enactment entitling NFO's).'"
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court's "favorable total social
result" standard is inherently vague and will not totally eliminate metaphysical underpinnings from justifications for entitlement decisions by Parliament.
Although the perceptive legal scholar may be able to
deconstruct the myth of the scientific policy/metaphysics dichotomy," the Court's requirement of a scientific policy basis for
the Land Act may play an important role from a political science perspective. As discussed earlier, stormy political controversies lurk behind the legal issues of The Land Act Case I and
of similar property right reform issues that are inevitably in
store for Hungary and all other nations emerging from communism. Simply suppressing these debates is impossible. Some
degree of property reform is inevitable when leaving behind a
communist state of affairs.188 Moreover, suppression of these
debates would enhance the dangers of divisiveness and limit
the chances of arriving a t innovative solutions which could
uni@ the nation. '"
The Court's requirement that scientific policy objectives
underlie the contents of this inevitable debate is a means of
making Hungary's k t u r e struggles over entitlement reform
less divisive and more constructive. Metaphysical debates tend
to be divisive because their contents embody opposing basic
beliefs and values. Parties adhering to different basic beliefs
186. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining term "non-former owner" or "NFO" and how Land Act's provisions discriminated against NFO's).
In The Land Act Case III, the Court stated that, to avoid violation of the equal
protection clause, Parliament must provide an overview of its future plans to
entitle those excluded from an underinclusive entitlement scheme. The Land Act
Case III, supm note 63. By contrast, the United States Supreme Court has been
willing to uphold underinclusive plans based on its assumption that Congress
would proceed "one step at a time." Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.483, 489
(1955); see also supra note 184 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., MICHAEL
J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988) (discussing the proper relation between morality and scientific rationality).
188. See supm text accompanying notes 119-24 (discussing how property right
reform is inevitable when leaving communism behind and how the Land Act Case
debate cannot be limited by resurrecting fundamental rights to property from the
1940s).
189. See Sunstein, supra note 8.
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and values can appear to each other as if they are from different communities. In contrast, scientific debates on property
reform can encompass radically different viewpoints, but they
force all parties to arrive a t a common language-empirical
measurements-and the same conceptual goal-"more favorable total social result."
If Parliament reforms entitlements on scientific grounds,
then the effect on the losing parties will be less alienating than
if Parliament rejects the losing parties' views on metaphysical
grounds. The defeat of a viewpoint on metaphysical grounds
labels that position's means and ends as devoid of moral justification. Theoretically, the victorious proposal in a scientific
policy debate need not be repugnant to the basic values of the
backers of the losing proposal. A scientific defeat only indicates
disagreement with empirical measurements rather than fundamental value differences,
In addition, because the defeated proposals have the same
objectives and underlying standards as today's victorious
scheme, the losers in a scientific-policy debate have the consolation that the proposals defeated today will have a chance for
enactment in the fixture. In contrast, a metaphysically grounded viewpoint is not subject to modification by experience. Accordingly, metaphysical divisions in a community are not only
likely to be perceived as more fundamental, but they also may
result in more longstanding and insurmountable disputes.
The above analysis admittedly oversimplifies the reality of
the scientific-policylmetaphysicsdichotomy; however, the reality is not necessarily as important as its political effect. If Hungary will have to face difficult questions of entitlement reform,
then the Court's ruling that Parliament's resolutions must
pursue scientific policy objectives should modify the nature of
the debates. The factions will avoid focusing on issues that
highlight differing fundamental beliefs within Hungary, such
as what inherent significance one believes pre-communist titles
have today. The theme of how to help Hungary will provoke
differing opinions, but it will also facilitate the maintenance of
unity in a community of diverse beliefs.

E. A Lesson of The Land Act Case I:
Leaving the Past Behind and the Metaphysical
Justice /Scientific Policy' Dichotomy
The pursuit of forward-looking policy objectives constitutes
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not only a wise approach to the delicate issue of property right
reform, but also an efficient and unifPing method for leaving
behind the unattractive remnants of communism in general.
For instance, members of the new government have complained
that many senior members of the judiciary are simply lefiover
communist party hacks, rather than skilled j~rists.'~"The
Parliament must now choose between two approaches to remedying this problem. The metaphysical justice approach would
be to undertake a process like Czechoslovakia's lustrace. Such
an approach would find senior judges unworthy of office based
upon their strong ties to the illegitimate authority of the past.
The social consequences would be the dangers explained in
III:C:3. By contrast, a forward-looking policy to leaving behind
the era of unqualified judges would avoid such drawbacks. The
scientific policy approach, which has recently found favor
among some members of Parliament, would subject all senior
judges to a competitive exam which measures professional legal
skills.1g1 Those judges who occupy senior positions solely because they issued the decisions ordered by communist party
officials, rather than as a result of their superior legal skills,
would be identified. The past's "hack" judiciary would be left
behind through focus on improving the capacity of H u n g d s
judiciary to function with intelligence and independence, rather
than through a witch-hunt with costly social implications.'"
F. Addressing Uncertainty
The final part of The Land Act Case I is a completely different advisory opinion that the Court included in the same
decision. The petition submitted by the Prime Minister asked
whether the Constitution's takings clause requires payment of
compensation when the property of an agricultural cooperative
changes ownership by 'tirtue of law" rather than by an "official
resolution of expropriation." The question raised two issues

190. Oltay, supra note 34.
191. Id.
192. I concede that the advocated approach would not identi& all communist
party hacks. Moreover, the mation of neutral, merit-based exams is a difficult
task. However, the records relied upon by the lrcstrace process are also turning out
to be far from accurate.
Another step critical to the reform and independence of the Hungarian judiciary
is the improvement of salaries and working conditions, which are currently far
below those of the average private attorney.
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concerning the situations under which the Constitution requires compensation: (1)what types of owners are entitled to
compensation after a taking and (2) under what circumstances
does a taking occur.
The Court answered the fmt question by holding that the
takings clause protects all property right owners, including
cooperatives, "natural persons," and 'legal entities." The owners only need to operate independently of the State. An owner
is still protected even if it is regulated by the State or was
formed originally by State action.
The Court answered the second question by stating that
the Constitution requires the payment of compensation for the
taking of a property right even if the taking occurs by a means
other than an official decree of expropriation. If State action
infringes upon the property right or if the State transfers the
rights to another private party, then the Constitution requires
compensation. The Court also emphasized that all compensation must be "immediate, unconditional and full."
The opinion appears to impose an element of absolute
respect for property rights onto Parliament's property reform
efforts. The Court may have made such statements in this
advisory opinion to counteract uncertainties as to the integrity
of property rights in Hungary. Two circumstances peculiar t o
this opinion had the potential for creating the harmful economic consequences which flow from such uncertainties.lg3
First, the Court probably wanted to eliminate any uncertainty in the economy created by the first part of The Land Act
Case I. The rejection of the rights of pre-communist property
owners to compensation could be misinterpreted as a sign that
the protection of property rights is not a priority of the new
regime. The convenient inclusion of this opinion alongside the
rejection of the Smallholders' claims enabled the Court t o avoid
letting the first part of the decision create the impression that
post-communist property rights are not protected from future

193.
See Richard Epstein, A
Z Quiet on the Eastern Front, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
555 (1991) (the extent of property right protection by East European nations dictates whether foreign investors will take a short term or long term view of investment prospects).
On the costs which result from uncertainty as to the integrity of property
rights, see generally BRUCEA. ACKE-,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 41-70 (1977) (discussing utilitarian approach to takings clause adjudications);
POSNER,supra note 112 (discussing the economic theory of property rights).
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nationalization efforts.
Second, the opinion appears to be a response t o Smallholders' Party proposals to order the transfer to pre-nationalization
owners of the rights to certain properties. These proposals had
been hindering the privatization process by scaring investors
away from State properties once owned by supporters of the
Smallholders Party. The opinion serves to eliminate those
investors' apprehensions and the negative effects they were
having on the economy. In particular, the opinion relieves the
uncertainty as to the future value of the property rights of
independent agricultural cooperatives, which were formed from
nationalized land.
These two circumstances are rooted in the particular context of this case. Accordingly, whether the Constitutional
Court's fiture applications of the takings clause will have the
same fervor as the rhetoric in this advisory opinion may depend on whether the foreseeable takings a t that time have as
high a potential to disrupt the economy as the takings at issue
in this opinion.

Parts I1 and I11 examined the formal extent of the Court's
power and the substantive theories underlying a major opinion,
respectively. In one sense, Parts I1 and I11 revealed sources of
the Court's authority. From a hermeneutic perspective, however, those sources must have a source as well. The Article now
goes a step further t o examine the ultimate source of the form
and substance of the Court's authority. In accordance with the
democratic republican notion of government by consent, the
Hungarian community appears to be at least partially the ultimate source of the Court's exercise of power.
The Court's capacity t o root the form and substance of its
authority in the Constitution and the ACC is prima facie proof
that the Court is responsive to the community. Democratic
republicanism does not require the Court t o ignore the constitutional text or jurisdictional legislation because of its perception of a contradictory popular consensus.lg4 Technically, responsiveness to the constitution and the ACC should be a
Cf. McCo~ell,supra note 6 (criticizing Professor Perry for advocating a
system of judicial review which responds exclusively to extra-legal sources, rather
than the actual written law).

194.
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sufficient indication that judicial review is responsive to the
community. However, skepticism often exists as to whether
judicial review conforms with democratic republican theory,
even when the Court is acting within the scope of its lawful
authority.lg5 This is especially true in Hungary, where the
democratic republican roots of the Constitution and the ACC
are not readily apparent.lg6Accordingly, investigation beyond
the technical legality of judicial review is necessary to clarify
the issue of the Court's legitimacy as a democratic republican
body.
The following subsections discuss two aspects of the community pertaining to the function of judicial review: (1) expectations of the nature of judicial decisionmaking and (2) expectations of the meaning of constitutional law. The first subsection shows how the Court's formal authority responds to Hungarian culture's visions of judicial precedents and the adjudicatory process. The second subsection examines whether the
Court interprets the Constitution in a manner which is consistent with the ideals of the social movement which produced the
amended Constitution.
A. Hungarian Legal Tradition
The American jurisprudential mind may fmd anathema the
Constitutional Court's advisory opinion and pre-enactment
jurisdiction, as well as the other factors that increase the scope
of the Court's power t o interpret the Constitution. The roots of
this reaction are, at least partly, due to two aspects of American jurisprudence that are absent from Hungarian legal culture: the common law adjudicatory tradition and legal realism.
The ensuing discussion shows how Hungarian legal traditions
are responsible for the absence of these two strains of American legal thought from Hungarian culture and how Hungary
consequently has significantly different expectations of the
nature of judicially created precedent and of judicial interpretation of legal texts. Both of those expectations are sources for
the Court's extensive authority to issue binding precedents and

195. See supra note 16.
196. Id.; see Boz6ki, supra note 10, at 549 ("One can only answer the question
whether the new Constitution and system of public law correspond to the political
and legal culture of the country [Hungary] after several years of tested experience.").
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to engage in constitutional interpretation.

1. The differencebetween precedent in Hungary's civil code
culture and America's common law culture197
In the United States, expectations of judicial adherence t o
broad, neutral principles are in constant tension with expectations of narrow, specific holdings. The former expectation emanates from the universal definition of legality, while the latter
is an attribute of the common law tradition. America's common
law heritage emphasizes the restrictions upon the scope of
holdings. Decisions are fact-bound. The principles they set forth
are readily malleable with changes in distinguishing circumstances. Decisions may discuss abstract principles; but common
law adjudicatory techniques stress that each decision is limited
t o analogous fact patterns. These restrictions on common law
adjudication technically do not apply beyond the development
of the common law. However, in American constitutional case
law, the common law tradition has created expectations of the
scope of judicial authority. These common law characteristics
are equally prominent in constitutional case law. Accordingly, if
a United States Supreme Court Justice's opinions lean too far
toward setting forth and adhering to neutral principles that
apply "across the board," then he will be criticized as an ab197. This subsection shows that the Civil Code tradition serves as a source within the Hungarian community for the Constitutional Court's scope of authority,
notwithstanding the fad that in practice Hungary may not be a purely Civil Code
legal system. For instance, the Constitutional Court is not a Civil Code court; the
Constitutional Court's opinions have characteristics of the common law case approach; and Hungarian Civil Code adjudications may be moving in a direction
where common law i~ovationsand fad-bound precedents become more frequent as
a diversity of novel and complex issues like pollution disputes begin to come before
the courts. This subsection relies upon the Civil Code solely for its role in defining
the Hungarian community's expectations of judicially created precedent.
Perceptive observers could point out the fact-bound nature of precedents in a
Hungarian Civil Code system. In addition, the common law system has attributes
of the Civil Code system. See, e.g., Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 456
(K.B. 1789) (Where cases are new in their principle, there I admit that it is
necessary to have recourse to legislative interposition in order to remedy the grievance; but where the case is only new in the instance, and the only question is the
application of a principle recognized in the law to such new case, it will be just as
competent to Courts of Justice to apply the principle to any case which may arise
two centuries hence as it was two centuries ago . . . .") (quoted in Epstein, supra
note 193, at 559 n.5).
My goal is to show the role played by popular propositions and expectations,
rather than to demystify these popular conceptions.
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solutist and possibly a s an activist and a countermajoritarian. lg8
Hungary's Civil Code tradition has produced a legal culture
with different expectations of precedent. Prior to the operation
of the Constitutional Court, the only judicially created precedents in Hungarian law were those Supreme Court opinions in
response to fact scenarios without a pertinent Code provision? The Hungarian Supreme Court precedents set forth
the principle missing from the Code, rather than a solution
bound to a f a d pattern. Hungarian lawyers do not rely on the
particular circumstances from which a precedent was derived
to limit the applicability of the precedent's principle.200Law198. See BICKEL,supra note 3, at 162, 173-74 (criticizing Justice Black's lack of
passive virtues); Deutsch, supra note 3 (discussing the extreme adherence of
Justice Hugo Black to neutral principles and the consequent "immodesty" of his
jurisprudence).
The expectation of common law restraint in constitutional case law surfaced in
a recent debate between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia on the appropriate
scope of the Webster v. Reproductive Health Services opinion. Justice O'Co~or,who
favored a limited holding, wrote that there is a " 'fundamental rule of judicial
restraint,' " 492 US. 490, 526 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Three
Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)), which states that
the Supreme Court will not "generally 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise fads to which it is to be applied.' " Id.
(O'Co~or,J., concurring) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y., & Phila. Steamship Co. v.
Commissioner of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))).
Justice Scalia responded with an insightful analysis of recent opinions which
shows that the Supreme Court's adherence to the fundamental rule quoted above is
only a myth. Nevertheless, even after this penetrating critique, Justice Scalia
concluded that he had only shown that it is a "reality that our policy not to
'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts'
has a frequently applied good-cause exception." Id. at 534 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). Despite the revelations of his survey of recent opinions, Justice
Scalia showed that the expectation of judicial restraint is still present because he
felt compelled to provide a "good-cause exception" to justify expanding the scope of
the Webster holding.
199. Technically, there is no such thing as a binding case law precedent in
Hungary's Civil Code system. The Hungarian Supreme Court fills in gaps in the
Code by issuing decrees of varying specificity, rather than by resolving an actual
case. The actual Supreme Court case law, as opposed to the Supreme Court
decrees of legal principles (the judicially created precedents), is not binding
precedential authority.
200.
However, it would be an overstatement to claim that a skilled Hungarian
lawyer, while disputing whether a precedential principle governs a case or what
result a principle requires, would refrain from referring to specific fact scenarios to
which courts have applied the principle. My point is only that the American
cultural perception is that at the foundation of a common law precedent are the
facts from which the precedent is derived, while the Hungarian cultural perception
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yers look to these Civil Code precedents as if they were "black
letter" rule entries in the Code, rather than holdings with possible sui generis characteristics. Hungary's Civil Code tradition
defines precedents as broad, abstract pronouncements. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court, unlike the United States Supreme Court, emerged from a legal culture that lacks the tension between expectations of neutral principles and expectations of precedents of limited substance and authority. The
Constitutional Court's broad powers to issue abstract principles
reflect the communal expectations in Hungary of a high court's
role.
However, whether Hungarian legal culture will always
accept Constitutional Court precedents with the same ease as
the decrees of the Hungarian Supreme Court is questionable
due t o one significant factor: the Constitutional Court's abstract
pronouncements restrict the will of Parliament, while the Hungarian Supreme Court's announcements of norms complement
Parliament's efforts by filling in gaps in legislation. Conflicts
between the Constitutional Court and Parliament may well
inspire Parliament to attempt to challenge Hungarian cultural
expectations of judicial precedent with respect to the Constitutional Court's work.
2. The non-legal realist vision of the interpretation of legal
texts

Hungary's civil code tradition also results in an absence of
legal realism from mainstream Hungarian legal thought. The
bulk of Hungarian judicial decisionmaking involves the application of the pertinent Code provision, rather than the creation
of precedents. Most Hungarians view the application of the
Code as a technocratic act, rather than as a decision dependent
on ideological preferences. The case study method appears to a
typical Hungarian jurist as an emphasis on practical studies.
Hungarian lawyers typically claim, "American law students do
not have any exposure to theory when they only learn by the
case study method.'a01 American legal realists do not share

is that at the foundation of a Civil Code precedent is the principle itself.
201. I witnessed such remarks by Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Romanian
lawyers at the Hungarian Ministry of Justice Seminars, Budapest, January 21-23,
1991; the Jan Hus Foundation Law Reform Conference, Bratislava, November 1990;
and the Soros Foundation Rule of Law Conferences, Cluj-Napoca and Bucharest,
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this reaction because they view a case as the product of a judicial interpretation that could have gone in other directions. By
contrast, a Hungarian jurist does not perceive a simple adjudication of a case under the Code as requiring theoretical choices
for the judge.202
This vision of self-applying law is likely a product of the
Soviet influence on the judicial system and of East-Central
Europe's naivete about the Western civil code tradition, rather
than of the civil code system itself. In contrast to the civil code
judiciaries emerging from communism, courts in Western civil
code countries frequently cite authorities to justie their particular interpretation of a legal rule.2" A court's denial of the
role of authorities guiding interpretation conceals the controlling influences upon the interpretation of a rule and facilitates
manipulation. Such easily accessible manipulation was in the
interest of communist regimes. In addition, a decision that
shows the genealogy of its interpretation of a rule implicitly
concedes that the interpretation is subject to future supersessive interpretations, while a decision that purports to be the
product of a self-applying rule implies fmality and perfectioa204

May 1991. At those events, Professor George Fletcher noted that lawyers in civil
code countries often have such an outlook upon the case study method.
See Sbjo, supra note 16, at 18 (Hungarian judges "want very clear rules
202.
and refuse responsibility for creative precedent-setting. They would like to act as
the paragraph-automat of Max Weber.").
Professor George Fletcher has repeatedly pointed this out to lawyers and
203.
judges in post-communist nations who claim that civil code legal cultures have no
use for the study of case law and for the citation of authorities to justify a judge's
particular interpretation of a rule. See Remarks of George Fletcher and of Hungarian lawyers and judges, Hungarian Ministry of Justice Seminar, Hungary, January
21-23, 1991; Remarks of George Fletcher and of Romanian lawyers and judges,
Soros Foundation Rule of Law Conferences, Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca, Romania,
May 27, 29, 1991; Remarks of George Fletcher and of Czechoslovakian lawyers,
Jan Hus Foundation Law Reform Conference, Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, November, 1990. However, Western civil code judiciaries regard the authority of professors
and treatises more highly than do common law courts.
204.
The research of Michel Foucault focuses on revealing genealogies or the
history of the authorities which society implicitly relies upon to support visions of
"the natural" and "the truth." Foucault's revelation of genealogies enables him to unmask the apparently "natural" and "true" as only an artificial construct. See Michel
Foucault, Two Leckres, in POWER~KNOWLEDGE
83 (1980) ("Genealogies . . . are
precisely anti-sciences. Not that they vindicate a lyrical right to ignorance or nonknowledge . . . . [Genealogies] are concerned, rather, with the insurrection of
knowledges that are opposed . . . to the effects of the centralising powers which
are linked to the institution and functioning of an organised scientific discourse
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Hungary's non-legal realist outlook contributes t o the acceptability of the Constitutional Court's broad powers of constitutional interpretation. Hungarians are accustomed to accepting judicial application of the Code and are more willing to
view a decision of the Constitutional Court as the sole, correct
application of the constitutional text. To Hungarians accustomed to observing civil law adjudications, the Court's tasks of
constitutional interpretation appear much more innocent and
less subject to interpretive discretion than they would t o a legal
realist culture.
The absence of legal realism from Hungarian culture is
likely to disappear quickly, a t least with regard to the Court,
for two reasons. First, the Constitutional Court explicitly cites
the extra-textual authorities which guide its interpretation of
the constitutional text. References to philosophers, Western
European domestic laws, international norms, Hungarian legal
experts, and previous decisions of the Court have all appeared
in recent Constitutional Court opinions. The Court's implicit
concession that the Constitution is not self-applying invites
criticism that the Court has chosen the wrong interpretation.
The second factor is that the Constitutional Court is not engaged in the application of Parliament's rules but in the review
of those rules. Consequently, the political branches are more
likely to engage in criticism of the Court's work. Such critiques
will surely lead to legal realist allegations that ulterior motives
influence decisions.205

B. The Rendszemaltozas and the Constitution
Judicial review can be responsive not only to the communal outlook upon the judicial role but also to the outlook upon
the meaning of constitutional law. Hungary's present amended
Constitution emerged from the rend~zervaltozas.~~
If the

within a society such as ours."). In case law, the revelation of a legal
interpretation's genealogy subjects the interpretation to supersessive interpretations.
205.
Indeed, the Court's opposition to compensation schemes has been attributed
to the alleged communist sympathies of the Judges. Part 111's extensive discussion
of the Court's legal reasoning in The Land Act Case I shows that accusation to be
unfounded. However, true motivations can always be hidden behind legal reasoning
and reliance on precedents. That is why even a court which cites authorities for its
interpretation of a legal rule is subject to legal realist accusations of manipulation
by dark forces.
206. See supra note 11 (rendszervaltozas means "change of regime").
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Court's constitutional interpretations are the products of prior
communal consent, then they should reflect the communal
ideals of the rendszervaltozas. Social scientists have not yet
definitively resolved what the rendszervaltozas means to Hung a r i a n ~ . ~However,
~'
based upon available evidence and
scholarship, this subsection arrives at three normative categories for analysis of the transition's significance. Each category
is used to assess the democratic republican character of the
Court.

1. The rendszervaltozas as restoration
a. A change without a focus. A good place to start a search
for the ideals of the rendszervaltozas is Hungary's past. Paraphrasing the observations of Hannah Arendt and Michael
Walzer, Professor Michael M c C o ~ e l lwrites, "[Alllegiance to
the memory of an idealized past, with its idealized principles,
has historically been the leading impetus to constructive soThere are some indications that
cial. . . transf~rmation."~~~
the ideal of the rendszervaltozas is a resurrection of the state of
affairs before the communist
of the government
began in the late 1940s. Streets have regained their pre-communist names. In addition, the traditional Hungarian coat of
arms has replaced the red-starred shield as the national symbol. Most importantly, several 'sleeping beauty' [political] parties have awakened from their several-decades-longsleep . . . to
claim legal continuity"20swith the pre-communist era. Among
the "sleeping beauties" are the Smallholders Party, the Hungarian People's Party, the Social Democrat Party, and the
Christian Democrat Party.
However, legal signs, as well as the obsemations of sociologists, tend t o indicate that the transition was not a revolutionary "swinging back"210into a particular preordained order. If
the rendszervaltozas has continuity with the pre-communist
era, then the rendszervaltozas must view the communist era as
the illegitimate suppression and reformation of the pre-commu-

207.
Boz6ki, supra note 10, at 538 ("A generally accepted set of conceptions and
a scientih paradigm of the postcommunist transition are not yet available.").
208.
See McConnell, supra note 6, at 1505 & n.17 (quoting ARENDT, supra note
3, at 35-36).
209.
Boz6ki, supra note 16, at 6.
210.
ARENDT,supra note 3, at 35-36.
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nist era. But, unlike Czechoslovakia, Hungary has refrained
from undergoing a lustrace or purgation process premised on
the belief that association with the prior regime was association with an illegitimate a~thority.~"
Indeed, the new regime
recently prosecuted someone for unlawful infringement upon
the authority of the communists, before it prosecuted two communist officials for having breached their lawful a u t h ~ r i t y . ~ ~
Another sign of the continuity between the authority of the
prior regime and the present regime is the unquestioned inheritance of the communist debt.213

211.

In November 1991, Parliament passed a law which
permit[s] trials of all those people accused of committing murder and
treason between December 1944 and May 1990 whom the Communist
Government had protected from being brought to trial . . . . Sponsors of
the legislation say that perhaps 100 people could be tried, compared with
the hundreds of thousands who could possibly lose their [public employment] positions [under the lustrace law] in Czechoslovakia.
Judith Ingram, Coming TZ.ials That May IZy the Hungarian Soul, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 1991, at A4. Moreover, the new law may never go into effect. President Goncz
has refused to sign it and a challenge to the law before the Constitutional Court
will be resolved in early 1992. See Letter of Dr. Gabor Halmai, Chief Clerk to
President S6lyom of the Constitutional Court, to Ethan Klingsberg @ec. 20, 1991).
Goncz similarly precipitated a constitutional challenge to Parliament's third Land
Act bill by his refusal to sign it. See infra note 257. The President's decision to
exploit the formal requirement that he sign all legislation is a significant development in the balance of power in Hungarian government, because Goncz is a member of an opposition party.
212.
The new Chief Prosecutor charged the defendant in the first case with
unlawfully revealing State secrets. The defendant had informed the public that,
prior to and during the transition negotiations, the secret police were monitoring
the meetings of the "Opposition Roundtablen-the leaders of the opposition parties-and then providing the information to the Socialist Party. The defendant
received a "censure": a mild form of a conviction which carries no sentence with it.
The communist defendants, put on trial several months later, were the supervisors
of the operation which the defendant in the first case had revealed to the public.
The defendants in the second case received "the lightest possible sentences." Z.
Lovas, " f i r Danubegate," Uncaptive Minds, Summer 1991, at 17.
See &o Sbjo, supm note 16, at 17 ("InHungary, a handful of the most prominent judges who have sentenced innocent people in political trials or the participants in the 1956 revolt were asked to retire. All that took place without any
publicity."). Such singling out of those judges who suppressed the 1956 uprising, as
opposed to those judges who enforced nationalization and other communist programs, corresponds with the next subsection's reading of the centrality of 1956 for
the rendszervaltouls.
213. See Holmes, supra note 85, at 212 (explaining natural law principle: "if you
inherit another's property (e.g., his throne) you also inherit his debts"). Such a
theory of debt inheritance is premised upon the continuity of law theory elaborated
in Part 111. If you inherit another's throne you also inherit his past
generally-including his laws, legal institutions, and property right reforms. Al-
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Furthermore, sociological analyses have not characterized
the rendszervaltozas as a revolutionary call for the restoration
of the pre-communist state of affairs. These preliminary assessments of recent events emphasize the decentralized nature of
the transition and the consequent failure of a particular set of
ideals to emerge. As Hungarian sociologist And& Boz6ki puts
it, the transition has been "morose rather than ~athartic."~"
Several factors are responsible for confounding efforts t o
put labels on the significance of Hungary's transition from
communism. One factor is the key role of the Hungarian communists in the transition. The degree to which communist
leaders facilitated and took part in the rendszervaltozas while
simultaneously endorsing socialist rhetoric can baffle attempts
to make sense of the transition. A complementary factor is the
gradual nature of the transition. Sociologists link the transition
of 1989 to reforms which began a decade earlier.215
Another factor is the factional nature of the opposition to
commimism. Unlike the situation in Poland and Czechoslovakia, a single anti-communist movement never existed in Hung = ~ The
. ~ various
~ ~ opposition groups which did emerge pos-

though you can change those laws, institutions, and property right reforms for the
present and future (in accordance with contemporary standards), you c a ~ o change
t
their authority over the past in most circumstances. By inheriting his throne, you
are recognizing the legitimacy of the exercise of power in the past by the occupier
of that throne. By contrast, if you took power, but not as an inheritor of the prior
regime's throne, then the continuity of law would not apply.
The Socialist Party has been required to return all of their material possessions to the State. At h t glance, this order appears to be an example of discontinuity, because the order condemns the Socialist Party's possession as illegitimate.
However, the Socialist Party made the purchases as a trustee of the State. Accordingly, the retention of the merchandise by the State as the Socialists step down
from power indicates that the same State is still the authority.
AU of the factors listed refer to the present regime's acceptance of the legitimacy of the exercises of authority during the communist era. However, the fad that
the prior regime technically authorized the present regime's Constitution does not
require such acceptances of the continuity of law. See supm part III.C.2. The
current disdain for the communist era indicates that this is a new era but does
not indicate that the exercises of authority during the past era were illegitimate at
the time.
214.
See An&& Boz6ki, The Authoritarian Legacy in Hungary's Transition from
Communism (June 27, 1991) (unpublished paper delivered at the Convention of the
Hungarian Sociological Association, Budapest).
Sociologists' incessant focus on Hungary's gradualism makes one susped
215.
whether there really was a marked change in the last two years. See, e.g., Boz6ki,
supm note 214; Szabo, supra note 64.
216.
Szabo, supra note 64.
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sessed radically different outlooks and often fiercely criticized
The fust free
the agendas of their fellow anti-c~mrnunists.~~'
elections manifest this phenomenon. Six parties, each with a
unique platform, attained an influential number of seats in
Parliament, while no party emerged with a majority of
seats.218The "sleeping beauty" parties with their pre-1947 ideals only fared slightly better than the Socialist Party.219 Traditional political trends, such as nationalism and rivalries between urban and country dwellers, characterized the transit i ~ n ; ~but
~ ' the rendszervaltozas neither resurrected a particular collective ideal from the pre-communist era221nor rejected the legitimacy of the authority exercised by the communists
in the past.
The Court's constitutional interpretation in The Land Act
Case I reflects the insignificance of the pre-communist era
values to the popular movement which led to the creation of
. ~ ~ ~Court had to decide wheththe amended C o n ~ t i t u t i o n The
er or not Article lO(2) of the Constitution permits Parliament
to recognize pre-communist property rights.2B The Court interpreted Article lO(2) to recognize nationalization's reform of
property rights as a legitimate exercise of authority and to
deny the current validity of the pre-communist rights. Part I11
established that this interpretation rested on sound legal theo-

A. Arato, The Rise, Decline, and Possible Revival of Civil Society (June 27,
217.
1991) (unpublished paper delivered at the Convention of the Hungarian Sociological
Association, Budapest).
Boz6ki writes of the plethora of disputes between opposition parties prior to,
during, and following the Roundtable negotiations. It appears that only resentment
toward the communist attempts to exploit this factionalism resulted in any cooperation at all. See Boz6ki, supra note 16; Bozbki, supra note 10.
218. See supra note 94.
219.
The two most successful "sleeping beauty" parties were the Smallholders
with 11.7% and the Christian Democrats with 6.5% of the votes. The Socialists
received 10.9% of the votes.
Szabo, supra note 64.
220.
221.
Indeed, Boz6ki argues that opposition to communism developed on an
individual level rather than on the level of any collective ideals. See Boz6ki, supra
note 16.
222. See discussion supra part 1II.C.
223.
If Parliament could recognize pre-communist property rights, then a justification would exist for enactment of an entitlement scheme which discriminates in
favor of the pre-communist property owners. Article 10(2) of the amended Constitution indicates that the scope of the exclusive property and economic activities of
KCZZTARSASAG ALK(YI'MANYA[Constituthe State shall be defined by law. A MAGYAR
tion] ch. I, art. lO(2) (Hung.).
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ry and social policy. This examination of the social events
which created the Constitution shows the decision to have also
been responsive to the Hungarian community.
However, the thesis that the Court interpreted the Constitution in a manner consistent with the popular vision which led
to the creation of the amended Constitution must overcome one
striking piece of evidence: The majority of the first elected
Parliament endorsed the recognition of pre-communist property
rights. The parliamentary majority's support for the Smallholders Party's effort to resurrect pre-communist property rights
does not necessarily indicate that all aspects of the Land A d
responded to majority views of the Hungarian community.
Surveys reveal that only the minority Smallholders Party and
a n additional small percentage of the citizenry actively supported the Land Act. The Smallholders used threats to bring down
the ruling coalition, rather than the backing of a popular majority, to attain the support of a parliamentary majority.224
Normally, the results of such special interest politics are
~~
judiconsistent with democratic r e p u b l i ~ a n i s m .Moreover,
cial review's role is not to confound the efforts of special interest groups. However, when special interest group politics result
in legislation founded on conflicts with the majority's fundamental beliefs, as reflected in the Constitution, then judicial
review is consistent with democratic republican principles. In
such a scenario, judicial review and constitutional law are more
responsive to the community than is the legislature. The Land
Act Case I was one such scenario.226Judicial review in The

Of those surveyed in June 1989, when the Opposition Roundtable first
began the transition negotiations with the communists, two thirds said that some
reform of the State's monopoly on property rights was needed, but only 18%
endorsed returning land to the pre-communist owners and only 9% endorsed the
return of other types property to the pre-communist owners. Hankiss, supra note
157, at 55 (Gallup survey). A survey conducted in March 1991, five months after
The Land Act Case I and two months before Parliament endorsed another compensation scheme, revealed that two-thirds of the nation opposed the compensation
concept. See supra note 101.
225.
Cf. supra note 9 (the dissenters or minority in a republic consent to the
majority's adopted decision or rule, because, as participants in a republican government, the minority has consented to decisionmaking procedures and to the results
of those procedures).
226.
For a more detailed account of the political events preceding The L a d Act
Case I, see discussion supm part IIIA. For a defense of the consistency of judicial
review with majoritarianism in American history, see Ackerman, supra note 6;
Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.

224.
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Land Act Case I operated on the basis of neither surveys nor
the Judges' sociological instincts; it operated on the basis of
constitutional interpretation. Surveys and other indications of
public sentiments, however, aflj.rm that the Court's application
of the Constitution was responsive to the populace.
b. 1956 and the ideals of 1989. Even though the transition
was not a consensual call to return to the pre-communist era,
there is one past event which served as an inspirational model
for the rendszerualtozas: the 1956 uprising. Like the
rendszerualtozas, the 1956 conflict was between the Soviet
backed wing of the communist party and a diverse group of
reform communists, bureaucrats, Smallholders, nationalists,
students, and urban intellectuals. Due to the diverse nature of
the 1956 movement, all participants in the rendszerualtozas
have been able to draw upon those events for support and inspiration.
Simultaneously with the announcement that the communist party would "accept political pluralism," reform communist
Imre Poszgay attracted attention by publicly describing 1956 as
a "popular uprising." Poszgay's statement was a radical revision of the previous appellation: "counter-revolution." It was
the "rehabilitation" of a previous era and therefore an indication that a transition was a t hand.227Then the commencement of the negotiations between the Opposition Roundtable
and the communists was marked on June 16, 1989, by the
formal reburial of reform communist Imre Nagy and other
heroes, who had been executed by the Soviets in 1956 and then
buried ignominiously. Hundreds of thousands attended speeches by leaders fkom the Opposition Roundtable and the communist party. The speakers associated their respective causes and
roles in the current negotiations with the martyrs of 1956.~"

1013 (1984).
227.
For emphasis of the importance of this event, see Szabo, supra note 64;
Boz6ki, supra note 16.
Reform communist Imre Nagy Began to lose his once enormous popularity" by
Odober 24, 1956, when it appeared that the 1956 Revolution would succeed.
Charles Gati recalls, T h e people no longer [would] think in terms of the Party
and its factions. At issue was not 'socialist legality'," but a more fundamental
change to political pluralism. Gatii supra note 158, at 380. A similar fate befell
1989s popular communist reformer Imre Pozsgay after the legalization of political
plurality.
TRANSITION
(Video with English narra228. See Fekete Doboz, THE HUNGARIAN
tion) (showing the Imre Nagy Funeral, the digging up of Imre Nagy's bones as
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Then finally, Parliament intentionally passed the amendments
which entirely changed the 1949 Constitution on the anniversary of the 1956 uprising, October 23, 1989.228
The transition's identification with the events of 1956 is
helpful in assessing the significance of the rendszervaltozas.
The 1956 uprising is not just a malleable icon of opposition to
orthodox communism. Similarly, the rendszervaltozas was more
than merely the ouster of the communists without any accompanying idealistic focus. The 1956 movement and the
rendszervaltozas may not have been defintive calls to return t o
either the pre-communist or any other particular state of aff a i r ~ however,
;~~
both 1956 and 1989 stood for democratization, the legalization of factionalism, and the limitation of the
State's unfettered domination of property rights, public debate
and other fundamental aspects of civil society. Moreover, 1956
and 1989 both stood for the cooperation of groups who share
these broad ideals despite their ultimately diverse agendas.
Boz6ki's analysis of 1989 concludes, "[O]pposition cooperation
was the movement of nationwide s~ope."~'
well as pre-1989 illegal ceremonies at the unmarked Nagy grave site and in the
streets of Budapest commemorating the 1956 uprising). The events in the video all
link the recent transition movement to 1956.
A similar reburial of communists, who had been ignominiously executed by orthodox communists, helped spark the 1956 movement. On October 6, 1956, L&z16
Rajk and three other communists who had been killed in the 1949 purges were
reburied in a ceremony attended by tens of thousands. At the Rajk reburial, as at
the Nagy reburial, the authorities used the ceremony to manifest their commitment
to reform, while the opposition used the ceremony to show the Communist Party's
guilt and corruption. Gati, supra note 158, at 377-79.
229.
In addition, a quiet purgation process has been directed at judges who
imposed sanctions against the participants in the 1956 uprising, but not against
judges who helped enforce nationalization and other communist programs. See
supra note 2 12.
Although nobody in government would risk the backlash of refraining from
praising the 1956 uprising, there are members of the government who try to play
down the importance of the memory of 1956. Many current party leaders had
stayed on the sidelines during the 1956 revolt and now associate the 1956 movement with reform communism. Accordingly, MDF neglected to commemorate the
anniversary of the reburial of Imre Nagy and has endorsed a national holiday
based on the accomplishments of St. Istvan rather than the events of October
1956.
230.
As in 1989, the movement of 1956 had a few indications of a popular
desire to return to an earlier era: Nagy's government announced plans to restore
the traditional emblem; the post-World War I1 political parties announced plans to
reorganize; and Cardinal Mindszenty was liberated from prison. See Gati, supra
note 158, at 379-83.
231.
Boz6ki, supra note 16, at 19-20 (emphasis in original); see a h Vihor
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On a formal level, the Constitutional Court embodies the
broad ideals embraced by the Hungarian transition movement.
The extensive burden placed on the Constitutional Court to
provide binding pronouncements of constitutional law responds
to an underlying desire to impose restrictions upon the State.
During the communist era, restrictions on the State had been
meaningless, despite the existence of a Constitution and the
founding in 1983 of a constitutional advisory committee to the
Parliament.232By 1989, it had become clear that binding enforcement of constitutional law by an independent body was
necessary to effect the ideal of restricting the State. Moreover,
the broad grants of mandatory jurisdiction enable the Court to
serve as a reliable guardian of constitutional rights. In contrast, if jurisdiction was more difficult to attain, the Court's
role as the designated protector of constitutional limitations
upon the State would be diminished.
The Court not only limits the State in order to provide
room for Hungary's affinity for factionalism and civil society,
but the Court also limits factionalism and the exercise of liberOrban's Speech at t h Reburial of Imre Nagy, UNCAPTIVE
MINDS, October 1989, at
26 (opposition leader's outline of broad "ideals of 1956" and their significance for
1989 transition).
A crucial event in bringing about the rendsze~altozaswas the united rally of
the opposition parties on March 15, 1989, in Budapest. This rally attended by
"100,000 people and nearly every group in the Hungarian oppositionn revealed that
the communists would not be able to retain their power through exploiting the
opposition's factionalism and reaching separate compromises with the various
MINDS,
opposition groups. What Does the Hungarian Nation Demand?,UNCAPTNE
MayJuneJuly, 1989, at 20. The opposition groups formulated a list of demands
and "read them to the crowd who approved them by acclamation." The list of
demands reflects the ideals of the rendszervaltozas described above.
232. The Constitutional Law Council was made up mostly of members of the
Congress of People's Deputies, the body which the Council was supposedly instructing. Moreover, the Council lacked the power to review enactments or to issue
binding constitutional interpretations. The positivist legal acts of the government
continued to determine the scope of constitutional law despite the existence of the
Council. See generally Isvan Kovks, From the Constitutional Law Council to the
Constitutional Court (April 1989) (unpublished manuscript included in Materials of
Roundtable Conference on Constitutional Reform, February 1990). The Constitutional Law Council failed to function as an independent guardian of constitutional
rights as a result not only of formal fadors, but also of the fact that the members
of the Council were communist party collaborators.
The creation of the Constitutional Court is part of post-communist Hungary's
effort to reform the Constitutional Law Council so that its work has authority. The
authorization of the Constitutional Court to take over the advisory opinion requests
on the Council's docket reinforces this vision of continuity between the two bodies.
See ACC, supra note 19, ch. 5, 5 58; see also KovBcs, supra.
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ty so as to protect the rendszervaltozas ideal of cooperation. A
statement by the Minister of Justice on the transition encapsulates how the Constitutional Court is a response to this sentiment:
The unintended consequences-especially anarchy, a lack of
patience for changes, and the danger of violent solutions--are
real, partly as a consequence of the special characteristics of
the Hungarian political culture, and partly due to the unforeseeable, at present still unknown, patterns of the disintegration of the previous political system. The process of
constitutionalism may play a special role in warding off these
unintended consequences.233

Empowering the Constitutional Court with vast jurisdiction
permits the Court to impose boundaries on factional agendas
and thus to ensure unity with regard, at least, to certain basic
prin~iples.~~
2. The rendszervaltozas and the scientificpolicy ideal
The Land Act Case I opinion's rejection of metaphysical
State objectives and requirement of verifiable scientific policy
justifications for State actionzs5also responds to an apparent
attribute of the transition. The thesis of this subsection is that
the public, being disillusioned with the communist regime's
metaphysically based policies, supported the rendszervaltozas
so that critical scientific analyses would support future governKBlmsln Kulcsgr, Constitutional State, Constitutionalism, and Human Rights
in the Transformation of the Hungarian Political System 10 Veb. 1990) (unpublished manuscript included in materials of Roundtable Conference on Hungarian
Constitutional Reform). KulcsAr was the Minister of Justice during the historic law
reforms of October 1989 and is now ambassador to Canada.
See also Boz6ki, supra note 16 (describing contemporary fears that national
socialist demagoguery will take over in Hungary).
234.
A recent call by President Vaclav Havel for the creation of a Czechoslovakian Constitutional Court reflected a similar response to post-communist fears of
factional violence. Public fears of civil strife arose after certain leaders of Slovakia
issued a series of separatist statements in late 1990. President Havel stated that
he would never utilize the military to ensure unity. Instead, Havel called for the
immediate creation of a national constitutional court to review the legality of the
proposed actions of the Slovak leaders. Havel believed that constitutional law could
unify the country more effectively than could military force. Since the Czechoslovakian Constitution at the time was still the discredited Stalinist Constitution of the
pre-Velvet Revolution regime, it would be even more precise to say that Havel's
confidence was in the institution of the constitutional court.
235.
See discussion supra part 1II.D.

233.
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ment policies.
The communist regime had originally rested its authority
upon claims to both a metaphysical "mission" and the scientific
pursuit of the public goode2=By the 1980s, the propaganda
The so-called
emphasis on the latter ground inten~ified.~~'
"scientific worldview" and "entrepreneurship" of the communists, however, lacked any demonstrable basis. There is some
preliminary evidence that the populace behind the
rendszervaltozas sought a new regime characterized by wellfounded, scientific policy. A study of Hungarian voting patterns
in 1990 by Susan Gal and Katalin Kovacs reveals that voters
preferred to choose candidates based on the evidence of their
technical expertise, as opposed to their party affiliations and
platform^.^" Furthermore, surveys in the 1980s revealed that
Hungarians have little respect for natural rights.23gThis is
another indication that the decision to head in a new direction

236. The party justitied its leading role, in part with its claim of a historic
mission, in part through the claim that, as the only repository of a scientific worldview, it is its sole prerogative to define the "public good." In
terms of this ideology, society is not competent to participate in political
decisions.
Lbsz16 Bruszt, 'Without Us But For Us?" Political Orientation in Hungary in the
NO. 2, CHANGING
VALPeriod of Late Patenzalism, in RESEARCHREVIEW:PROJECT
UES IN HUNGARIAN
SOCIETY,
supra note 157, at 59, 62.
237. See Hankiss, supra note 157, at 46 (describing how "entrepreneurship" and
"enterprising" had become key phrases in communist propaganda in the 1980s).
238. Susan Gal & Katalin Kovacs, The Elections of 1990 (June 25, 1991) (unpublished paper delivered at the Convention of the Hungarian Sociological Association, Budapest). The September, 1990 study focuses on a rural commanity of
three thousand and local elections.
239.
Elemer Hankiss, assessing the results of the European Values Systems
Study of 1982, concludes that Hungarians do not exhibit "an individualism rich in
values but a rude, resenthl, convulsive egoism and privatism." Hankiss, supm note
157, at 42. For instance, only 31% of Hungarians responded that they would raise
their children to respect others, while the rest of Europe responded positively to
that question on an average level between 43% and 62%. See id.
Based upon a national survey of rights consciousness in Hungary in December
1986 and January 1987, Andrbs SAjo writes, "Arguments on human dignity are
scarce and because of prejudices some people are not willing to extend human
dignity to all members of society . . . . There is little respect among the citizens
toward each other." Andr6s Sbjo, Rights-Awareness in Hungary, in RESEARCH
REVIEW:PROJECT NO. 2, CHANGING
VALUESIN HUNGARIAN
S O C m , supm note
157, at 27, 38. Sdjo seems to doubt not only citizens' rights consciousness, but also
the public's capacity to question whether social policy is scientifically grounded:
Hungary is "a country where childish dependence on the goodwill of the authorities
was raised into supreme virtue and where experience teaches that insistence on
rights is being overfussy." Id.
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occurred largely out of recognition of the practical utility of
such a change, rather than as part of a sudden awakening to
the moral superiority of the free markets and l i b e r a l i ~ m . ~ ~
The Land Act Case I instructs Parliament that laws affecting entitlements must have a demonstrable scientific policy
justification. As discussed in Part 111, the Court implies that for
Parliament to create entitlements the Constitution requires
more than simply a vague, post-Lochner reference to the public
good. This interpretation of the Constitution responds to the
popular enthusiasm for scientific policy which, according to
preliminary evidence, underlies the rends~ervaltozas.~~'

3. The rendszervaltozas and the ideal of the West

A final candidate for an ideal of the rendszervaltozas is the
desire t o emulate the West. Part 1I.G explained how Western
legal norms play an authoritative role in the Court's constitutional interpretations. This subsection proposes that such a
development responds to a popular trend underlying the creation of the amended Constitution.
The Hungarian community may not be N l y knowledgeable
of the substantive details of Western legal standards;242but
in a democratic republican State, the populace often consents to
the pursuit of broad ideals rather than detailed particular^.^^
In the realm of constitutional law, the adoption of judicial review and the text of the amended constitution both manifested
On the economic utility of recognizing human rights, see discussion infra
240.
part lV.B.3 (explaining that conformity with human rights norms enables membership in the Council of Europe which is a stepping stone to the practical benefits of
membership in the EEC).
241.
This thesis, like the prior one, must overcome the fact that the elected
Parliament has enacted legislation in a manner contrary to this supposed attribute
of the majority. See discussion supm part 1V.B.l.a (constitutional interpretation can
be more responsive to communal ideals than a d s of the legislature).
See SBjo, supra note 16, at 7 ("The choices [for the future] are determined
242.
by the available Western models (which are often little and selectively known . . .

-3.

243. - Westerners often refrain from authorizing their legislators and judges to
implement particularized results. Instead, the populace authorizes officials to
deliberate for it in accordance with certain broad ideals. See supra note 8 (explaining how exercise of deliberative function is responsive to electorate and in accordance with democratic republican theory of government by consent). See also SAjo,
supm note 16, at 15 ("[IN is quite understandable that in a society at the verge of
economic collapse and where the faculty of self-determination was systematically
destroyed, one expects an active intervention even in [the] shaping of liberal
institutions . . . .").
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a desire t o emulate the legal norms of the West. Judicial review is a Western c o n ~ e p t as
, ~ are most of the clauses of the
amended Constitution. The President of the Constitutional
Court recently warned, "If considerable limitations were imposed on our jurisdiction, then the Hungarian legislature would
have to encounter intense reaction from all over Europe and
would need to give an explanation."245A departure from European expectations of the Court's formal role would require an
explanation, because the Hungarian community perceives conformity to Western legal conventions to be of sigmfkance.
While Hungary's general fascination with the WestU6
may be partially attributed to psychological reasons, there are
also practical bases underlying the communal desire to have
legal standards conform to those of the West. The responsiveness of the Court's constitutional interpretations to Western
norms manifests this practical foundation. The Death Penalty
Case's adherence to Western European legal trendsU7may facilitate Hungary's admission into the Council of Europe and
ultimately the European Economic Community. If Hungarian
legal standards, especially in the area of human rights, satisfy
Western criteria, then the Council of Europe is more likely to
admit Hungary. Admission to the Council is important because
it serves as a stepping stone to the financial benefits of membership in the European Economic Community. In the Fall of
1990, Hungary began a one year probationary period preceding
admission to the Council. If during this period the Council had
reviewed Hungarian procedures surrounding the application of
the death penalty and had found them to be inadequate, as it

244. See Machecek, supra note 84, at 10 (judicial review by a constitutional
court is "form of expression of the European legal culture").
S6lyom, supra note 25, at 1-2.
245.
Hankiss provides a survey from 1989 which shows the Hungarian admira246.
tion for the West. Hanbiss, supra note 157, at 57-58. However, he notes, "It is one
thing . . . to admire the success of Western countries; and it is another and more
difficult thing . . . [to choose] to adopt an already existing" model of economics and
government. Id. at 58; cf SAjo, supra note 16, at 8 n.7 ('The early communist
regimes of the region tried to justify themselves by proving that the legal solutions
they appl[ied were] identical with those of the Soviet law. Now the most common
reference is that the legal solution is in conformity with the Western solution.
People are never particularly clear what . . . they mean [by] Western."). Professor
SAjo adds that appeals t o religion, anti-communism, nationalism, and consumerism
may be more persuasive than references to standards of Western constitutionalism.
Id. at 7.
247. See discussion supra part 1I.G.
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did those in the United States,* then Hungary's chances for
admission by the end of 1991 would have been seriously
hanned. Accordingly, the effort of The Death Penalty Case to
conform Hungarian law to European norms responded t o practical concerns which may underlie the desire to emulate the
West.
The strict standards of the takings clause enunciated in
The Land Act Case 1249also manifest a practical strain in
Hungarian constitutional case law's responsiveness to the transition movement's Western ideals. As described in Part 111, the
holding attempted to eliminate circumstances which inhibit
Western businesses from participating in the Hungarian economy.260The decision's acquiescence to Western property right
standards could well result in economic benefits for the
country.

V. EPILOGUE:
R~~CENT
DEVELOPMENTS
AND FUTURE UNCERTAINTY
Parts I1 and I11 set forth the structure of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court's authority. Part IV traced the credibility
of judicial review's form and substance to sources in the Hungarian community. Whether the roots of the Court's formal
elements of power and substantive theories in underlying communal sources will be sufficient for the Court to be politically
effective is currently indefinite.
Since October 1990, Parliament has enacted three compensation statutes in defiance of the fundamental principles enunciated in The Land Act Case I. The fvst enactment, the Church
Property Act, provides for grants of State property to churches.251With regard to such a statute, The Land Act Case Ps
248. See discussion supra part 1I.G (discussing Council's standards for procedures
surrounding the death penalty and Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Court H.R.
(ser. A) at 23 (1989)).
249. See The Land Act Case I, supra note 49.
250. See supra part 1II.F (discussing how opinion was responsive to factors
inhibiting foreign businesses from (1) making long-term investments because of the
possibility of future nationalization efforts and (2) investing in properties targeted
by Smallholders Party for reprivatization).
251.
The majority of elementary schools and large numbers of university dormitories will be returned to religious groups. The Act provides the churches with ten
years to establish a "social function." Although this Act ostensibly facilitates the
development of civil society, the pervasive role of State support actually stunts
such development. See Arato, supra note 217.
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principles set forth the following rules: (1) the churches have
no inherent right to any State property even though the State
acquired property from the churches through nationalization;
and therefore (2) the creation of entitlements on behalf of
churches discriminates against other private organizations,
unless Parliament can show that the goal of the statute is the
pursuit of "a more favorable total social result." The Act superficially attempts t o comply with The Land Act Case I's requirement that such a discriminatory entitlement scheme have "a
more favorable total social result." Under the terms of the Act,
the churches receive the property rights to facilitate their fulfillment of a forward-looking "social function," rather than
exclusively as restitution for the communist confiscations. Putting aside the issue of churchlstate ~eparation:~' the "social
function" objective would probably enable the Act to survive
deferential, post-Lochner equal protection type scrutiny.253
However, The Land Act Case I implies that more than simply a
superficial reference to the present and future general welfare
is necessary to satisfy the "more favorable social result requirement."25" In addition, The Land Act Case I stresses that
The "social
"underinclusive" justifications are unac~eptable.'~~
function" objective appears to be underinclusive, because Parliament failed to consider that the creation of equivalent
entitlements on behalf of secular organizations would also
fulfill a "social function." The Court has yet to review the
Church Property Act, even though it has been subject to popular criticism.
The other two enactments are revised plans t o compensate
pre-nationalization property owners. The revisions respond to
252.
The churches function separately from the State in the Republic of Hungary. A MAGYAR
KOZTARSASAGALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. XII, art. 60(3) (Hung.).
253. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday
closing laws against equal protection challenge because closing businesses on Sunday serves a beneficial social function as well as a religious function); cf.
LAURENCE
H. TRIBE,AMERICAN
CON~TITWIONAL
LAW 1223 n.61 (2d ed. 1988) ("If
the society decides that all enterprises whose dominant purpose is charitable . . .
should be granted an exemption [from having to pay taxes] for all their activities,
there seems no strong reason to withhold such beneficial treatment from charitable
institutions which are religious in character.").
254.
The President of the Court indicated, with regard to the Church Property
Act, that the Land Act Case I had not been studied by Parliament in its context.
S6lyom, supra note 25, at 41; see also supra text accompanying notes 184-86
(discussing level of scrutiny).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 166, 184-86.
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minor constitutional issues, but still violate the equal protection clause and takings 'clause principles discussed in Part 111.
Any attempt by backers of these compensation statutes to limit
the Court's power is unlikely, because the ruling coalition lacks
the two-thirds majority necessary to amend either the ACC or
the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court has exhibited signs of
appeasing the ruling coalition on the compensation issue. In
April 1991, the opposition Alliance of Free Democrats petitioned the Court to review the proposed Land Act I1 before its
passage. As described in Part II.C.2, the Court denied jurisdiction. The development of a justiciability limitation in that case
may have been not only an attempt to limit the burden of the
Court's large docket:"
but also a sign of deference to the political branches on a delicate topic. In May 1991, Parliament
passed the Land Act 11. On June 3, 1991, the Court struck it
down. In contrast with The Land Act Case Ps unanimous declaration of the fundamental constitutional problems with compensation schemes, the most recent opinion focused only on
minor issues. Only one concurring opinion restated the foundational principles discussed in Part III.257
See supra part 1I.C (justiciability restrictions are a response to large dock-

256.

et).
257.

See m e Land Act Case III, supra note 63 (Voros, J., concurring).
Act Case III responded to the six questions set forth in the petition

The Land

of President Arpad Goncz. Both the Court and President Arpad Goncz's SZDSZ,
which is a strong supporter of the institution of judicial review, may have focused
on the six minor issues so that the Court could strike down the Act without
putting itself into fundamental conflict with the compensation concept and the
ruling parliamentary coalition. The explanation for such a desire would be the
avoidance of criticism of judicial review by the ruling coalition. In addition, the
limited scope of The Land Act Case III prevents the leader of the ruling coalition,
the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), from delegating responsibility for a
difficult political decision to the Constitutional Court. Taking into account public
opinion and sound economic policy advice, the MDF would probably prefer to
withdraw its support for the compensation concept. Nevertheless, MDF is bound t o
maintain its support for compensation because of the demands of its coalition
partner, the Smallholders Party. If the Court had pressed the issue of discrimination against NFO's, see supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining term
%on-former owner" or WFO" and how Land Act's provisions discriminated against
NFO's), and thereby had declared the compensation concept fundamentally unconstitutional, then the Court would have done MDF's dirty work. Both the Court and
SZDSZ would prefer to have compensation ultimately defeated in the political
arena to preserve the Court's political capital. In addition, the limited holding is in
SZDSZ's interest because it increases the likelihood that either the MDF-Smallholders coalition will collapse or the MDF will be associated with an unpopular bill.
In response to the six questions in President Arpad Goncz's petition, the Court
held that (1) the limitation of compensation to those who lost property after 1949
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On June 26,1991, the ruling coalition passed the Land Act
111. The statute attempted to respond to the most recent holding but made no attempt to remedy discrimination against
NFO's (non-former owners).268On June 28, 1991, the Socialist Party announced the commencement of a campaign to initiate a referendum to block the enforcement of the Land Act 111.
The signatures of 100,000 citizens is necessary to initiate a
referendum. If over fiRy percent of the population participates
in the balloting, the results of the referendum vote become as
binding as a Court holding.
The drawn out referendum process has similarities to the
democratic republican vision of movements to amend the constitution, a process "through which mobilized masses of ordinary citizens finally organize their political will with suEcient
clarity to lay down the law to those who speak in their name
on a daily basis in"2" the national legislature. The fact that
the referendum process can fulfill a role parallel to that of judicial review is revealing as to the democratic republican ideals
of judicial review. But the decision of opponents of the Land
Act I11 to turn to the referendum process to enforce the communal consensus, rather than simply to petition the Court, is an
indication of a lack of confidence in the capacity of judicial
review and constitutional law to enforce the communal consensus. The Court's o w . recent passivity in the last two Land Act
Cases may be responsible for that dearth of confidence. Future
developments in the compensation scheme controversy and
is not inherently unconstitutional, (2) but the Compensation Act violates the
Constitution due to its failure to provide either (a) a "constitutional reason" for the
plan's exclusion of those who lost property as a result of pre-1949 confiscations,
such as those directed at Germans in 1945 and at Jews in 1939, or (b) an outline
of plans to compensate PI-e-1949 victims; (3) the limitation of compensation to
victims of financial and material losses is constitutional; (4) the Act violates the
Constitution's equal protection clause by ensuring that at least 94% of former land
owners will receive full compensation, while only providing partial compensation to
former owners of other types of property; (5) the Act violates the constitutional
rights of local governments by ordering property under local control to be turned
over to former owners; and (6) the Constitution permits Parliament to create
coupons exchangeable for shares of property currently under the control of agricultural cooperatives. For a more detailed critique of the politics and reasoning behind
the recent decision, see Ethan Klingsberg, Hungary: The Constitutional Pditics of
Compensation, 2 SOW AM) EAST EUROPEANLAW 1 (June 1991) (published by
Columbia Law School's Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law).
258.
See supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining term %on-former
owner" or W O " and how Land A d s provisions discriminated against NFO's).
259.
Ackerman, supra note 6, at 475.
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other upcoming events, such as the possible adoption of a new
Constitution and parliamentary elections, will further clarifs
the nature of the Court's authority?"

This Article should enable readers to understand better the
bases for the authority of constitutional courts. The various
procedures and circumstances which make the Hungarian
Court's power possible have been reviewed. Moreover, the ramifications of the policy and philosophical choices available in the
critical constitutional matters confronting the post-communist
regimes are now clarified. Most importantly, investigations
such as this into the sociological underpinnings of judicial review demonstrate that despite the circuity of the connections
between an institution exercising judicial review and the populace, those connections can be meaningful.
This last realization is particularly important with respect
to Eastern Europe where cynicism about the legitimacy of the
new constitutionalism is widespread?' While Hungarian legal thinkers appear willing to take refuge in natural l a d B 2as
a basis for the new constitutional law and judicial review, those
same thinkers continue to question the legitimacy of the new
constitutional system through reference to the criteria of democratic republican theory.26s To an extent, this natural
law/majoritarianism schizophrenia haunts all serious probes
into the foundation of judicial review. But in Eastern Europe,
the ambivalence has a special sigmficance.
Most of the dissidents under communism relied upon natural law, because it enabled them to justify radical positions
that lacked the support of either a symbol of authority or mass
p ~ p u l a r i t y .NOW
~ ~ that those dissidents possess the seats of
260. The referendum initiative failed to materialize. The Court has received
thirty petitions challenging the constitutionality of the most recent compensation
statute, but has yet to issue a decision. Letter from Dr. Gabor Halmai, Chief Clerk
to President S6lyom of the Constitutional Court, to Ethan Klingsberg (Dec. 20,
1991).
261. See supra note 16.
262. HLA. Hart explains the classical underpinning of "Natural Law: that there
are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with
which man-made law must conform if it is to be valid." HART, supra note 133, at
182.
263. See supra note 16.
264. The Solidarity movement is an exception. Solidarity had the authority of an
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power and their stances are becoming enshrined in law, the
need to appeal to higher law is no longer ne~essary.~"But
these new leaders realize that a transition from communism is
not successful simply because certain higher principles have
become the law of the land. The change from communism to
democracy requires the development of a new type of citizenry.
New participatory muscles will have to be used by the masses.
If the directions of the new regime are ultimately dictated by
the higher law visions of an elite group of law professors serving on the Constitutional Court, then the development of those
new muscles will be fhtile. Fear of such a scenario is why the
former dissidents still question the legitimacy of the new constitutional system, despite its substantive consistency with
their beliefs. This Article responds to their concerns by showing
that there is a connection between the Court and the public.
Many characteristics of the public's input indicate that the
citizenry is not taking full advantage of its potential for influencing the Court. For example, the popular desire to imitate
the West, as well as the current expectations of precedent and
the adjudicatory process, indicate citizens' willingness to abstain from development of particularistic views and to invest
the Court with a large degree of discretion. But the important
factor is that the connection between the Court and the public
exists. The rest can be left to the evolution of a more educated

independent hierarchy and large demonstrations for most of the 1980s. In Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, the situation was much different. Opposition was
often not manifested. Dissent passively existed only in the minds of individuals.
Consequently, dissidents lacked even "underground" authority. As late as 1985,
most Hungarian citizens refused even to indicate dissatisfaction with the State in
anonymous surveys. See Hankiss, supra note 157, at 49-51 (Hankiss attributes
"radical, though contradictory, changes" in responses to similar surveys conducted
in 1985 and 1989 Yto the fact that people are now, in 1989, . . . less constrained
to show themselves loyal to the system and its institutions; . . . [there is a] newly
acquired courage . . . ."). This is why social science analysts generally misjudged
Eastern Europe. As late as 1988, few social scientists thought the populace of
communist nations, other than Poland, had any impetus to support profound
changes. Only observers like Timothy Garton Ash, who took a more journalistic,
first-hand approach, were able to perceive that the masses were ready to give
active support to alternative regimes. See, e.g., Timothy Garton Ash, Prague-A
Poem Not Disappearing, in VACLAVHAVEL:LIVINGIN TRUTH213-21 (Jan Vladislav
ed., 1986).
265. See supra Part III.B & 1II.C (discussing JOHN
M. FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW
AND NATURAL
RIGHTS(under most circumstances, mature minds of practical reason
look to the law that is in force as the embodiment of "natural law," as described
in note 262)).
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and activated citizenry. Moreover, the cynicism of new leaders
and domestic commentators is a positive sign, because it shows
that they are truly dedicated to democracy and will not settle
for an era founded solely on natural law.

